Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy
Translated by: W.V. Cooper
J.M. Dent and Company. London, 1902. The Temple Classics,
edited by Israel Golancz M.A.
Book I
Page 1
'To pleasant songs my work was erstwhile
given, and bright were all my labours then;
but now in tears to sad refrains am I
compelled to turn. Thus my maimed Muses guide
my pen, and gloomy songs make no feigned tears
bedew my face. Then could no fear so
overcome to leave me companionless upon my way.
They were the pride of my earlier bright-lived
days: in my later gloomy days they are the
comfort of my fate; for hastened by
unhappiness has age come upon me without warning,
and grief hath set within me the old age of her
gloom. White hairs are scattered untimely on
my head, and the skin hangs loosely from my
worn-out limbs.
'Happy is that death which thrusts not itself
upon men in their pleasant years, yet comes to
them at the oft-repeated cry of their sorrow.
Sad is it how death turns away from the
unhappy with so deaf an ear, and will not close,
cruel, the eyes that weep. Ill is it to trust to
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Fortune's fickle bounty, and while yet she smiled
upon me, the hour of gloom had well-nigh
overwhelmed my head. Now has the cloud put off
its alluring face, wherefore without scruple my
life drags out its wearying delays.
'Why, O my friends, did ye so often puff me
up, telling me that I was fortunate? For he
that is fallen low did never firmly stand.'
While I was pondering thus in silence, and
using my pen to set down so tearful a complaint,
there appeared standing over my head a woman's
form, whose countenance was full of majesty,
whose eyes shone as with fire and in power of
insight surpassed the eyes of men, whose colour
was full of life, whose strength was yet intact
though she was so full of years that none would
ever think that she was subject to such age as
ours. One could but doubt her varying stature,
for at one moment she repressed it to the
common measure of a man, at another she
seemed to touch with her crown the very
heavens: and when she had raised higher her
head, it pierced even the sky and baffled the
sight of those who would look upon it. Her
clothing was wrought of the finest thread by
subtle workmanship brought to an indivisible
piece. This had she woven with her own
hands, as I afterwards did learn by her own
shewing. Their beauty was somewhat dimmed
by the dulness of long neglect, as is seen in the
smoke-grimed masks of our ancestors. On the
border below was inwoven the symbol
, on
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that above was to be read a
1
And
between
the two letters there could be marked degrees,
by which, as by the rungs of a ladder, ascent
might be made from the lower principle to the
higher. Yet the hands of rough men had torn
this garment and snatched such morsels as they
could therefrom. In her right hand she carried
books, in her left was a sceptre brandished.
When she saw that the Muses of poetry were
present by my couch giving words to my
lamenting, she was stirred a while; her eyes
flashed fiercely, and said she, 'Who has
suffered these seducing mummers to approach
this sick man? Never do they support those
in sorrow by any healing remedies, but rather
do ever foster the sorrow by poisonous sweets.
These are they who stifle the fruit-bearing
harvest of reason with the barren briars of the
passions: they free not the minds of men from
disease, but accustom them thereto. I would
think it less grievous if your allurements drew
away from me some uninitiated man, as happens
in the vulgar herd. In such an one my labours
would be naught harmed, but this man has
been nourished in the lore of Eleatics and
Academics; and to him have ye reached?
Away with you, Sirens, seductive unto
destruction! leave him to my Muses to be cared for
and to be healed.'
Their band thus rated cast a saddened glance
Page 4
upon the ground, confessing their shame in
blushes, and passed forth dismally over the
threshold. For my part, my eyes were dimmed
with tears, and I could not discern who was
this woman of such commanding power. I
was amazed, and turning my eyes to the ground
I began in silence to await what she should do.
Then she approached nearer and sat down
upon the end of my couch: she looked into
my face heavy with grief and cast down by
sorrow to the ground, and then she raised her
complaint over the trouble of my mind in these
words.
'Ah me! how blunted grows the mind when
sunk below the o'erwhelming flood! Its own
true light no longer burns within, and it would
break forth to outer darknesses. How often
care, when fanned by earthly winds, grows to
a larger and unmeasured bane. This man has
been free to the open heaven: his habit has it
been to wander into the paths of the sky: his
to watch the light of the bright sun, his to
inquire into the brightness of the chilly moon;
he, like a conqueror, held fast bound in its
order every star that makes its wandering circle,
turning its peculiar course. Nay, more, deeply
has he searched into the springs of nature,
whence came the roaring blasts that ruffle the
ocean's bosom calm: what is the spirit that
makes the firmament revolve; wherefore does
the evening star sink into the western wave but
to rise from the radiant East; what is the
Page 5
cause which so tempers the season of Spring
that it decks the earth with rose-blossoms;
whence comes it to pass that Autumn is prolific
in the years of plenty and overflows with
teeming vines: deeply to search these causes was
his wont, and to bring forth secrets deep in
Nature hid.
'Now he lies there; extinct his reason's light,
his neck in heavy chains thrust down, his
countenance with grievous weight downcast; ah!
the brute earth is all he can behold.
'But now,' said she, 'is the time for the
physician's art, rather than for complaining.'
Then fixing her eyes wholly on me, she said,
'Are you the man who was nourished upon
the milk of my learning, brought up with my
food until you had won your way to the power
of a manly soul? Surely I had given you
such weapons as would keep you safe, and your
strength unconquered; if you had not thrown
them away. Do you know me? Why do
you keep silence? Are you dumb from shame
or from dull amazement? I would it were
from shame, but I see that amazement has
overwhelmed you.'
When she saw that I was not only silent,
but utter]y tongue-tied and dumb, she put her
hand gently upon my breast, and said, 'There
is no danger: he is suffering from drowsiness,
that disease which attacks so many minds which
have been deceived. He has forgotten himself
for a moment and will quickly remember, as
Page 6
soon as he recognises me. That he may do
so, let me brush away from his eyes the
darkening cloud of thoughts of matters perishable.'
So saying, she gathered her robe into a fold
and dried my swimming eyes.
Then was dark night dispelled, the shadows
fled away, and my eyes received returning
power as before. 'Twas just as when the
heavenly bodies are enveloped by the west
wind's rush, and the sky stands thick with
watery clouds; the sun is hidden and the
stars are not yet come into the sky, and night
descending from above o'erspreads the earth:
but if the north wind smites this scene, launched
forth from the Thracian cave, it unlocks the
imprisoned daylight; the sun shines forth, and
thus sparkling Phoebus smites with his rays our
wondering eyes.
In such a manner were the clouds of grief
scattered. Then I drew breath again and
engaged my mind in taking knowledge of my
physician's countenance. So when I turned
my eyes towards her and fixed my gaze upon
her, I recognised my nurse, Philosophy, in
whose chambers I had spent my life from
earliest manhood. And I asked her,
'Wherefore have you, mistress of all virtues, come
down from heaven above to visit my lonely
place of banishment? Is it that you, as well as
I, may be harried, the victim of false charges? '
'Should I,' said she, 'desert you, my nursling?
Page 7
Should I not share and bear my part of the
burden which has been laid upon you from
spite against my name? Surely Philosophy
never allowed herself to let the innocent go
upon their journey unbefriended. Think you
I would fear calumnies? that I would be
terrified as though they were a new
misfortune? Think you that this is the first time
that wisdom has been harassed by dangers
among men of shameless ways? In ancient
days before the time of my child, Plato, have
we not as well as nowadays fought many a
mighty battle against the recklessness of folly?
