Interpreting Political Violence in Islamic Philosophy
Mohammad Azadpur
San Francisco State University
Part 1
The tragic events of September the eleventh and the crisis in the Middle East
have simultaneously brought to the forefront of peoples minds so-called
Islamic terrorism and caused them to question its roots. "Terrorism,
according to Noam Chomsky, is not a difficult term to define.
In "The Evil Scourge of Terrorism," he refers to a "U.S. Army manual
[which] defines terrorism as 'the calculated use of violence or
threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious,
or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion,
or instilling fear.'"[1]
Chomsky clarifies this by reference to "a Pentagon-commissioned
study by noted terrorologist Robert Kupperman, which speaks of the
threat or use of force 'to achieve political objectives without
the full-scale commitment of resources.'"[2]
Chomsky's article is aimed at the problematic inclusiveness of the
definition of "terrorism," its propensity to encompass some of the
international engagements of the government of the United States.
In this essay, I am not interested in debating the range of the
various forms of terrorism, nor am I interested in exploring the
meaning of "Islamic terrorism," a label used to identify the activities
of radical Islamic factions who, for the sake of a political ideology,
engage in violent and destructive behavior towards the innocent.
Rather, I want to focus on a more basic issue: the relation between
Islamic political thought and political violence, a concept under
which terrorism is subsumed. More specifically, I am concerned with
the question whether, in the Islamic context, there is a necessary
internal connection between philosophical reflections on the nature
of the political life and the appeal to violence or the threat of
its use. It is my position that such a connection does not exist,
and that the ground for the appeal to politically motivated violence
in the Islamic context must be sought elsewhere.
My strategy for
arguing this is straightforward. I first
identify two main traditions in Islamic political philosophy whose focus is the
relation between the good life and political activity. No matter which of these traditions we
investigate, we find some philosophers who advocate violence and others who
condemn it. This demonstrates that there
is no logical or cultural axiom that forces an appeal to violence in the
context of Islamic political philosophy!
The reasons for the endorsement of violence become accessible when we
refrain from seeking a theoretical basis for it in Islamic thought and attend
to the specific historical contexts within which violence has been
endorsed. This conclusion has important
implications for the current discussions of "Islamic terrorism. " It means, essentially, that we have to search long
and hard for reasons to appeal to (and support) political violence in the
Islamic world and, moreover, our search must be directed at concrete
historical situations that might have occasioned violence. This essay will
conclude with some reflections on this direction of thought.
Part 2.
According to the
great scholar of Islamic thought, Louis Massignon, Islamic thought reconciles
Greek philosophy and Abrahamic monotheism.
At the outset of this discussion, however, I want to emphasize that the
Greeks and Muslims have quite a different conception of philosophy than the one
advocated by today's mainstream academic philosophers. Philosophy is, for them, not just a
theoretical examination of concepts of and arguments concerning the various
subjects of inquiry. It is, rather, a
way of life. In a treatise titled The Attainment of Happiness, Alfarabi
(Abū Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābi, 870-950 CE)
widely known as the second teacher (after Aristotle) and the founder of Islamic
political philosophy, distinguishes between true philosophy and that which is
counterfeit. He writes:
As for mutilated philosophy: the counterfeit philosopher, the vain philosopher,
or the false philosopher is the one who sets out to study the theoretical
sciences without being prepared for them. For he who sets out
to inquire ought to be innately equipped for the theoretical sciences
that is, fulfill the conditions prescribed by Plato in the Republic:
he should excel in comprehending and conceiving that which is essential
He should by natural disposition disdain the appetites, the dinar,
and like. He should be high-minded and avoid what is disgraceful
in people. He should be pious, yield easily to goodness and justice,
and be stubborn in yielding to evil and injustice. And he should
be strongly determined in favor of the right thing.[3]
The cultivation and improvement of
character therefore constitutes the centerpiece of Alfarabi's notion of true
philosophy. In contemporary
Anglo-American academic philosophy, it is merely an aspect of the
sub-discipline of ethics. For the Greeks
and the Muslims, the acquisition of virtue (Gr. arētē, Ar. fadl),
the perfection of character, paves the way for the intellectual labors of
theoretical inquiry. It allows the
individual to resist extraneous goals and distractions and attend to the
problems of thought and action. In the words of Alfarabi, a virtuous person
excels "in comprehending and conceiving that which is essential."[4]
Part 3.
