It may be said, that with whatever powers I was originally vested to negociate an Exchange, the Resolution of the 19th Decr. last was an Abridgement of them, so far as to annex a new Condition; the Settlement and Payment of Accounts previous to it's taking place. I had no Conception of this being the Case, in the present Instance. However the Letter may warrant the Construction. Besides, the common Principle of preventing the Inconveniences, necessarily resulting from allowing the Enemy to make their Payments in paper Currency, I had reason to imagine, that General Burgoyne's Army was more particularly the Object of the concluding Clause. This Interpretation I the more readily adopted; for, exclusive of the Affairs of that Army, I verily believed, that from the confused, defective State of our Accounts relating to Prisoners, there would be a considerable Ballance in favor of Mr. Howe. Nor was the Situation of our Accounts the only Reason for this Belief. The Prisoners in our Hands, especially those Westward of the Delaware, as I am informed, have been in a great measure supported by their own Labor and at the Expence of the Enemy, who have had Agents constantly among us. If this is the Case, the Reason of the Resolve not applying, the Effect ought not of Course.

    But perhaps it may be thought contrary to our Interest to go into an Exchange, as the Enemy would derive more immediate Advantage from it, than we should. This I shall not deny; but it appeared to me, that on Principles of genuine extensive Policy, independant of the Considerations of Compassion and Justice, we were under an Obligation not to elude it. I have the best Evidence, that an Event of this Kind is the general Wish of the Country. I know it to be the Wish of the Army, and no one can doubt, that it is the ardent Wish of the unhappy Sufferers themselves. We need only consult the Tide of Humanity and the Sympathies natural to those connected by the Cements of Blood, Interest and a common Dread of Evil, to be convinced, that the prevailing Current of Sentiment demands an Exchange. If the Country, the Army, and even the Prisoners themselves, had a precise Idea of our Circumstances, and could be fully sensible of the Disadvantages, that might attend the giving our Enemy a considerable Reinforcement, without having an Equivalent, they might perhaps be willing to make a Sacrifice of their Feelings to the motives of Policy. But they have not this Knowledge, and cannot be intrusted with it, and their Reasonings of Necessity will be governed by what they feel.

    Were an Opinion once to be established, and the Enemy and their Emissaries know very well how to inculcate it, if they are furnished with a plausible Pretext, that we designedly avoided an Exchange, it would be a Cause of Dissatisfaction and Disgust to the Country and to the Army; of Resentment and Desperation to our captive Officers and Soldiers. To say nothing of the Importance of not hazarding our national Character, but upon the most solid Grounds, especially in our Embryo-state, from the Influence it may have on our Affairs abroad; it may not be a little dangerous, to beget in the minds of our own Countrymen, a Suspicion that we do not pay the strictest Observance to the Maxims of Honor and good Faith. It is prudent to use the greatest Caution, not to shock the Notions of general Justice and Humanity, universal among Mankind, as well in a public as a private View: in a Business, on the side of which the Passions are so much concerned as in the Present, Men would be readily disposed to believe the worst and cherish the most unfavourable Conclusions. Were the Letters that have passed between General Howe and myself from first to last and the Proceedings of Congress on the same Subject, to be published with proper Comments, it is much to be feared, if the Exchange should be deferred till the Terms of the last Resolve were fulfilled, that it would be difficult to prevent our being generally accused with a Breach of good Faith. Perhaps it might be said, that while the Enemy refused us Justice, we fondly embraced the Opportunity to be loud, persevering, incessant in our Claims; but the Moment they were willing to render it, we receded from ourselves and started new Difficulties. This I say, might be the Reasoning of speculative Minds, and they might consider all our Professions, as mere Professions, or at best, that Interest and Policy were to be the only Arbiters of their Validity.

    Imputations of this Nature, would have a tendency to unnerve our Operations, by diminishing that Respect and Confidence, which are essential to be placed in those who are at the Head of Affairs, either in the civil or military Line. This, added to the Prospect of hopeless Captivity would be a great Discouragement to the Service. The ill Consequences of both would be immense, by increasing the Causes of Discontent in the Army, which are already too numerous, and many of which are in a great measure unavoidable, by fortifying that unwillingness, which already appears too great, towards entering into the Service, and of Course impeding the progress both of drafting and recruiting, by dejecting the Courage of the Soldiery from an Apprehension of the Horrors of Captivity, and finally by reducing those, whose Lot it is to drink the bitter Cup, to a Despair, which can only find Relief by renouncing their Attachments and engaging with their Captors. These Effects have already been experienced in part from the Obstacles that have hitherto lain in the Way of Exchanges; but if these Obstacles were once to seem the Result of System, they would become tenfold. Nothing has operated more disagreeably upon the Minds of the Militia, than the Fear of Captivity on the Footing it has heretofore stood. What would be their Reasonings, if it should be thought to stand upon a worse.