And though Plato did survive, did not his
master, Socrates, win his victory of an unjust
death, with me present at his side? When
after him the followers of Epicurus, and in turn
the Stoics, and then others did all try their
utmost to seize his legacy, they dragged me, for
all my cries and struggles, as though to share
me as plunder; they tore my robe which I
had woven with mine own hands, and snatched
away the fragments thereof: and when they
thought I had altogether yielded myself to
them, they departed. And since among them
were to be seen certain signs of my outward
bearing, others ill-advised did think they wore
my livery: thus were many of them undone by
the errors of the herd of uninitiated. But if
you have not heard of the exile of Anaxagoras,
2
Page 8
nor the poison drunk by Socrates,3
nor
the
torture of Zeno,4 which all were of
foreign
lands, yet you may know of Canius,5
Seneca,6
and Soranus,7 whose fame is neither
small
nor
passing old. Naught else brought them to
ruin but that, being built up in my ways, they
appeared at variance with the desires of
unscrupulous men. So it is no matter for your wonder
if, in this sea of life, we are tossed about by
storms from all sides; for to oppose evil men is
the chief aim we set before ourselves. Though
the band of such men is great in numbers, yet
is it to be contemned: for it is guided by no
leader, but is hurried along at random only by
error running riot everywhere. If this band when
warring against us presses too strongly upon us,
our leader, Reason, gathers her forces into her
citadel, while the enemy are busied in
plundering useless baggage. As they seize the most
worthless things, we laugh at them from above,
untroubled by the whole band of mad marauders,
and we are defended by that rampart to which
riotous folly may not hope to attain.
'He who has calmly reconciled his life to
fate, and set proud death beneath his feet, can
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look fortune in the face, unbending both to
good and bad: his countenance unconquered he
can shew. The rage and threatenings of the
sea will not move him though they stir from its
depths the upheaving swell: Vesuvius's furnaces
may never so often burst forth, and he may
send rolling upwards smoke and fire; the
lightning, whose wont it is to smite down lofty
towers, may flash upon its way, but such men
shall they never move. Why then stand they
wretched and aghast when fierce tyrants rage in
impotence? Fear naught, and hope naught:
thus shall you have a weak man's rage disarmed.
But whoso fears with trembling, or desires
aught from them, he stands not firmly rooted,
but dependent: thus has he thrown away his
shield; he can be rooted up, and he links for
himself the very chain whereby he may be
dragged.
'Are such your experiences, and do they
sink into your soul?' she asked. 'Do you
listen only as "the dull ass to the lyre "?
Why do you weep? Wherefore flow your
tears? " Speak, nor keep secret in thine
heart." If you expect a physician to help
you, you must lay bare your wound.'
Then did I rally my spirit till it was strong
again, and answered, 'Does the savage
bitterness of my fortune still need recounting? Does
it not stand forth plainly enough of itself?
Does not the very aspect of this place strike
you? Is this the library which you had chosen
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for yourself as your sure resting-place in my
house? Is this the room in which you would
so often tarry with me expounding the
philosophy of things human and divine? Was my
condition like this, or my countenance, when I
probed with your aid the secrets of nature, when
you marked out with a wand the courses of the
stars, when you shaped our habits and the rule
of all our life by the pattern of the universe?
8
Are these the rewards we reap by yielding
ourselves to you? Nay, you yourself have
established this saying by the mouth of Plato,
that commonwealths would be blessed if they
were guided by those who made wisdom their
study, or if those who guided them would make
wisdom their study.9 By the mouth
of that
same great man did you teach that this was the
binding reason why a commonwealth should be
governed by philosophers, namely that the helm
of government should not be left to
unscrupulous or criminal citizens lest they should bring
corruption and ruin upon the good
citizens.10
Since, then, I had learned from you in quiet
and inaction of this view, I followed it further,
for I desired to practise it in public government.
You and God Himself, who has grafted you in
the minds of philosophers, are my witnesses
that never have I applied myself to any office
of state except that I might work for the
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common welfare of all good men. Thence
followed bitter quarrels with evil men which
could not be appeased, and, for the sake of
preserving justice, contempt of the enmity of
those in power, for this is the result of a free
and fearless conscience. How often have I
withstood Conigastus to his face, whenever he
has attacked a weak man's fortune! How
often have I turned by force Trigulla,11
the
overseer of the Emperor's household, from an
unjust act that he had begun or even carried
out! How many times have I put my own
authority in danger by protecting those wretched
people who were harried with unending false
charges by the greed of barbarian Goths which
ever went unpunished! Never, I say, has any
man depraved me from justice to injustice. My
heart has ached as bitterly as those of the
sufferers when I have seen the fortunes of our
subjects ruined both by the rapacity of persons
and the taxes of the state. Again, in a time
of severe famine, a grievous, intolerable sale
by compulsion was decreed in Campania, and
devastation threatened that province. Then I
undertook for the sake of the common welfare a
struggle against the commander of the Imperial
guard; though the king was aware of it, I
fought against the enforcement of the sale, and
fought successfully. Paulinus was a man who
had been consul: the jackals of the court had
Page 12
in their own hopes and desires already swallowed
up his possessions, but I snatched him from
their very gaping jaws. I exposed myself to
the hatred of the treacherous informer Cyprian,
that I might prevent Albinus, also a former
consul, being overwhelmed by the penalty of a
trumped-up charge. Think you that I have
raised up against myself bitter and great quarrels
enough? But I ought to have been safer
among those whom I helped; for, from my
love of justice, I laid up for myself among the
courtiers no resource to which I might turn
for safety. Who, further, were the informers
upon whose evidence I was banished? One
was Basilius: he was formerly expelled from
the royal service, and was driven by debt to
inform against me. Again, Opilio and
Gaudentius had been condemned to exile by the
king for many unjust acts and crimes: this
decree they would not obey, and they sought
sanctuary in sacred buildings, but when the
king was aware of it, he declared that if they
departed not from Ravenna before a certain
day, they should be driven forth branded upon
their foreheads. What could be more stringent
than this? Yet upon that very day information
against me was laid by these same men and
accepted. Why so? Did my character deserve
this treatment? Or did my prearranged
condemnation give credit and justification to my
accusers? Did Fortune feel no shame for this?
If not for innocence calumniated, at any rate for
the baseness of the calumniators?
Page 13
'Would you learn the sum of the charges
against me? It was said that "I had desired
the safety of the Senate." You would learn
in what way. I was charged with "having
hindered an informer from producing papers by
which the Senate could be accused of treason."
What think you, my mistress? Shall I deny
it lest it shame you? Nay, I did desire the
safety of the Senate, nor shall ever cease to
desire it. Shall I confess it? Then there
would have been no need to hinder an informer.
Shall I call it a crime to have wished for the
safety of that order? By its own decrees
concerning myself it has established that this
is a crime. Though want of foresight often
deceives itself, it cannot alter the merits of
facts, and, in obedience to the Senate's
command, I cannot think it right to hide the truth
or to assent to falsehood.
'However, I leave it to your judgment and
that of philosophers to decide how the justice of
this may be; but I have committed to writing for
history the true course of events, that posterity
may not be ignorant thereof. I think it unnecessary
to speak of the forged letters through which I am
accused of " hoping for the freedom of Rome."
Their falsity would have been apparent if I had
been free to question the evidence of the
informers themselves, for their confessions have
much force in all such business.
'But what avails it? No liberty is left to
hope for. Would there were any! I would
answer in the words of Canius, who was accused
Page 14
by Gaius Cæsar,12 Germanicus's son,
of being
cognisant of a plot against himself: " If I had
known of it, you would not have."
'And in this matter grief has not so blunted
my powers that I should complain of wicked
men making impious attacks upon virtue: but
at this I do wonder, that they should hope to
succeed. Evil desires are, it may be, due to
our natural failings, but that the conceptions of
any wicked mind should prevail against
innocence while God watches over us, seems to me
unnatural. Wherefore not without cause has
one of your own followers asked, " If God is,
whence come evil things? If He is not,
whence come good? "
'Again, let impious men, who thirst for the
blood of the whole Senate and of all good
citizens, be allowed to wish for the ruin of us
too whom they recognise as champions of the
Senate and all good citizens: but surely such as
I have not deserved the same hatred from the
members of the Senate too?
'Since you were always present to guide me
in my words and my deeds, I think you
remember what happened at Verona. When
King Theodoric, desiring the common ruin of
the Senate, was for extending to the whole
order the charge of treason laid against Albinus,
you remember how I laboured to defend the
innocence of the order without any care for my
own danger? You know that I declare this
truthfully and with no boasting praise of self.