In the Republic, Plato's Socrates portrays an ideal the virtuous or
just person as the philosopher-king: He is an individual whose
cultivated practical and theoretical sensibilities enable him to
be the ultimate lawgiver. In the ideal city, Plato's philosopher
is dragged from his solitary theoretical occupation into the work
of ruling the city, as he is the best person for legislating right
and wrong. His virtue enables him to maintain order in the city
for the sake of justice, which, in turn, enables the citizens to
actualize their potential for virtue. Early Islamic Peripatetics
or mashshā'ūn (e.g., Alfarabi), begin the process
of reconciling the Greek with the Islamic tradition by attaching
the quality of prophecy to the Greek ideal of the human individual.[5]
In other words, for them the ideal human being is not
just a philosopher and legislator (king); he is also a prophet (nabi).
This move (i.e., the addition of the quality of prophecy to the
ideals of philosophy and kingship) is aimed, in part, at bringing
the Greek ideal into closer correspondence with the Islamic exemplar,
Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet, according to the Islamic tradition,
has three basic attributes: walāyah (friendship/intimacy
with God), nubuwwah (prophecy), and risālah (conveying
the divine law).[6]
For the Islamic Peripatetics, the analogue to walāyah
is philosophy, since a philosopher's practical and theoretical excellence
brings him near the divine intellect.[7]
Nubuwwah, on the other hand, culminates in the
practice (tariqah) set forth by the Prophet so that through
its discipline the faithful can accomplish the ideal of intimacy
with the divine. Alfarabi also specifies prophecy further in order
to include the more common attributes of the prophet, i.e., the
ability to foretell the future and have visions of the spiritual
realm. For him, prophecy is the perfected faculty of imagination
impregnated by the divine intellect.[8] Finally, the ideal political state (madīnat
al-fādilah) according to Muslim Peripatetics is one
which is so organized that it brings the citizens as close as they
can possibly be to a state of personal excellence. It is governed
by the shari'a, the divine law, which the philosopher/prophet
(utilizing the quality of risālah) legislates in order
to make perfection available to all members of the community.
Some of the Islamic philosophers emphasize the individual's struggle for excellence;
for them, the inquiry into the ideal state is not a political program
per se; it is rather the project of bringing to light the
need for and motivating the achievement of the just (virtuous,
fādil) soul. This harkens back to the Republic:
in order to define what a just individual is, Socrates declares
that it is easier to define justice in the city first and then,
by establishing an analogy between the city and the individual,
arrive at the definition of justice in the person. Socrates' strategy
accords with his later contention that justice is primarily an attribute
of persons and characters, and then only derivatively a property
of laws, the social structure of the city-state, or the quality
of our actions.[9]
Although the thrust of Socrates' arguments seems to be that happiness
is not something that you calculate and maximize (it is intrinsic
to the just life), one cannot help but notice the subservience of
the city and citizenship to the demands of personal excellence.
To put it more precisely, participation in the city is necessary
for the achievement of virtue, but, upon acquiring virtue, the individual
does not need to engage in political activity. In fact, he shuns
the city and seeks the solitude necessary to philosophize, and,
in the end, he must be forced to return and take on the responsibilities
of rulership.
In contrast to Plato's account of the relation between the virtuous
person and the city, Aristotle claims, in his Politics, that
human beings are by nature political.[10]
Aristotle's virtuous person in contrast to the Platonic exemplar
cultivates friendships willingly and engages in political activity.
It is important to understand that the Islamic philosophers vary
in their commitment to political Aristotelianism or Platonism.
