I now sit down agreeably to Your Request to recollect & commit to writing the Circumstances most worthy of Notice at the Time of Congress agreeing to the final Instructions to our Commissioners for negotiating Peace (2)-And to point out the Views which seemed to me chiefly to have governed that Body & induced them to direct our Commissioners to be ultimately guided by the Opinion &Judgement of the Court of France.

   It will not be improper to permit some short Remarks upon the State of things from the Beginning of the War both before & after the French Alliance.

   It was from the first Appearance of Things coming to Extremities admitted by all that the cheif if not the only Quarter from which we were to look for foreign Aid was France. As also that Foreign Aid was necessary that is to say that unless we had foreign Aid we could not expect to establish our Independence but after many years of suffering-a depopulated Country & deluge of Blood-& that most probably some of the States themselves might have been lost.

   I do not remember any Difference of Opinion worth mentioning upon either of these two Points. Therefore our Views were directed to France. There was a much greater Difference of Opinion whether we should offer an Alliance to any other Power.

   When Application was made to France that Court proceded with the utmost Caution. It was easy however from the whole Intercourse to perceive two things (1) That both The Court & Nation of France were very desirous that we should be supported & succeed (2) That at the same Time they were exceedingly doubtful whether it was safe for them to involve themselves much with us or openly to take our Part.

   This Backwardness arose plainly from two different Causes which seemed to have almost equal Influence (1) Jealousy of us least we should not adhere to our Resolutions but draw back & make Peace with England (2) A necessary Fear of the Power of England and particular its Naval Force. They have hardly even yet been wholly free of either of these apprehensions.

   The Affairs of the United States were never in a more critical situation than in December 1776 when Congress went to Baltimore-there never was a greater need for or greater Anxiety to obtain foreign Aid. The Number that attended Congress then was small but their Measures were decided & I believe judicious. I do not remember one Word of Despondency to have fallen from any Member or the most distant hint of a Desire to draw back & make submission to England. But the Means of persuading France to [in]terpose effectually was the great Subject of Deliberation & Discussion.

   At that Time there was a Letter or Letters mentioned from a P[er]son in France which intimated that we should make Propositions to France to induce them to support us in an effectual Manner & since this Sentiment was Spoke of coming from that Quarter that if we could put France in the Place of England they would certainly protect us. This came from no official Persons nor was directed to any official Body nor had we any Reason to suppose that it was done at the Suggestion of the Court of France. I do not believe it was. The Proposition was not worthy of being taken into Consideration.

   There were however several Persons in Congress who reasoned in this Manner. It is plain we cannot be supported without foreign Aid. There is no Place to which we can apply with Probability of Success but France. We know she is disposed to assist us but We have been given no Sufficient Inducement to that Power to interpose. We have offered nothing to France but what we have offered to every other Nation. The Proposals mentioned were to offer France an exclusive Trade with the united States for a limited Time-or to offer them an exclusive Trade in some particular Articles-or to offer them a Distinction from other Nations in form of Freedom from Imposts &c.

   After a very deliberate & accurate Discussion it was the Opinion of a very considerable Majority of Congress to make no such Proposals. That they were contrary to the very Spirit of our undertaking-that if we were to be independent we could be independent of all the World-That to separate the united States from England was an

   Object of itself sufficiently interesting to France-That it did not appear from any Communications made to our Commissioners that the Court of France desired any such Preferences but that their slowness & Caution arose from other Causes.

   Therefore Congress sent the most solemn Assurances that we never would [give] up or in the least Degree recede from the Declaration of Independence. Soon after this Instructions were given to our Commissioners to propose to the Court of France that if they would enter into the War with us we would assist to the utmost of our Power in the conquest of the West Indies by furnishing Provisions & Stores for the Fleets & Armies of the King of France & by any other Way in our Power and that all such Conquests should remain with France. One of the Copies of these Instructions was taken on the Passage, published in London, republished in Charlestown S. Carolina & from these Papers published in Philadelphia yet neither Friends nor Enemies discerned or suspected from them the nature of the important Debate which had preceded them.

   Soon after the Capture of Burgoyne the Court of France came to a determined Resolution to support us vigorously. The first Authentic assurance of this was contained in letters from our Commissioners of date Dec 16, 1777 & reached us about the last of January 1778 though the Treaty was not subscribed till the 6th of Feb. that year.