Page 15
For the secret value of a conscience, that
approves its own action, is lessened somewhat
each time that it receives the reward of fame
by displaying its deeds. But you see what
end has fallen upon my innocency. In the
place of the rewards of honest virtue, I am
suffering the punishments of an ill deed that
was not mine. And did ever any direct
confession of a crime find its judges so well
agreed upon exercising harshness, that neither
the liability of the human heart to err, nor the
changeableness of the fortune of all mankind,
could yield one dissentient voice? If it had
been said that I had wished to burn down
temples, to murder with sacrilegious sword
their priests, that I had planned the massacre
of all good citizens, even so I should have been
present to plead guilty or to be convicted, before
the sentence was executed. But here am I,
nearly five hundred miles away, without the
opportunity of defending myself, condemned to
death and the confiscation of my property
because of my too great zeal for the Senate.
Ah! well have they deserved that none should
ever be liable to be convicted on such a charge!
Even those who laid information have seen the
honour of this accusation, for, that they might
blacken it with some criminal ingredient, they
had need to lie, saying that I had violated my
conscience by using unholy means to obtain
offices corruptly. But you, by being planted
within me, dispelled from the chamber of my
soul all craving for that which perishes, and
Page 16
where your eyes were looking there could be
no place for any such sacrilege. For you
instilled into my ears, and thus into my daily
thoughts, that saying of Pythagoras, " Follow
after God." Nor was it seemly that I, whom
you had built up to such excellence that you
made me as a god, should seek the support of
the basest wills of men. Yet, further, the
innocent life within my home, my gathering of
most honourable friends, my father-in-law
Symmachus,13 a man esteemed no
less in his
public life than for his private conscientiousness,
these all put far from me all suspicion of this
crime. But--O the shame of it!--it is from
you that they think they derive the warrant for
such a charge, and we seem to them to be allied
to ill-doing from this very fact that we are steeped
in the principles of your teaching, and trained in
your manners of life. Thus it is not enough
that my deep respect for you has profited me
nothing, but you yourself have received wanton
contumely from the hatred that had rather fallen
on me. Yet besides this, is another load added
to my heap of woes: the judgment of the world
looks not to the deserts of the case, but to the
evolution of chance, and holds that only this
has been intended which good fortune may
chance to foster: whence it comes that the
good opinion of the world is the first to desert
the unfortunate. It is wearisome to recall what
were the tales by people told, or how little
Page 17
their many various opinions agreed. This
alone I would fain say: it is the last burden
laid upon us by unkind fortune, that when any
charge is invented to be fastened upon unhappy
men, they are believed to have deserved all
they have to bear. For kindness I have
received persecutions; I have been driven from
all my possessions, stripped of my honours, and
stained for ever in my reputation. I think I
see the intoxication of joy in the sin-steeped
dens of criminals: I see the most abandoned
of men intent upon new and evil schemes of
spying: I see honest men lying crushed with
the fear which smites them after the result of
my perilous case: wicked men one and all
encouraged to dare every crime without fear of
punishment, nay, with hope of rewards for the
accomplishment thereof: the innocent I see
robbed not merely of their peace and safety,
but even of all chance of defending themselves.
So then I may cry aloud:--
'Founder of the star-studded universe, resting
on Thine eternal throne whence Thou turnest
the swiftly rolling sky, and bindest the stars
to keep Thy law; at Thy word the moon now
shines brightly with full face, ever turned to her
brother's light, and so she dims the lesser
lights; or now she is herself obscured, for
nearer to the sun her beams shew her pale
horns alone. Cool rises the evening star at
night's first drawing nigh: the same is the
morning star who casts off the harness that she bore
Page 18
before, and paling meets the rising sun. When
winter's cold doth strip the trees, Thou settest
a shorter span to day. And Thou, when
summer comes to warm, dost change the short
divisions of the night. Thy power doth order
the seasons of the year, so that the western
breeze of spring brings back the leaves which
winter's north wind tore away; so that the
dog-star's heat makes ripe the ears of corn
whose seed Arcturus watched. Naught breaks
that ancient law: naught leaves undone the
work appointed to its place. Thus all things
Thou dost rule with limits fixed: the lives of
men alone dost Thou scorn to restrain, as a
guardian, within bounds. For why does
Fortune with her fickle hand deal out such
changing lots? The hurtful penalty is due to
crime, but falls upon the sinless head: depraved
men rest at ease on thrones aloft, and by their
unjust lot can spurn beneath their hurtful heel
the necks of virtuous men. Beneath obscuring
shadows lies bright virtue hid: the just man
bears the unjust's infamy. They suffer not for
forsworn oaths, they suffer not for crimes
glozed over with their lies. But when their
will is to put forth their strength, with triumph
they subdue the mightiest kings whom peoples
in their thousands fear. O Thou who dost
weave the bonds of Nature's self, look down
upon this pitiable earth! Mankind is no base
part of this great work, and we are tossed on
Fortune's wave. Restrain, our Guardian, the
engulfing surge, and as Thou dost the unbounded
Page 19
heaven rule, with a like bond make true and
firm these lands.'
While I grieved thus in long-drawn pratings,
Philosophy looked on with a calm countenance,
not one whit moved by my complaints Then
said she, 'When I saw you in grief and in tears
I knew thereby that you were unhappy and in
exile, but I knew not how distant was your
exile until your speech declared it. But you
have not been driven so far from your home;
you have wandered thence yourself: or if you
would rather hold that you have been driven,
you have been driven by yourself rather than
by any other. No other could have done so
to you. For if you recall your true native
country, you know that it is not under the rule
of the many-headed people, as was Athens of old,
but there is one Lord, one King, who rejoices in
the greater number of his subjects, not in their
banishment. To be guided by his reins, to bow
to his justice, is the highest liberty. Know
you not that sacred and ancient law of your
own state by which it is enacted that no man,
who would establish a dwelling-place for himself
therein, may lawfully be put forth? For there
is no fear that any man should merit exile, if
he be kept safe therein by its protecting walls.
But any man that may no longer wish to dwell
there, does equally no longer deserve to be
there. Wherefore it is your looks rather than
the aspect of this place which
disturb me.14 It
Page 20
is not the walls of your library, decked with
ivory and glass, that I need, but rather the
resting-place in your heart, wherein I have not
stored books, but I have of old put that which
gives value to books, a store of thoughts from
books of mine. As to your services to the
common weal, you have spoken truly, though
but scantily, if you consider your manifold
exertions. Of all wherewith you have been
charged either truthfully or falsely, you have
but recorded what is well known. As for the
crimes and wicked lies of the informers, you
have rightly thought fit to touch but shortly
thereon, for they are better and more fruitfully
made common in the mouth of the crowd that
discusses all matters. You have loudly and
strongly upbraided the unjust ingratitude of the
Senate: you have grieved over the charges
made against myself, and shed tears over the
insult to my fair fame: your last outburst of
wrath was against Fortune, when you complained
that she paid no fair rewards according to
deserts: finally, you have prayed with passionate
Muse that the same peace and order, that are seen
in the heavens, might also rule the earth. But
you are overwhelmed by this variety of mutinous
passions: grief, rage, and gloom tear your mind
asunder, and so in this present mood stronger
measures cannot yet come nigh to heal you.
Let us therefore use gentler means, and since,
just as matter in the body hardens into a
swelling, so have these disquieting influences,
let these means soften by kindly handling the
Page 21
unhealthy spot, until it will bear a sharper
remedy.
'When the sign of the crab doth scorch the
field, fraught with the sun's most grievous rays,
the husbandman that has freely intrusted his
seed to the fruitless furrow, is cheated by the
faithless harvest-goddess; and he must turn him
to the oak tree's fruit.