But no matter which political stance they adopt, they respond ambiguously
to the appeal to force or the threat of force as a means of realizing
the ideal state. In itself, this is, I would argue, an important
historical fact: it undermines the claim that there is a necessary
connection between Islamic political philosophy and violence.
Part 4.
Let us begin with
political Platonists: Avicenna (Abū 'Alī al-Husayn Ibn Sīnā, 980-1037 CE), for
example, supports the Platonic view that the virtuous human being
transcends the limitations of the political and engages in solitary
intellectual inquiry, which may culminate in divine enlightenment.[11] Political legislation, according to Avicenna,
necessitates rarefaction of divine wisdom.[12] It is an activity that the ideal person
performs for the sake of maintaining the basic associations needed to cultivate virtue,[13]
and not a necessary part of its practice.
Despite the fact
that he sees political activity as having only instrumental value, Avicenna
nevertheless prescribes the use of violence as a means of ensuring that the
best possible individual be placed in a position of power, namely the
philosopher/prophet. In the Shifā , he argues
that:
the
legislator must then decree in his law that if someone secedes and lays claim
to the caliphate by virtue of power and wealth, then it becomes the duty of
every citizen to fight and kill him. If
the citizens are capable of so doing but refrain from doing so, then they
disobey God and commit an act of unbelief.
The blood of anyone who can fight but refrains becomes free for the
spilling after this fact is established in the assembly of all.[14]
However, he qualifies this endorsement of violence by claiming that a leader
must have independent judgment, be endowed with the noble qualities
of courage, temperance, and good governance, and know the law to
a degree unsurpassed by anyone else.[15]
Fighting on behalf of such a leader (once we have found him), may
not be so bad, but it is difficult for most any individual to demonstrate
that he possesses such qualities of leadership. But if he does,
Avicenna urges us to accept his rule: "If the seceder, however,
verifies that the one holding the caliphate is not fit for it, that
he is afflicted with an imperfection, and that this imperfection
is not found in the seceder, then it is best that the citizens accept
the latter."[16]
The Sunni theologian and philosopher, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzālī
(1058-1111), attacks the early Peripatetics (including Avicenna)
for their unfettered endorsement of the power of human intellect.
He uses philosophical arguments, drawn from the arsenal of the
Greek Skeptical tradition, to limit the scope of the philosophical
quality attributed to the ideal person. Ghazzālī argues that
the intellect (the philosopher's privileged faculty) cannot provide
access to the inner meaning of the prophetic revelations.[17] He construes nearness to God (walāyah)
as the achievement of practical excellence in the manner
of Sufis.[18]
The ideal person is then the mystic/prophet/lawgiver, and the
successors are the Sufis (in spiritual affairs), the ulemā
(in matters pertaining to religious doctrine), and the caliphs
or the sultans (in matters of governance).
Despite his attack
on the mashshā'ūn, Ghazzālī remains faithful
to the Platonic thesis concerning the relation between the political life and
the cultivation of the self. Political
activity is only a means for achieving personal excellence and salvation; in
fact, according to Ghazzālī, political order
must be maintained, even if the state and its ruler are unjust. In the Ihyā Ūlūm
al-Dīn, Ghazzālī
claims that "an evil-doing and barbarous sultan, so long as he is supported by
military force, so that he can with difficulty be deposed, and that the attempt
to depose him would create unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left
in possession, and obedience must be rendered to him."[19] This is clearly a strong prohibition of the
use of violence (or the threat of its use) for political gain.
Part 5.
In his work, On the Perfect State, Alfarabi accepts the
Platonic ideal of the virtuous person, but he reconciles it with
the Aristotelian stance on the status of political activity in the
good life the life led by the virtuous. According to Aristotle,
as we have seen, human beings are by nature political. Therefore,
the virtuous person must also cultivate the political dimension
of his soul and exercise it in the political life life in the
polis.[20]
In this same vein, Alfarabi maintains that the achievement of personal
virtue is not the culmination of happiness or fulfillment (sa'ādah).
