The subject we are now upon, is felt and confessed by us all to be of the utmost consequence, and perhaps I may also say, of

   As the deliberation arises from a message sent to us by Lord Howe, at least by his permission, I think it is of importance to attend with greater exactness to all the circumstances of that message, than has been done by any gentleman who has yet spoken on the subject. It comes from the commander in chief of the forces of the king of Great Britain, and one who is said to carry a commission to give peace to America.

   From the conduct of the ministry at home, from the acts of parliament, and from Lord Howe's proclamation in conformity to both, it is plain, that absolute unconditional submission is what they require us to agree to, or mean to force us to. And from the most authentic private intelligence, the king has not laid aside his personal rancour; it is rather increasing every day. In these circumstances, Lord Howe has evidently a great desire to engage us in a treaty; and yet he has constantly avoided giving up the least punctilio on his side. He could never be induced to give General Washington his title. He plainly tells us he cannot treat with Congress as such; but he has allowed a prisoner of war to come and tell us he would be glad to see us as private gentlemen.

   It has been said that this is no insult or disgrace to the Congress; that the point of honour is hard to be got over, in making the first advances. This, Sir, is mistaking the matter wholly. He has got over this point of honour; he has made the first overtures; he has told General Washington, by Colonel Putnam, that he wished that message to be considered as making the first step. His renewed attempts by Lord Drummond, and now by General Sullivan, point out to all the world that he has made the first step.(2) It will doubtless be related at home, and I am of opinion it is already written and boasted of to the ministry at home, that he has taken such a part. Therefore, any evil or condescension that can attend seeking peace first, has been submitted to by him. Yet has he uniformly avoided any circumstance that can imply that we are anything else but subjects of the king of Great Britain, in rebellion. Such a message as this, if in any degree intended as respectful to us, ought to have been secret; yet has it been open as the day. In short, such a message was unnecessary; for if he meant only to communicate his mind to the Congress by private gentlemen, he might have done that many ways, and it needed not to have been known either to

   Lord Howe speaks of a decisive blow not being yet struck; as if this cause depended upon one battle, which could not be avoided. Sir, this is a prodigious mistake. We may fight no battle at all for a long time, or we may lose some battles, as was the case with the British themselves in the Scotch rebellion of 1745, and the cause notwithstanding be the same. I wish it were considered, that neither loss nor disgrace worth mentioning, has befallen us in the late engagement, nor comparable to what the British troops have often suffered. At the battle of Preston, Sir, they broke to pieces, and ran away like sheep, before a few highlanders. I myself saw them do the same thing at Falkirk, with very little difference, a small part only of the army making a stand, and in a few hours the whole retreating with precipitation before their enemies. Did that make any difference in the cause? Not in the least-so long as the body of the nation were determined, on principle, against the rebels. Nor would it have made any other difference, but in time, though they had got possession of London, which they might have easily done if they had understood their business; for the militia in England there gathered together, behaved fifty times worse than that of

   America has done lately. They generally disbanded and ran off wholly as soon as the rebels came within ten or twenty miles of them. In short, Sir, from any thing that has happened, I see not the least reason for our attending to this delusive message. On the contrary, I think it is the very worst time that could be chosen for us; as it will be looked upon as the effect of fear, and diffuse the same spirit, in some degree, through different ranks of men.

   The improbability of any thing arising from this conference, leading to a just and honourable peace, might be shewn by arguments too numerous to be even so much as named. But what I shall only mention is, that we are absolutely certain, from every circumstance, from all the proceedings at home, and Lord Howe's own explicit declaration in his letter to Dr Franklin, that he never will acknowledge the independence of the American States.(3)

   I observed that one or two members said, in objection to the report of the board of war, that it was like a begging of the question, and making a preliminary of the whole subject in debate. Alas, Sir, this is a prodigious mistake. It was not only not the whole, but it was properly no subject of debate at all, till within these three months. We were contending for the restoration of certain privileges under the government of Great Britain, and we were praying for re-union with her. But in the beginning of July, with the universal approbation of all the states now united, we renounced this connection, and declared ourselves free and independent. Shall we bring this into question again? Is it not a preliminary? has it not been declared a preliminary by many gentlemen, who have yet given their opinion for a conference, while they have said they were determined on no account, and on no condition, to give up our independence? It is then a necessary preliminary-and it is quite a different thing from any punctilios of ceremony. If France and England were at war, and they were both desirous of peace, there might be some little difficulty as to who should make the first proposals; but if one of them should claim the other, as they did long ago, as a vassal or dependent subject, and should signify a desire to converse with the other, or some deputed by him, and propose him many privileges, so as to make him even better than before, I desire to know how such a proposal would be received? If we had been for ages an independent republic, we should feel this argument with all its force. That we do not feel it, shews that we have not yet acquired the whole ideas and habits of independence; from which I only infer, that every step taken in a correspondence as now proposed, will be a virtual or partial renunciation of that dignity so lately acquired.

   I beg you would observe, Sir, that Lord Howe himself was fully sensible that the declaration of independence precluded any treaty, in the character in which he appeared; as he is said to have lamented

   But, Sir, many members of this house have either yielded, or at least supposed, that no desirable peace, or no real good, could be finally expected from this correspondence, which is wished to be set on foot; but they have considered it as necessary in the eye of the public, to satisfy them that we are always ready to hear any thing that will restore peace to the country. In this view it is considered as a sort of trial of skill between Lord Howe and us, in the political art. As I do truly believe, that many members of this house are determined by this circumstance, I shall consider it with some attention. With this view it will be necessary to distinguish the public in America into three great classes. 1. The tories, our secret enemies. 2. The whigs, the friends of independence, our sincere and hearty supporters. 3. The army, who must fight for us.

   As to the first of them, I readily admit that they are earnest for our treating. They are exulting in the prospect of it; they are spreading innumerable lies to forward it. They are treating the whigs already with insult and insolence upon it. It has brought them from their lurking holes: they have taken liberty to say things in consequence of it, which they durst not have said before. In one word, if we set this negotiation on foot, it will give new force and vigour to all their seditious machinations. But, Sir, shall their devices have any influence upon us at all? If they have at all, it should be to make us suspect that side of the question which they embrace. In cases where the expediency of a measure is doubtful, if I had an opportunity of knowing what my enemies wished me to do, I would not be easily induced to follow their advice.

   As to the whigs and friends of independence, I am well persuaded that multitudes of them are already clear in their minds, that the conference should be utterly rejected; and to those who are in doubt about its nature, nothing more will be requisite, than a clear and full information of the state of the case, which I hope will be granted them.

   As to the army, I cannot help being of opinion, that nothing will more effectually deaden the operations of war, than what is proposed. We do not ourselves expect any benefit from it, but they will. And they will possibly impute our conduct to fear and jealousy as to