'When the field is scarred by the bleak north
winds, wouldst thou seek the wood's dark
carpet to gather violets? If thou wilt enjoy
the grapes, wouldst thou seek with clutching
hand to prune the vines in spring? 'Tis in
autumn Bacchus brings his gifts. Thus God
marks out the times and fits to them peculiar
works: He has set out a course of change, and
lets no confusion come. If aught betake itself
to headlong ways, and leaves its sure design, ill
will the outcome be thereto.
'First then,' she continued, 'will you let me
find out and make trial of the state of your
mind by a few small questions, that so I may
understand what should be the method of your
treatment?'
'Ask,' said I, 'what your judgment would
have you ask, and I will answer you.'
Then said she, 'Think you that this universe
is guided only at random and by mere chance?
or think you there is any rule of reason
constituted in it?'
'No, never would I think it could be so, nor
Page 22
believe that such sure motions could be made at
random or by chance. I know that God, the
founder of the universe, does overlook His
work; nor ever may that day come which shall
drive me to abandon this belief as untrue.'
'So is it,' she said, 'and even so you cried
just now, and only mourned that mankind alone
has no part in this divine guardianship: you
were fixed in your belief that all other things
are ruled by reason. Yet, how strange! how
much I wonder how it is that you can be so
sick though you are set in such a health-giving
state of mind! But let us look deeper into it:
I cannot but think there is something lacking.
Since you are not in doubt that the universe is
ruled by God, tell me by what method you
think that government is guided?'
'I scarcely know the meaning of your
question; much less can I answer it.'
'Was I wrong,' said she, 'to think that
something was lacking, that there was some
opening in your armour, some way by which
this distracting disease has crept into your soul?
But tell me, do you remember what is the aim
and end of all things? what the object to
which all nature tends?'
'I have heard indeed, but grief has blunted
my memory.'
'But do you not somehow know whence all
things have their source?'
'Yes,' I said; 'that source is God.'
'Is it possible that you, who know the
beginning of all things, should not know their end?
Page 23
But such are the ways of these distractions,
such is their power, that though they can move
a man's position, they cannot pluck him from
himself or wrench him from his roots. But
this question would I have you answer: do
you remember that you are a man?'
'How can I but remember that?'
'Can you then say what is a man?'
'Need you ask? I know that he is an
animal, reasoning and mortal; that I know, and
that I confess myself to be.'
'Know you naught else that you are?' asked
Philosophy.
'Naught,' said I.
'Now,' said she, 'I know the cause, or the
chief cause, of your sickness. You have
forgotten what you are. Now therefore I have
found out to the full the manner of your
sickness, and how to attempt the restoring of your
health. You are overwhelmed by this
forgetfulness of yourself: hence you have been thus
sorrowing that you are exiled and robbed of all
your possessions. You do not know the aim
and end of all things; hence you think that if
men are worthless and wicked, they are
powerful and fortunate. You have forgotten by what
methods the universe is guided; hence you
think that the chances of good and bad fortune
are tossed about with no ruling hand. These
things may lead not to disease only, but
even to death as well. But let us thank the
Giver of all health, that your nature has not
altogether left you. We have yet the chief
Page 24
spark for your health's fire, for you have a true
knowledge of the hand that guides the universe:
you do believe that its government is not subject
to random chance, but to divine reason.
Therefore have no fear. From this tiny spark the
fire of life shall forthwith shine upon you. But
it is not time to use severer remedies, and since
we know that it is the way of all minds to
clothe themselves ever in false opinions as they
throw off the true, and these false ones breed a
dark distraction which confuses the true insight,
therefore will I try to lessen this darkness for a
while with gentle applications of easy remedies,
that so the shadows of deceiving passions may
be dissipated, and you may have power to
perceive the brightness of true light.'
'When the stars are hidden by black clouds,
no light can they afford. When the boisterous
south wind rolls along the sea and stirs the
surge, the water, but now as clear as glass,
bright as the fair sun's light, is dark,
impenetrable to sight, with stirred and scattered sand.
The stream, that wanders down the
mountain's side, must often find a stumbling-block, a
stone within its path torn from the hill's own
rock. So too shalt thou: if thou wouldst see
the truth in undimmed light, choose the straight
road, the beaten path; away with passing joys!
away with fear! put vain hopes to flight! and
grant no place to grief! Where these
distractions reign, the mind is clouded o'er, the
soul is bound in chains.'
Page 25
Book II
THEN for a while she held her peace. But
when her silence, so discreet, made my thoughts
to cease from straying, she thus began to speak:
'If I have thoroughly learned the causes and
the manner of your sickness, your former good
fortune has so affected you that you are being
consumed by longing for it. The change of one of her
this alone has overturned your peace of mind
through your own imagination. I understand
the varied disguises of that unnatural state. I
know how Fortune is ever most friendly and
alluring to those whom she strives to deceive,
until she overwhelms them with grief beyond
bearing, by deserting them when least expected.
If you recall her nature, her ways, or her
deserts, you will see that you never had in her,
nor have lost with her, aught that was lovely.
Yet, I think, I shall not need great labour to
recall this to your memory. For then too,
when she was at your side with all her flattery,
you were wont to reproach her in strong and
manly terms; and to revile her with the
opinions that you had gathered in worship of me
with my favoured ones. But no sudden change
of outward affairs can ever come without some
upheaval in the mind. Thus has it followed
Page 26
that you, like others, have fallen somewhat away
from your calm peace of mind. But it is time
now for you to make trial of some gentle and
pleasant draught, which by reaching your
inmost parts shall prepare the way for yet
stronger healing draughts. Try therefore the
assuring influence of gentle argument which
keeps its straight path only when it holds fast
to my instructions. And with this art of
orators let my handmaid, the art of song, lend
her aid in chanting light or weighty harmonies
as we desire.
'What is it, mortal man, that has cast you
down into grief and mourning? You have
seen something unwonted, it would seem,
something strange to you. But if you think that
Fortune has changed towards you, you are
wrong. These are ever her ways: this is her
very nature. She has with you preserved her
own constancy by her very change. She was
ever changeable at the time when she smiled
upon you, when she was mocking you with the
allurements of false good fortune. You have
discovered both the different faces of the blind
goddess. To the eyes of others she is veiled
in part: to you she has made herself wholly
known. If you find her welcome, make use of
her ways, and so make no complaining. If
she fills you with horror by her treachery,
treat her with despite; thrust her away from
you, for she tempts you to your ruin. For
though she is the cause of this great trouble for
you, she ought to have been the subject of
Page 27
calmness and peace. For no man can ever
make himself sure that she will never desert
him, and thus has she deserted you. Do you
reckon such happiness to be prized, which is
sure to pass away? Is good fortune dear to
you, which is with you for a time and is not
sure to stay, and which is sure to bring you
unhappiness when it is gone? But seeing that
it cannot be stayed at will, and that when it
flees away it leaves misery behind, what is
such a fleeting thing but a sign of coming
misery? Nor should it ever satisfy any man to
look only at that which is placed before his
eyes. Prudence takes measure of the results to
come from all things. The very changeableness
of good and bad makes Fortune's threats
no more fearful, nor her smiles to be desired.
And lastly, when you have once put your neck
beneath the yoke of Fortune, you must with
steadfast heart bear whatever comes to pass
within her realm. But if you would dictate
the law by which she whom you have freely
chosen to be your mistress must stay or go,
surely you will be acting without justification;
and your very impatience will make more bitter
a lot which you cannot change. If you set
your sails before the wind, will you not move
forward whither the wind drives you, not
whither your will may choose to go? If you
intrust your seed to the furrow, will you not
weigh the rich years and the barren against
each other? You have given yourself over to
Fortune's rule, and you must bow yourself to
Page 28
your mistress's ways. Are you trying to stay
the force of her turning wheel? Ah! dull-witted
mortal, if Fortune begin to stay still,
she is no longer Fortune.
'As thus she turns her wheel of chance with
haughty hand, and presses on like the surge of
Euripus's tides, fortune now tramples fiercely on
a fearsome king, and now deceives no less a
conquered man by raising from the ground his
humbled face. She hears no wretch's cry, she
heeds no tears, but wantonly she mocks the
sorrow which her cruelty has made. This is
her sport: thus she proves her power; if in the
selfsame hour one man is raised to happiness,
and cast down in despair, 'tis thus she shews
her might.