   It is easy to see from the Treaty itself that the french Court was still somewhat apprehensive of the Issue for they put in the 8th Article that they were not to lay down their Arms till the Independence of America shall have been formally or tacitly assured &c.

   In the Year 1779 When the first Proposal was made of attempting a Treaty of Peace under the Mediation of the Emperor & King of Spain Congress was called upon to consider & determine upon what Terms of Peace they would be willing to accept at the same time to be prepared for War. At that Time in a very large & full Conference with M. Gerard the french Minister he particularly & strongly recommended to Congress not to be too high in their Demands & indeed discovered an Apprehension that we might mar the Treaty by being so. Probably this might be occasioned or augmented by rash publications at that Time insisting that we ought not to make Peace with out having Canada, Florida & Nova Scotia ceded to us. The Minister took great Pains to represent to Congress that much would depend upon the Opinion the mediating Powers might form of our Temper & Disposition & that it was plain England took all public Pains to represent us as an ambitious People that wanted to extend their Bounds & would be dangerous to other Nations. In this Conference also he told us that the Events of War are uncertain, that therefore we ought not to be too confident & particularly he used this Expression that it was hard to say what might be the Effect of a decisive Victory at Sea. If Rodney's victory

   From this state of Things & all that followed I am convinced that nothing could be more false than the Supposition of some Persons that France wanted the War to continue for the Purposes of Ambition & the greater Humiliation of her Enemy. On the Contrary France always discovered a Desire to have the War terminated & listened to any Proposal for this Purpose perhaps prompted or suggested the Offers of Mediation from Spain, the Emperor & Russia. This was the natural Consequence of the two Causes above assigned for her slowness & Caution in entering upon the War.

   Mr John Adams was chosen for the Purpose & the Commission for negotiating a Peace with great Britain was given to him alone. The Instructions at first sent to him contained a Description of our Claims as to Territory & made the following particulars essentially necessary to our making Peace. The Extension of our Bounds to the 45 Degree of Latitude North & to the Mississippi westward-The right of fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland-And a free Navigation of the Mississippi to the Mouth.

   When Mr Adams was in France he thought it best to intimate to the Court of England as from himself that he had a Commission for negotiating Peace. The Court of France was of Opinion that that Time was not proper that things were not sufficiently ripe for it & that no such separate Intimation should be made & that it might encourage England in the Expectation of Engaging in a separate Treaty with America & dividing the Allies, a thing which they earnestly desired & made repeated attempts to accomplish. In a Correspondence between Mr Adams & the D. de Vergennes on this subject & also on the Subject of the Act of Congress of the 18th of March 80-estimating the continental Money at 40 for 1, Mr Adams maintained his Opinions with a Tenaciousness which gave great Offence to the Court of France & indeed such was the Manner of his writing upon these Subjects that he was finally forbid to continue it by an express order de par le roi.

   In the year 1781 Congress entered upon the Reconsideration of the Instructions (3) formerly sent to Mr Adams particularly the making essential Conditions of the extensive boundary, of the fishing on Newfoundland & the free Navigation of the Mississippi. The last of these we heard from our Ministers was very disagreeable to the Court of Spain another viz the fishery not very agreeable to the Court of France who had not this Right by Treaty themselves, & the other We had Reason to suspect that the English might be very tenacious upon nor did we know what might be the Sentiments of the Mediating Powers or the P[owers] of Europe in general as to our Right or the Expediency of our having such extensive Dominions. It was also to be considered that as none of these particulars was specified in the Alliance with

   France the Question was necessarily reduced to this Form whether though France should not support us in these Claims we would continue the War ourselves unless they were granted.

   In this Situation after much & long discussion it was at last resolved as to all the three to depart from making them absolute & essential Conditions least at our Distance it should be a Bar to an otherwise honorable Peace. The Spirit therefore of the final Instructions was that the former should still serve to shew what we wished & thought we ought to Obtain but from a Desire of Peace we left it to our Ministers in Conjunction with our Allies to do what Circumstances should discover to be wisest upon the whole. When these Matters were transacting the Minister of France often intimated both to Committees in Conference with him & to particular Members of Congress that it would be highly agreeable to his Court that Congress should leave nothing as general or undetermined but say expressly upon every particular what they would & what they would not yield. It could not easily be known with Certainty whether this arose chiefly or only from their Jealousy of Mr Adams or whether they preferred upon the whole that as little should be left discretionary as possible least blame should be laid upon themselves.