Rather this fulfillment requires that one dwells in a virtuous
city (madīnah), a city where co-operation is the order
of the day as far as the exercise of virtue is concerned. He writes:
The most excellent good and
the utmost perfection is, in the first instance, attained in a city, not in a
society which is less complete than it.
But, since good in its real sense is such as to be attainable through
choice and will and evils are also due to will and choice, only a city may be
established to enable its people to co-operate in attaining some ends that are
evil. Hence felicity is not attainable
in every city. The city, then, in which
people aim through association at co-operating for the things by which felicity
in its real and true sense can be attained, is the excellent city.[21]
Alfarabi admits the Platonic view
that virtue, "utmost perfection", requires a city as the smallest co-operative
unit, which satisfies all the needs of the community. However, he also embraces Aristotelianism,
when he claims that "felicity in its real and true sense" can only be attained
in the excellent city, through the exercise of excellence in a political
context (involving co-operation).
In regard to the
political use of violence, Alfarabi rejects as ignorant cities which are
instituted upon the appeal to violence as the principle ground for instilling
order and maintaining obedience to authority.
He also declares that practical cities (not ideal ones) can be
classified as either peace-loving or war-mongering, and that the citizens of
peace-loving ones are free from everything unsound in their nature.[22]
In the Nasirean Ethics, the Shiite philosopher and theologian,
Khāwjah Nasīr ad-Dīn Tūsī (1201-74), identifies
the qualities of the philosophical and political ideal in a characteristically
Shiite (mainly Isma'ili) manner. According to Tūsī , the
enactment of contracts, the management of a kingdom, and the administration
of a city require a philosopher/prophet/legislator, "the possessor
of law" (sāhib-e namūs) or "the speaker" (nātiq).
Aside from the promulgation of religious law, each age is in need
of a philosopher/ruler, the "absolute regulator of the world" (malik
'alā al-itlaq; also referred to as imām or
asās). He writes:
In
short, not every age and generation has need of a Possessor of the Law, for one
enactment suffices for the people of many periods; but the world does require a
Regulator in every age, for if management ceases, order is taken away likewise,
and the survival of the species in the most perfect manner cannot be realized.[23]
Tūsī makes sure that the emphasis is placed on the perfection
of the human species rather than its survival. He goes on to say
that the goal of the science of politics is the study of universal
laws, which are given by the nātiq and maintained by
the asās. The purpose of the laws is the production
of "the best interest of the generality inasmuch as they are directed,
through co-operation, to true perfection."[24]
This is virtue or excellence, which I mentioned earlier as constituting
the core of Islamic and Greek philosophy. But, like Alfarabi,
Tūsī appropriates the Aristotelian position and claims
that man is by nature political.[25]
In the same vein, he contends that the perfect man is not solitary,[26]
but rather requires a city, a civil society. He writes:
Now,
since natural fellowship is one of the properties of men, and inasmuch as the
perfection of any thing lies in the manifestation of its property
, so the
perfection of this species too lies in the manifestation of this property to
its own kind. This property, moreover,
is the principle of the love calling forth civilized life and the (social)
synthesis.[27]
Tūsī's
view differs from Aristotle's in the way he characterizes the human
characteristics exhibited in the civilized life. Aristotle considered friendship as perhaps
the primary political feature of man,[28]
whereas Tūsī opts for a more
comprehensive attribute: love. "Love is
more general than friendship, for Love is conceivable amid a swarming throng,
but Friendship does not reach this degree of comprehensiveness."[29]
According to Khāwjah Nasīr ad-Dī n, if a king abandons
his concern for justice and the good and gives "himself up to enjoyment
and pleasure-seeking
, confusion and infirmity overtake the city's
business
, felicity turns to misery, close association becomes
hatred and affection is replaced by distance
, [and] the people
of such an age remain without the possibility of acquiring goods."[30]
In such a situation, Tūsī promotes political activism,
involving the use of violence (his co-operation with Isma'ilis of
alamūt and later with Hūlāgū, against
the Abbasid caliph, testifies to this).[31]
He writes: "At such a time, it becomes necessary to take up once
more (the process of) management and seek the Imam of Truth and
the Just King."[32]
The Andalusian Avempace (Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Bajjā h, d.