'Now would I argue with you by these few
words which Fortune herself might use: and
do you consider whether her demands are fair
"Why, O man," she might say, " do you daily
accuse me with your complainings? What
injustice have I wrought upon you? Of what good
things have I robbed you? Choose your judge
whom you will, and before him strive with me
for the right to hold your wealth and honours.
If you can prove that any one of these does
truly belong to any mortal man, readily will I
grant that these you seek to regain were yours.
When nature brought you forth from your
mother's womb, I received you in my arms
naked and bare of all things; I cherished you
Page 29
with my gifts, and I brought you up all too
kindly with my favouring care, wherefore now
you cannot bear with me, and I surrounded
you with glory and all the abundance that was
mine to give. Now it pleases me to withdraw
my hand: be thankful, as though you had
lived upon my loans. You have no just cause
of complaint, as though you had really lost what
was once your own. Why do you rail against
me? I have wrought no violence towards you.
Wealth, honours, and all such are within my
rights. They are my handmaids; they know
their mistress; they come with me and go
when I depart. Boldly will I say that if
these, of whose loss you complain, were ever
yours, you would never have lost them at all.
Am I alone to be stayed from using my rightful
power? The heavens may grant bright sunlit
days, and hide the same beneath the shade of
night. The year may deck the earth's
countenance with flowers and fruits, and again wrap
it with chilling clouds. The sea may charm
with its smoothed surface, but no less justly it
may soon bristle in storms with rough waves.
Is the insatiate discontent of man to bind me to
a constancy which belongs not to my ways?
Herein lies my very strength; this is my
unchanging sport. I turn my wheel that spins
its circle fairly; I delight to make the lowest
turn to the top, the highest to the bottom.
Come you to the top if you will, but on this
condition, that you think it no unfairness to sink
when the rule of my game demands it. Do
Page 30
you not know my ways? Have you not heard
how Croesus,15 king of Lydia, who
filled even
Cyrus with fear but a little earlier, was
miserably put upon a pyre of burning faggots, but
was saved by rain sent down from heaven?
Have you forgotten how Paulus shed tears of
respect for the miseries of his captive, King
Perses?16 For what else is the crying and
the
weeping in tragedies but for the happiness of
kings overturned by the random blow of fortune?
Have you never learnt in your youth the ancient
allegory that in the threshold of Jove's hall
there stand two vessels, one full of evil, and one
of good? What if you have received more
richly of the good? What if I have not ever
withheld myself from you? What if my
changing nature is itself a reason that you should
hope for better things? In any way, let not
your spirit eat itself away: you are set in the
sphere that is common to all, let your desire
therefore be to live with your own lot of
life, a subject of the kingdom of the world.
"'If Plenty with o'erflowing horn scatter
her wealth abroad, abundantly, as in the storm-tossed
sea the sand is cast around, or so beyond
all measure as the stars shine forth upon the
studded sky in cloudless nights; though she
Page 31
never stay her hand, yet will the race of men Met II.
still weep and wail. Though God accept their
prayers freely and give gold with ungrudging
hand, and deck with honours those who deserve
them, yet when they are gotten, these gifts
seem naught. Wild greed swallows what it
has sought, and still gapes wide for more.
What bit or bridle will hold within its course
this headlong lust, when, whetted by abundance
of rich gifts, the thirst for possession burns?
Never call we that man rich who is ever
trembling in haste and groaning for that he
thinks he lack
'If Fortune should thus defend herself to
you,' said Philosophy, 'you would have naught,
I think, to utter on the other part. But if
you have any just defence for your complaining,
you must put it forward. We will grant you
the opportunity of speaking.'
Then I answered, 'Those arguments have a
fair form and are clothed with all the sweetness
of speech and of song. When a man listens to
them, they delight him; but only so long.
The wretched have a deeper feeling of their
misfortunes. Wherefore when these pleasing
sounds fall no longer upon the ear, this deep-rooted
misery again weighs down the spirit.'
'It is so,' she said. 'For these are not the
remedies for your sickness, but in some sort are
the applications for your grief which chafes
against its cure. When the time comes, I will
apply those which are to penetrate deeply.
Page 32
But that you may not be content to think
yourself wretched, remember how many and how
great have been the occasions of your good
fortune. I will not describe how, when you
lost your father, men of the highest rank
received you into their care: how you were
chosen by the chief men in the state to be allied
to them by marriage; 17 and you were dear
to
them before you were ever closely related;
which is the most valuable of all relationships.
Who hesitated to pronounce you most fortunate
for the greatness of your wives' families, for
their virtues, and for your blessings in your
sons too? I need not speak of those things
that are familiar, so I pass over the honours
which are denied to most old men, but were
granted to you when yet young. I choose to
come to the unrivalled crown of your good
fortune. If the enjoyment of anything mortal
can weigh at all in the balance of good fortune,
can your memory of one great day ever be
extinguished by any mass of accumulated ills?
I mean that day when you saw your two sons
proceed forth from your house as consuls
together, amid the crowding senators, the eager
and applauding populace: when they sat down
in the seats of honour and you delivered the
speech of congratulation to the king, gaining
Page 33
thereby glory for your talent and your eloquence:
when in the circus you sat in the place of
honour between the consuls, and by a display
of lavishness worthy of a triumphing general,
you pleased to the full the multitude who were
crowded around in expectation.
'While Fortune then favoured you, it seems
you flaunted her, though she cherished you as
her own darling. You carried off a bounty
which she had never granted to any citizen before.
Will you then balance accounts with Fortune?
This is the first time that she has looked
upon you with a grudging eye. If you think
of your happy and unhappy circumstances both
in number and in kind, you will not be able to
say that you have not been fortunate until now.
And if you think that you were not fortunate
because these things have passed away which
then seemed to bring happiness, these things too
are passing away, which you now hold to be
miserable, wherefore you cannot think that you
are wretched now. Is this your first entrance
upon the stage of life? Are you come here
unprepared and a stranger to the scene? Think
you that there is any certainty in the affairs of
mankind, when you know that often one swift
hour can utterly destroy a man? For though
the chances of life may seldom be depended
upon, yet the last day of a lifetime seems to be
the end of Fortune's power, though it perhaps
would stay. What, think you, should we
therefore say; that you desert her by dying, or
that she deserts you by leaving you?'
Page 34
'When o'er the heaven Phoebus from his rose-red car
begins
to shed his light abroad, his flames oppress the paling stars and
blunt
their whitened rays. When the grove grows bright in spring with
roses
'neath the west wind's warming breath, let but the cloudy gale
once
wildly blow, and their beauty is gone, the thorns alone remain.
Often
the sea is calmly glistening bright with all untroubled waves,
but as
often does the north wind stir them up, making the troubling
tempest
boil. If then the earth's own covering so seldom constant stays,
if its
changes are so great, shalt thou trust the brittle fortunes of
mankind,
have faith in fleeting good? For this is sure, and this is fixed
by
everlasting law, that naught which is brought to birth shall
constant here
abide.'
Then I answered her, 'Cherisher of all the
virtues, you tell me but the truth: I cannot
deny my rapid successes and my prosperity.
But it is such remembrances that torment me
more than others. For of all suffering from
Fortune, the unhappiest misfortune is to have
known a happy fortune.'
