| Volume Thirty-Seven | 1995 | |
Notes for "The Pressures of PATCO"
1. R. Magnuson et al., "Turbulence in the Tower," Time, 8/17/81, p. 17; Arthur Shostak and David Skocik, The Air Controllers' Controversy: Lessons from the PATCO Strike (NY: Human Sciences Press, 1986), p. 68.
2. The importance of ATCs to public safety and their position as federal employees led to numerous congressional hearings in which air controllers voiced their concerns. Government organizations, FAA-commissioned panels, and PATCO also conducted detailed studies and surveys of the air traffic control workforce, compiling rich sources of data from which it is possible to elicit the views of air controllers and management.
3. Ronald Howard, Brave New Workplace (NY: Viking, 1985), p. 7. See, for instance, Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (NY: Basic Books, 1984).
4. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Stephen Wood et al, The Degradation of Work? (London: Hutchinson, 1982), pp. 13-14.
5. See David Noble, Forces of Production (NY: Knopf, 1984); Harley Shaiken, Work Transformed (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985); Barbara Garson, The Electronic Sweatshop (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Howard, Brave New Workplace.
6. Hearings 1983-1984, p. 1372; Shostak, p. 138.
10. Shostak, p. 98. It is worth noting that at the same time that the FAA refused to employ more ATCs to handle the growing volume of air traffic, the number of FAA managers hired increased considerably.
11. Howell Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), p. 27.
13. Hoo-min D. Toong and Amar Gupta, "Automating Air-Traffic Control," Technology Review, April 1982, p. 54.
14. Robert Wesson et al., ÒScenarios for Evolution of Air Traffic ControlÓ (Monograph, Rand, R-2698- FAA, November 1981), p. 2.
15. The FAA was in all likelihood probably not purposefully risking the safety of air travel, but instead used rationalizations to deny this effect and justify their efforts to maintain their authority such as asserting that the ATC system had been overstaffed before the strike and so there was no need to hire additional workers.
16. U. S. Congress, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Rebuilding of the Nation's Air Traffic Control System (Has Safety Taken a Back Seat to Expediency?) (Washington: U.S. Government, 1985), pp. 55-56
20. Stanley Aronowitz, Working Class Hero (NY: Adena Books, 1983), p. 68.
22. It should be noted that the average salary for controllers at the time of the strike was $31,000. Shostak, p. 114; David Morgan, "Terminal Flight: The Air Traffic Controllers' Strike of 1981," Journal of American Studies (August 1984), p. 175.
23. Hearings 1983-1984, pp. 222, 228, 259.
24. Hearings 1981, p. 190; David Bowers, "What Would Make 11,500 People Quit Their Jobs?," Organizational Dynamics (Winter 1983), p. 8.
25. Newsweek 8/17/81, p. 23; New York Times 8/4/81, p. A-1; Los Angeles Times 8/6/81, p. 1-1.
30. Phil Keisling, "Money Over What Really Mattered," Washington Monthly (September 1983), p. 16. Keisling went on to condemn the controllers as preoccupied with their own comfort and security and allowing economic interests to overwhelm legitimate ones such as too much traffic at peak hours.
32. Hearings 1981, pp. 524, 521.
33. Hearings 1983-1984, p. 459.
34. New York Times 8/6/81, p. D-21; Shostak, p. 96.
36. Several studies of the air traffic controllers have examined the personalities of the people making up the ATC workforce. The Rose Report, in particular, looked closely at psychological make-ups when it tried to determine the presence and cause of stress. It found that in general ATCs "are highly intelligent men who control their anxieties by meticulous compulsive behavior, men who--though they tend to be bold and dominant individuals by nature and have no great intrinsic respect either for authority or regulations--are nevertheless, as members of a closely working team, group conforming by necessity." (Hearings 1983- 1984, p. 968) The study also found that many controllers had an intense and chronic feeling of alienation from their FAA managers and hated the supervisory system. They believed the FAA would scapegoat them if anything went wrong, but, "as people who take pride in their job, they take pride in not being intimidated." (Shostak, p. 23) Indeed, many observers have pointed to the collective psychological profile of ATCs as a critical component in the decision to strike. A tendency to take action and a disdain for authority made a dramatic statement likely whereas another workforce might have opted for a different method of protest. Undoubtedly, the FAA's style of management and refusal to compromise or make changes aggravated the situation as well. The FAA's behavior during the contract negotiations was the final straw.
37. Hearings 1979, p. 250; Hearings 1981, p. 3.
39. Hearings 1980, pp. 24, 25.
40. Chicago Tribune 8/6/81, p. 1; New York Times 8/13/81, p A-1; Shostak, pp. 21-25.
44. Hearings 1989, pp. 11, 20.
50. Hearings 1989, p. 3. For a more recent look at the safety of air travel which is very critical of the FAA, see "How Safe Is This Flight?" Newsweek 4/24/95, pp. 18-28.
51. David Montgomery, Workers' Control In America (NY: Cambridge UP, 1979), p. 4.