1138) is, like Tūsī, an Aristotelian in his conception
of the perfect individual's relation to the city. He writes that
"man is political by nature, and
all isolation is evil."[33]
However, he differs from Tūsī in an interesting way.
He does not prescribe active involvement in undermining the unjust
city and overthrowing its ruler, but rather he advocates the solitary
life:
The happy, were it possible for them to exist in these [unjust] cities, will
possess only the happiness of an isolated individual, and the only
right governance [possible in these cities] is the governance of
the isolated individual, regardless of whether there is one isolated
individual or more than one, so long as a nation or a city has not
adopted their opinion.[34]
As to why the solitary life is not an evil in this case, he writes
that isolation "is only evil as such; accidentally it may be good
For instance, bread and meat are by nature beneficial and nourishing,
while opium and colocynth are mortal poisons. But the body may
possess certain unnatural states in which the latter two are beneficial
and must be employed, and the natural nourishment is harmful and
must be avoided. However, such states are necessarily diseases
and deviations from the natural order."[35]
In a diseased political state, Avempace prescribes solitariness
as an antidote to overcoming the evils of injustice. This, of
course, implies a rejection of the appeal to violence in the face
of unjust political conditions.
Part 6.
Since the nineteenth century the call to active participation in
overcoming political stagnation and injustice has pervaded the political
discourse of prominent Islamic philosophers. In the writings of
such figures as Sayyid Jam ā l ad-D ī n al-Afgh ā
n ī (1837-97) and Muhammad Iqbā l (1877-1938), an ideal
Islamic state is to be promoted through a concrete political program
involving the use of violence so as to awaken the slumbering
masses and effect their rectitude and enlightenment. Afghānī
argues for the institution of an Islamic state as a pragmatic solution
to the plight of colonized Muslims. A strict Islamic state mobilizes
the Muslim masses and instills the necessary values to enable them
to become culturally and economically competitive with the Europeans.[36]
For Iqbā l, on the other hand, the institution of an Islamic
state disciplines the individual so that he can break out of the
narrowness of taqlīd (imitation of an exemplar), and
exercise ijtihād (independent judgment).[37]
Rūhollāh Khomeini's (1902-89) notion of governance of
the jurist (velā yat-e faqīh) is also an example
of the appropriation of the philosophical/Islamic ideal for a specific
political program. Khomeini argues that the jurists (fuqahā
) are the true representatives of the hidden Imam.[38]
In a limited way, they evidence his wal ā yah,
the quality that puts the Imam in possession of the inner meaning
of the revelation. As such, in Khomeini's activist appropriation
of the Islamic philosophical tradition, a just jurist (faqīh)
is not only the authority in religious and legal matters; he is
also the perfect political leader. A government of the juristsis
the only government, according to Khomeini, that can be just (i.e.,
it can preserve Islamic ideals and lift Muslims from the misery
brought upon them by their oppressors).[39]
Furthermore, the achievement of independent judgment (ijtihād),
which is considered to be the culmination of a jurist's course of
study, is limited by the larger, extant political goal of maintaining
the clerical regime.[40]
Part 7.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the justification of (violent)
activism, so prominent in modern Islamic political thought, is not
due to a specific theoretical orientation within Islam's scholarly
tradition. As we have noted in regard to the earlier history of
Islamic political thought, different philosophical positions (concerning
the nature of the political) admit of contradictory interpretations
regarding the use of violence. The adoption of an activist (involving
the use of violence) or a pacifist (non-violent) interpretation
of them has nothing to do with the intrinsic features of the theory
and everything to do with the specific historical context and
the political involvements of the relevant thinker. Nasīr ad-Dī
n Tūsī's engagement in the Mongol invasion of Iran, and
the overthrow of the Abbasid Baghdad was (likely) the main motivation