'But,' said Philosophy, 'you are paying the
him penalty for your mistaken expectations, and
with this you cannot justly charge your life's
circumstances. If you are affected by this
empty name of Fortune's gift of happiness, you
must listen while I recall how many and how
great are your sources of happiness: and thus, if
you have possessed that which is the most
Page 35
precious among all Fortune's gifts, and if that is still safe and
unharmed
in your possession, you will never, while you keep these better
gifts, be
able to justly charge Fortune with unkindness. Firstly, your
wife's
father, Symmachus, is still living and hale; and what more
precious
glory has the human race than him? And he, because your worth is
undiminished and your life still so valuable, is mourning for the
injustice you suffer, this man who is wholly made up of wisdom
and
virtue. Again, your wife lives, a woman whose character is full
of
virtue, whose modesty excels its kind; a woman who (to put in a
word
the gifts she brought you) is like her father. She lives, and,
hating this
life, for your sake alone she clings to it. Herein only will I
yield to
allow you unhappiness; she pines with tears and grief through her
longing for you. Need I speak of your sons who have both been
consuls, and whose lives, as when they were boys, are yet bright
with
the character of their grandfather and their father? Wherefore,
since
mortals desire exceedingly to keep a hold on life, how happy you
should be, knew you but your blessings, since you have still what
none
doubts to be dearer than life itself? Wherefore now dry your
tears.
Fortune's hatred has not yet been so great as to destroy all your
holds upon
happiness: the tempest that is fallen upon you is not too great
for you:
your anchors hold yet firm, and they should keep ever nigh to you
confidence in the present and hope for future time.
Page 36
'And may they continue to hold fast,' said I, 'that is my
prayer: while they are firm, we will reach the end of our voyage,
however things may be. But you see how much my glory has
departed.'
And she answered, 'We have made some progress, if you
are
not now weary entirely of your present lot. But I cannot bear
this
dallying so softly, so long as you complain that your happiness
lacks
aught, so long as you are full of sorrow and care. Whose
happiness is
so firmly established that he has no quarrel from any side with
his
estate of life? For the condition of our welfare is a matter
fraught with
care: either its completeness never appears, or it never remains.
One
man's wealth is abundant, but his birth and breeding put him to
shame.
Another is famous for his noble birth, but would rather be
unknown
because he is hampered by his narrow means. A third is blessed
with
wealth and breeding, but bewails his life because he has no wife.
Another is happy in his marriage, but has no children, and saves
his
wealth only for an heir that is no son of his. Another is blessed
with
children, but weeps tears of sorrow for the misdeeds of son or
daughter.
So none is readily at peace with the lot his fortune sends him.
For in
each case there is that which is unknown to him who has not
experienced it, and which brings horror to him who has
experienced it.
Consider further, that the feelings of the most fortunate men are
the
most easily affected, wherefore, unless all
Page 37
their desires are supplied, such men, being unused to all
adversity, are
cast down by every little care: so small are the troubles which
can rob
them of complete happiness.
'How many are they, think you, who would think
themselves
raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your
good
fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of
exile,
is home to those who live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched
unless
you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a
calm
mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish
to
change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? With
how much
bitterness is the sweetness of man's life mingled! For even
though its
enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from
departing
when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of
mortal
life which neither endures for ever with men of calm mind, nor
ever
wholly delights the care-ridden. Wherefore, then, O mortal men,
seek ye
that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are
confounded by error and ignorance. I will shew you as shortly as
I may,
the pole on which turns the highest happiness. Is there aught
that you
value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there
is
nothing. If then you are master of yourself, you will be in
possession of
that which you will never wish to lose, and which Fortune will
never be
able to take from you. Yet consider this further, that you may
Page 38
be assured that happiness cannot be fixed in matters of chance:
if
happiness is the highest good of a man who lives his life by
reason, and
if that which can by any means be snatched away, is not the
highest
good (since that which is best cannot be snatched away), it is
plain that
Fortune by its own uncertainty can never come near to reaching
happiness. Further, the man who is borne along by a happiness
which
may stumble, either knows that it may change, or knows it not: if
he
knows it not, what happiness can there be in the blindness of
ignorance
? If he knows it, he must needs live in fear of losing that which
he
cannot doubt that he may lose; wherefore an ever-present fear
allows
not such an one to be happy. Or at any rate, if he lose it
without
unhappiness, does he not think it worthless? For that, whose loss
can
be calmly borne, is indeed a small good. You, I know well, are
firmly
persuaded that men's understandings can never die; this truth is
planted
deep in you by many proofs: since then it is plain that the
happiness of
fortune is bounded by the death of the body, you cannot doubt
that, if
death can carry away happiness, the whole race of mortals is
sinking
into wretchedness to be found upon the border of death. But we
know
that many have sought the enjoyment of happiness not only by
death,
but even by sorrow and sufferings: how then can the presence of
this
life make us happy, when its end cannot make us unhappy?
Page 39
'He that would build on a lasting resting-place; who
would
be
firm to resist the blasts of the storming wind; who seeks, too,
safety
where he may contemn the surge and threatening of the sea; must
leave the lofty mountain's top, and leave the thirsting sands.
The hill is
swept by all the might of the headstrong gale: the sands
dissolve, and
will not bear the load upon them. Let him fly the danger in a lot
which
is pleasant rest unto the eye: let him be mindful to set his
house surely
upon the lowly rock. Then let the wind bellow, confounding
wreckage
in the sea, and thou wilt still be founded upon unmoving peace,
wilt be
blessed in the strength of thy defence: thy life will be spent in
calmness, and thou mayest mock the raging passions of the air.
'But now,' she continued, 'the first remedies of
reasoning
are
reaching you more deeply, and I think I should now use those that
are
somewhat stronger. If the gifts of Fortune fade not nor pass
quickly
away, even so, what is there in them which could ever be truly
yours,
or which would not lose its value when examined or thought upon?
'Are riches valuable for their own nature, or on account
of
your and other men's natures? Which is the more valuable, the
gold
itself or the power of the stored up-money? Surely wealth shines
more
brightly when spent than when put away in masses. Avarice ever
brings
hatred, while generous spending brings honour.
Page 40
But that cannot remain with one person which is handed over to
another: therefore money becomes valuable to its possessor when,
by
being scattered, it is transferred to others, and ceases to be
possessed.
And if all that is heaped together among mankind comes to one
man, it
makes the others all poor. A voice indeed fills equally the ears
of all
that hear: but your riches cannot pass to others without being
lessened:
and when they pass, they make poor those whom they leave. How
strait
then and poor are those riches, which most men may not have, and
which can only come to one by making others poor!
'Think again of precious stones: does their gleam attract
your
eyes? But any excellence they have is their own brilliance, and
belongs
not to men: wherefore I am amazed that men so strongly admire
them.
What manner of thing can that be which has no mind to influence,
which has no structure of parts, and yet can justly seem to a
living,
reasoning mind to be beautiful? Though they be works of their
creator,
and by their own beauty and adornment have a certain low beauty,
yet
are they in rank lower than your own excellence, and have in no
wise
deserved your admiration.
'Does the beauty of landscape delight you?'
'Surely, for it is a beautiful part of a beautiful
creation: and
in
like manner we rejoice at times in the appearance of a calm sea,
and we
admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon.
Page 41
'Does any one of these,' said she, 'concern you? Dare
you
boast yourself of the splendid beauty of any one of such things?
Are
you yourself adorned by the flowers of spring? Is it your
richness that
swells the fruits of autumn? Why are you carried away by empty
rejoicing. Why do you embrace as your own the good things which
are
outside yourself? Fortune will never make yours what Nature has
made
to belong to other things. The fruits of the earth should
doubtless serve
as nourishment for living beings, but if you would satisfy your
need as
fully as Nature needs, you need not the abundance of Fortune.
Nature is
content with very little, and if you seek to thrust upon her more
than is
enough, then what you cast in will become either unpleasing or
even
harmful
'Again, you think that you appear beautiful in many kinds
of
clothing. But if their form is pleasant to the eyes, I would
admire the
nature of the material or the skill of the maker. Or are you made
happy
by a long line of attendants? Surely if they are vicious, they
are but . a
burden to the house, and full of injury to their master himself;
while if
they are honest, how can the honesty of others be counted among
your
possessions?
'Out of all these possessions, then, which you reckon as
your
wealth, not one can really be shown to be your own. For if they
have
no beauty for you to acquire, what have they for which you should
grieve if you lose them, or in keeping which you should rejoice?
And
if
Page 42
they are beautiful by their own nature, how are you the richer
thereby?