   It was however my plan that this could not be complied with. To have been specific upon every Point & to have brought the States generally to agree upon them as to what might & what could not be given up would have required much more Time than could be allowed by the State of Affairs & probably it never could have been or with Cordiality & Unanimity at all. Besides these are some of the particulars that it was clearly impossible to be absolute & explicit upon for example as to Boundary. How could it be said that it is the Interest of the United States to contract their Boundaries to the westward 100 miles in order to have other Points secured but no Necessity or Advantage as sufficient to make them come in 200 miles. How could the Congress judge of the Sentiments of the Public upon such Matters so as to be peremptory & to make a Demand at the Risk of our Independence or our very Existance. Therefore it was without much Difficulty agreed to continue the Instructions in the general & discretionary Form.

   When the Instructions were therefore agreed upon Communications were made of them to the Minister of France & the Directions were given in the same Manner as always had been done to our Minister to make the most free & candid Communications of all his Proceedings to the Court of France & to avail himself of the assistance, friendship & Influence of that Court in all his Transactions. Then a Difficulty arose which was trying indeed, it appeared that this was not sufficient in the present Instance. The Minister read to the Committee the Letters of the D de Vergennes upon the Subject of Mr Adams

   When this Matter was reported to Congress a very serious Deliberation was taken upon it. What Mr Adams had done by which he had incurred the Displeasure of the Ministers of the King of France had been undoubtedly from his Zeal & Attachment to the Interest & honor of the united States. His Ability & his unshaken Fidelity was well known. In such a Case to displace a Minister merely because he had given umbrage to some at the Court where he resided by an excess of well Meant Zeal seemed to be a most pernicious Example & probably would have the worst Effects upon succeeding ministers & therefore ought not to be done. The Writer of this Memorial of Facts in particular was clearly of Opinion that Mr Adams judged wrong in both the Points which he contested in his Correspondence with the D. de Vergennes the Reasons for which need not now be mentioned. Yet he was as clearly of Opinion to sacrifice a Minister of unquestionable Integrity ought not on any Acct to be submitted to merely because he had more Zeal than good Manners & therefore it was proposed that a Clause should be added to the Instructions to this purpose and that he should do nothing without the Consent C approbation of the Court of France.

   Another Committee was appointed to confer with the Minister & made this Communication. But in Conference this also was in his Opinion insufficient. He repeated the Fears they had of Difficulties with Mr Adams & insisted that by this New Clause he was only bound negatively that he could not indeed do any Thing without the Consent of the Court of France but he might obstruct every Measure & unless he were perfectly satisfied effectually prevent any Thing being done.

   When this was repeated to Congress the Matter appeared exceedingly delicate & difficult. It was discussed at great Length. All the Objections against removing Mr Adams remained in their full force. But on the other it appeared humiliating at least if not dangerous to deliver ourselves up entirely to the Court of France. However after full Deliberation it was agreed by the Majority in Congress to add to the Instruction that he should be ultimately guided by the Opinion & Judgement of the Court of France.

   As This particular Resolution appeared so dubious to several Worthy Members of Congress & there were so many Attempts to reconsider

   It was plain that from the first Rise of the Controversy we had been greatly indebted to the Court of France. They had interposed effectually & Seasonably in our Cause. They had exerted themselves with much Vigor & Free[dom &] put themselves to a very great Expense upon our Acct. At the very Time when this Debate was agitated our most necessary Expenses were supported by them & even the Subsistence & Support of many Delegates in Congress was from Bills drawn upon France. We had accustomed ourselves & many public & Authentic Acts to call the K of France our great & generous Ally. Perhaps there were as humiliating Expressions on many of the public Acts & proceedings of Congress as could be in this Resolution which might well be considered as the effect of grateful & generous Sentiments.

   FC (DLC: Witherspoon Papers). In the hand of John Witherspoon.