for his activist appropriation of Aristotelian political philosophy.[41]
Avicenna's implication in the political activities of the Bū
yid kings and their manipulation of the Caliphate motivates, in
my view, his activism.[42]
Ghazzālī's pacifism, on the other hand, is prompted by
his alliance with the Seljuk court and his condemnation of the Shiite
opposition to the rule of its Sultans.[43]
Alfarabi and Avempace advocated pacifism, I believe, mainly because
of their commitment to the contemplative life and their lack of
interest in political intrigue.[44]
The call to violent uprising in modern Islamic
political philosophy is also due to the specific concerns of its
diverse authors. Each of the thinkers mentioned above was actively
involved in establishing a new political order. Afghani's political
activities spanned the whole of the Middle East, from India through
Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey to Egypt. He is best known for
his anti-British position, his advocacy of a pan-Islamic state,
and his participation in the assassination of Nāsir ad-Dīn
Shāh.[45]
Iqbāl's political activities in regard to establishing a separate
Muslim Indian state led his followers to reserve for him the posthumous
title of "the spiritual father of Pakistan." [46]
Khomeini's denunciation of the Pahlavi dynasty culminated in his
assumption of the leadership of Iran. in 1978.[47]
What is fascinating is perhaps not the philosophical legitimization
of political violence offered by these thinkers, but the relative
popularity of these interpretations among some Muslims today. This
popularity does not have to do with the claimed ascendancy of violence
in the Islamic culture. As we have seen, the philosophical tradition
at least vacillates between endorsing violence and advocating
non-violence. Instead, I would argue that the appeal of violence
in modern Islamic world is directly proportional to the increased
level of tyrannical manipulations taking place there. Confronted
with various forms of colonialism, imperialism, and totalitarianism,
desperate people find themselves in desperate situations. It is
therefore not surprising that some of them turn to violence.
ENDNOTES
[1]Noam Chomsky, "The Evil Scourge of
Terrorism," http://www.unet.univie.ac.at/~a9504438/Uni/c-terrorism.htm
(5 Dec. 2001).
[2] Chomsky, "The Evil Scourge of Terrorism."
[3] Abū Nasr al-Farabi,
"The Attainment of Happiness," in Medieval Political Philosophy:
A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1961), 80.
[4] Ibid.
[5] According to Aristotle,
ethical standards are not abstract moral principles (as prevalent in modern
moral philosophy); rather they are given by moral exemplars, the spoudaios or phronimos, i.e., practically wise person ["Nicomachean Ethics," in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed.
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1140a25-28, 1143b21-25].
[6] For a more detailed
discussion of this doctrine, refer to Henry Corbin's History of Islamic Philosophy, trans. Liadain Sherrard (London:
Kegan Paul International, 1993), 39-45.
[7] For a more detailed
discussion of this parallel, especially in relation to the thought of Alfarabi,
refer to Corbin's History of Islamic
Philosophy, 162-5.
[8] Abū Nasr al-Farabi,
On the Perfect State, trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 225.
[9] Plato, "Republic," in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), 442a-445e.
[10] Aristotle, "Politica," in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House,
1941), 253a1-3.
[11] Avicenna, "On the Proof of Prophecies and the
Interpretation of the Prophets' Symbols and Metaphors," in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and
Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1961), 114-5.
[12] Avicenna, "On the Proof of Prophecies
,"
116.
[13] Avicenna, "Healing:
Metaphysics X," in Medieval Political
Philosophy: A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 99.
[14] Avicenna, "Healing: Metaphysics X," 107.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Avicenna, "Healing: Metaphysics X," 110.
[17] For a treatment of
the limitations of human intellect, refer to Ghazzā l ī
's "Deliverance from Error and Attachment to the Lord of High and
Majesty," in The Faith and Practice of Ghazālī
, trans. W. Montgomery Watt (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1967), 15.