For these would have been pleasing of themselves, though cut out
from
your possessions. They do not become valuable by reason that they
have come into your wealth; but you have desired to count them
among your wealth, because they seemed valuable. Why then do you
long for them with such railing against Fortune? You seek, I
believe,
to put want to flight by means of plenty. But you find that the
opposite
results. The more various is the beauty of furniture, the more
helps are
needed to keep it beautiful;and it is ever true that they who
have much,
need much; and on the other hand, they need least who measure
their
wealth by the needs of nature, not by excess of display.
Is there then no good which belongs to you
and is implanted within you, that you seek your
good things elsewhere, in things without you
and separate from you? Have things taken
such a turn that the animal, whose reason gives
it a claim to divinity, cannot seem beautiful to
itself except by the possession of. lifeless
trappings? Other classes of things are satisfied
by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though
made like God in understanding, seek to find
among the lowest things adornment for their
higher nature: and you do not understand that
you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator.
He intended that the human race should be
above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust
down your honourable place below the lowest.
Page 43
For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that
to
which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than
them in
your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of
things;
and this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the
condition of
human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it
realises what
is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be
reduced to a
lower rank than the beasts. To other animals ignorance of
themselves is
natural; in men it is a fault. How plainly and how widely do you
err by
thinking that anything can be adorned by ornaments that belong to
others! Surely that cannot be. For if anything becomes brilliant
by
additions thereto, the praise for the brilliance belongs to the
additions.
But the subject remains in its own vileness, though hidden and
covered
by these externals.
'Again, I say that naught can be a good thing which does
harm
to its possessor. Am I wrong? "No," you will say. Yet many a time
do
riches harm their possessors, since all base men, who are
therefore the
most covetous, think that they themselves alone are worthy to
possess
all gold and precious stones. You therefore, who now go in fear
of the
cudgel and sword of the robber, could laugh in his face if you
had
entered upon this path with empty
pockets.18 How wonderful
is the
Page 44
surpassing blessing of mortal wealth! As soon as you have
acquired it,
your cares begin!
'O happy was that early age of men, contented with their
trusted and unfailing fields, nor ruined by the wealth that
enervates.
Easily was the acorn got that used to satisfy their longwhile
fast. They
knew not Bacchus' gifts, nor honey mixed therewith. They knew not
how to tinge with Tyre's purple dyes the sheen of China's silks.
Their
sleep kept health on rush and grass; the stream gave them to
drink as it
flowed by: the lofty pine to them gave shade. Not one of them yet
clave
the ocean's depths, nor, carrying stores of merchandise, had
visited new
shores. Then was not heard the battle's trump, nor had blood made
red
with bitter hate the bristling swords of war. For why should any
madness urge to take up first their arms upon an enemy such ones
as
knew no sight of cruel wounds nor knew rewards that could be
reaped
in blood? Would that our times could but return to those old
ways! but
love of gain and greed of holding burn more fiercely far than
Ætna's
fires. Ah! who was the wretch who first unearthed the mass of
hidden
gold, the gems that only longed to lie unfound? For full of
danger was
the prize he found.
'What am I to say of power and of the
Page 45
honours of office, which you raise to heaven because you know not
true
honoured power? What fires belched forth from Ætna's
flames,
what overwhelming flood could deal such ruin as these when they
fall
into the hands of evil men? I am sure you remember how your
forefathers wished to do away with the consular power, which had
been
the very foundation of liberty, because of the overbearing pride
of the
consuls, just as your ancestors had too in earlier times expunged
from
the state the name of king on account of the same pride. But if,
as
rarely happens, places of honour are granted to honest men, what
else is
delightful in them but the honesty they practise thereby?
Wherefore
honour comes not to virtue from holding office, but comes to
office
from virtues there practised.
'But what is the power which you seek and esteem so
highly? O creatures of the earth, can you not think over whom
you are set? If
you saw in a community of mice, one mouse asserting his rights
and
his power over the others, with what mirth you would greet the
sight!
Yet if you consider the body, what can you find weaker than
humanity?
Cannot a tiny gnat by its bite, or by creeping into the inmost
parts, kill
that body? How can any exercise right upon any other except upon
the
body alone, or that which is below the body, whereby I mean the
fortunes? Can you ever impose any law upon a free spirit? Can you
eyer disturb the peculiar restfulness which is the property of a
mind that
hangs together
Page 46
upon the firm basis of its reason? When a
certain tyrant thought that by tortures he would
compel a free man 19 to betray the
conspirators
in a plot against his life, the philosopher bit
through his tongue and spat it out in the tyrant's
face. Thus were the tortures, which the
tyrant intended to have cruel results, turned by
the philosopher into subjects of high courage.
Is there aught that one man can do to another,
which he may not suffer from another in his
turn? We have heard how Busiris, who used
to kill strangers, was killed by Hercules when
he came to Egypt. Regulus,20 who had cast
into chains many a Carthaginian captive, soon
yielded himself a prisoner to their chains. Do
you think that power to be any power, whose
possessor cannot ensure his own escape from
suffering at another's hands what he inflicts
upon some other?
'Further, if there were any intrinsic good in
the nature of honours and powers themselves,
they could never crowd upon the basest men.
For opposites will not be bound together.
Nature refuses to allow contraries to be linked
to each other. Wherefore, while it is undoubted
that for the most part offices of honour
are enjoyed by bad men, it is also manifest
that those things are not by nature good, which
Page 47
allow themselves to cling to evil men. And
this indeed may worthily be held of all the
gifts of fortune which come with the greatest
success to the most unscrupulous. And in this
matter we must also think on this fact, that no
one doubts a man to be brave in whom he has
found by examination that bravery is implanted:
and whoever has the quality of swiftness is
plainly swift. So also music makes men
musical, medicine makes men physicians,
oratory makes men orators. The nature of
each quality acts as is peculiar to itself: it is
not confused with the results of contrary
qualities, but goes so far as to drive out those
qualities which are opposed to it. Wealth
cannot quench the insatiable thirst of avarice:
nor can power ever make master of himself the
man whom vicious passions hold fast in
unbreakable chains. Honours, when joined to
dishonest men, so far from making them
honourable, betray them rather, and show them to be
dishonourable. Why is this so? It is because
you rejoice to call things by false names which
belong not to them their names are refuted
by the reality of their qualities: wherefore
neither riches, nor that kind of power, nor
these honours, can justly so be called.
Lastly, we may come to the same conclusion
concerning all the aspects of Fortune: nothing
is to be sought in her, and it is plain she has
no innate good, for she is not always joined
with good men, nor does she make good those
with whom she is joined.'
Page 48
'We have heard what ruin Nero wrought when Rome was
burnt and senators were slain. We know how savagely he did to
death
his brother,21 how he was stained by the
spilling of his own
mother's blood, and how he looked upon her cold body and yet no
tear fell upon his cheek:
yet could this man be judge of the morals that were dead.
Nay, he was ruler of the peoples whom the sun looks upon from the
time he rises in the east until he hides his rays beneath the
waves, and
those whom the chilling northern Wain o'errules, and those whom
the
southern gale burns with its dry blast, as it heats the burning
sands. Say,
could great power chasten Nero's maddened rage? Ah! heavy fate,
how
often is the sword of high injustice given where is already most
poisonous cruelty!'
Then I said, 'You know that the vain-glory of this world
has
had but little influence over me; but I have desired the means of
so
managing affairs that virtue might not grow aged in silence.'