[18] Ghazzālī, "Deliverance," 54-63.
[19] Quoted in Anthony Black's The History of Islamic Political Thought
(New York: Routledge, 2001) 104.
[20] For a defense of the claim
that Aristotle's Politics, or at
least relevant parts of it, were available to al-Farabi, refer to S. Pines,
"Aristotle's Politics in Arabic Philosophy," in Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975) 150-60. Muhsin Mahdi, in Alfarabi and the Foundations of Islamic Political Philosophy,
argues that the primary objective of Alfarabi's efforts in On the Perfect State and Political
Regime is political. He maintains these
texts are "models to guide future legislators in establishing new cities. Models of this kind
are artful productions
created by the teachers of legislators with an eye to general habits,
character, opinions, and conditions, and these the legislator will adjust
further with a view to a particular city under particular conditions" (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 123.
This is an interesting interpretation that reveals the Aristotelian
dimension of Alfarabi's philosophy, according to which the madī nah is seen to be necessary for
the exercise of excellence.
[21] Al-Fārābī,
On Perfect State, 231.
[22] Al-Fārābī, On the Perfect State , 315.
[23] Nasīr ad-Dīn Tūsī, Nasirean Ethics, trans. G.
M. Wickens (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), 192.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Nasīr ad-Dīn Tūsī's political thought betrays
a remarkable familiarity with Aristotle's Politics
[Black, The History of Islamic Political
Thought, 149].
[26] Tūsī, Nasirean Ethics, 242.
[27] Tūsī, Nasirean Ethics, 199.
[28] Aristotle, "Nicomachean
Ethics," 1169b3-1170b20.
[29] Tūsī, Nasirean Ethics, 197.
[30] Tūsī, Nasirean Ethics, 233.
[31] For a biography of Tūsī, refer to Hamid
Dabashi's "Khāwjah Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī: the philosopher/vizier and the intellectual climate of his times," in
History of Islamic Philosophy: Part
One, eds. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (New York: Routlege, 1996),
527-584.
[32] Tūsī , Nasirean Ethics, 233-4.
[33] Avempace, "The Governance of
the Solitary," in Medieval Political
Philosophy: A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 132.
[34] Avempace, "The Governance of
the Solitary," 128.
[35] Avempace, "The Governance of
the Solitary," 132-3.
[36] Keddie, Nikki R. An
Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1968), 36-45.
[37] Iqbāl, Muhammad. "The Principle of
Movement in Structure of Islam," in The
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf,
1965), 146-180.
[38] Rūhollāh Khomeini, "Islamic
Government," in Islam and Revolution,
trans. Hamid Algar (London: KPI, 1985), 82-4.
[39] Khomeini, "Islamic
Government," 84.
[40] This constraint has
continuously justified appeals to violence and the threat of violence by the
clerics who belong to the circle of power in today's Iran .
[41] Dabashi," Khāwjah Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī," 530-2.
[42] See Avicenna's autobiography
in William E. Gohlman's The Life of Ibn
Sina (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974), 16-113.
For a short biography of Avicenna, refer to D. Gutas's "Avicenna II:
Biography," in Encyclopaedia Iranica,
Vol. 3, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989),
67-70.
[43] Refer to W. Montgomery
Watt's "Al-Ghazali and Later Ash'arites," in Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1985), 85-97.
[44] For an account of al-Fārābi's life, refer to Richard
Walzer's account of his life in the introduction to On the Perfect State, 1-4.
For a short account of Avempace's life, refer to D. M. Dunlop's entry in
Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd
Edition, Volume 3, ed. H.A.R. Gibb (London: Luzac, 1971), 728.
[45] Keddie, An Islamic Response to
Imperialism, 30-2.
[46] Kurzman, Charles. Liberal
Islam: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University press, 1998), 255.
[47] Algar, Hamid. "Introduction of the Translator," in Islam and Revolution, 13-23.
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