'Yes,' said she, 'but there is one thing which can
attract
minds, which, though by nature excelling, yet are not led by
perfection
to the furthest bounds of virtue; and that thing is the love of
fame and
reputation for deserving well of one's country. Think then thus
upon it,
and see that it is but a slight
Page 49
thing of no weight. As you have learnt from
astronomers' shewing, the whole circumference of the earth is but
as a
point compared with the size of the heavens. That is, if you
compare
the earth with the circle of the universe, it must be reckoned as
of no
size at all. And of this tiny portion of the universe there is
but a fourth
part, as you have learnt from the demonstration of
Ptolemæus,23 And
yet what advantage is there in much that is written? For with
their authors these writings are
overwhelmed in the length and dimness of age. Yet when
you think upon your fame in future ages, you seem to think that
you
are prolonging it to immortality. But if you think upon the
unending
length of eternity, what enjoyment do you find in the long
endurance of
Page 51
your name? For though one moment bears but the least proportion
to
ten thousand years, yet there is a definite ratio, because both
are limited
spaces of time. But even ten thousand years, or the greatest
number you
will, cannot even be compared with eternity. For there will
always be
ratio between finite things, but between the finite and the
infinite there
can never be any comparison. Wherefore, however long drawn out
may
be the life of your fame, it is not even small, but it is
absolutely
nothing when compared with eternity. You know not how to act
rightly
except for the breezes of popular opinion and for the sake of
empty
rumours; thus the excellence of conscience and of virtue is left
behind,
and you seek rewards from the tattle of other men. Listen to the
witty
manner in which one played once upon the shallowness of this
pride. A
certain man once bitterly attacked another who had taken to
himself
falsely the name of philosopher, not for the purpose of true
virtue, but
for pride of fame; he added to his attack that he would know soon
whether he was a philosopher, when he saw whether the other bore
with meekness and patience the insults he heaped upon him. The
other
showed patience for a while and took the insults as though he
scoffed at
them, until he said, " Do you now see that I am a philosopher? "
" I
should have, had you kept silence," said the other stingingly.
But we
are speaking of great men: and I ask, what do they gain from
fame,
though they seek
Page 52
glory by virtue? what have they after the body is dissolved at
death?
For if men die utterly, as our reason forbids us to believe,
there is no
glory left to them at all, since they whose it is said to be, do
not exist.
If, on the other hand, the mind is still conscious and working
when it is
freed from its earthly prison, it seeks heaven in its freedom and
surely
spurns all earthly traffic: it enjoys heaven and rejoices in its
release
from the of this world.
'The mind that rushes headlong in its search for fame,
thinking that is its highest good, should look upon the spreading
regions
of the air, and then upon the bounded tracts that are this world:
then
will shame enter it; that, though fame grow, yet can it never
fill so
small a circle. Proud men! why will ye try in vain to free your
necks
from the yoke mortality has set thereon? Though fame may be wide
scattered and find its way through distant lands, and set the
tongues
there talking; though a splendid house may draw brilliance from
famous names and tales; yet death regards not any glory,
howsoever
great. Alike he overwhelms the lowly and the lofty head, and
levels
high with low.
'Where are Fabricius's24 bones,
that honourable
man? What now is Brutus?26 Their fame survives in
this: it has no more
than a few
slight letters shewing forth an empty name. We see their noble
names
engraved, and only know thereby that they are brought to naught.
Ye lie
then all unknown, and fame can give no knowledge of you. But if
you
think that life can be prolonged by the breath of mortal fame,
yet when
the slow time robs you of this too, then there awaits you but a
second
death.
'But,' she said, 'do not think that I would urge
implacable
war upon Fortune. There are VIII times when her deception of men
has certain merits: I
mean when she discovers herself, unveils her face, and proclaims
her ways. Perhaps you do
not yet understand what I would say. It is a strange thing that I
am trying to say, and for that
reason I can scarcely explain myself in
words. I think that ill fortune is of greater advantage to men
than good
fortune. Good fortune is ever lying when she seems to favour by
an
appearance of happiness. Ill fortune is ever true when by her
changes
she shews herself inconstant. The one deceives; the other
edifies. The
one by a deceitful appearance of good things enchains the
Page 54
minds of those who enjoy them: the other frees VIII them by a
knowledge that happiness is so fragile. You see, then, that the
one is
blown about by winds, is ever moving and ever ignorant of its own
self;
the other is sober, ever prepared and ever made provident by the
undergoing of its very adversities. Lastly, good fortune draws
men from
the straight path of true good by her fawning: ill fortune draws
most
men to the true good, and holds them back by her curved staff.
'And do you think that this should be reckoned among the
least
benefits of this rough, unkind, and terrible ill fortune, that
she has
discovered to you the minds of your faithful friends? Fortune has
distinguished for you your sure and your doubtful friends; her
departure
has taken away her friends and left you yours. At what price
could you
have bought this benefit if you had been untouched and, as you
thought,
fortunate? Cease then to seek the wealth you have lost. You have
found your friends, and they are the most precious of all riches.
'Through Love27 the universe with
constancy
makes changes all without discord: earth's elements, though
contrary, abide in treaty bound:
Phoebus in his golden car leads up the glowing day; his
sister rules the night that
Page 55
Hesperus brought: the greedy sea confines its waves in bounds,
lest the
earth's borders be changed by its beating on them: all these are
firmly
bound by Love, which rules both earth and sea, and has its empire
in
the heavens too. If Love should slacken this its hold, all mutual
love
would change to war; and these would strive to undo the scheme
which now their glorious movements carry out with trust and with
accord. By Love are peoples too kept bound together by a treaty
which
they may not break. Love binds with pure affection the sacred tie
of
wedlock, and speaks its bidding to all trusty friends. O happy
race of
mortals, if your hearts are ruled as is the universe, by
Love!'28
Page 56
BOOK III
When she finished her lay, its soothing tones left me
spellbound with
my ears alert in my eagerness to listen. So a while afterwards I
said,
'Greatest comforter of weary minds, how have you cheered me with
your deep thoughts and sweet singing too! No more shall I doubt
my
power to meet the blows of Fortune. So far am I from terror at
the
remedies which you did lately tell me were sharper, that I am
longing
to hear them, and eagerly I beg you for them.'
Then said she, 'I knew it when you laid hold upon
my words in silent attention, and I was waiting for that frame of
mind in you, or more truly, I brought it about in you. They
that remain are indeed bitter to the tongue, but sweet to the
inner
man. But as you say you are eager to hear, how ardently you would
be
burning, if you knew whither I am attempting to lead you!'
Whither is that?' I asked.
'To the true happiness, of which your soul too dreams;
but
your sight is taken up in imaginary views thereof, so that you
cannot
look upon itself.'
Page 57
Then said I, 'I pray you shew me what that truly is, and
quickly.'
'I will do so,' she said, 'for your sake willingly. But
first I
will try to picture in words and give you the form of the cause,
which
is already better known to you, that so, when that picture is
perfect and
you turn your eyes to the other side, you may recognise the form
of
true happiness.
'When a man would sow in virgin soil, first he clears
away
the bushes, cuts the brambles and the ferns, that the
corn-goddess may
go forth laden with her new fruit. The honey, that the bee has
toiled to
give us, is sweeter when the mouth has tasted bitter things. The
stars
shine with more pleasing grace when a storm has ceased to roar
and
pour down rain. After the morning star has dispersed the shades
of
night, the day in all its beauty drives its rosy chariot forth.
So thou hast
looked upon false happiness first; now draw thy neck from under
her
yoke: so shall true happiness now come into thy soul.'
She lowered her eyes for a little while as though
searching the
innermost recesses of her mind; and then she continued:--' The
trouble
of the many and various aims of mortal men bring them much care,
and
herein they go forward by different paths but strive to reach one
end,
which is happiness. And that good is that, to which if any man
attain,
he
Page 58
can desire nothing further. It is that highest of all good
things, and it
embraces in itself all good things: if any good is lacking, it
cannot be
the highest good, since then there is left outside it something
which can
be desired.
Wherefore happiness is a state which is made perfect by the
union of
all good things. This end all men seek to reach, as I said,
though by
different paths. For there is implanted by nature in the minds of
men a
desire for the true good; but error leads them astray towards
false
goods by wrong paths.
'Some men believe that the highest good is to lack
nothing,
and so they are at pains to possess abundant riches. Others
consider the
true good to be that which is most worthy of admiration, and so
they
strive to attain to places of honour, and to be held by their
fellow-citizens in honour thereby. Some determine that the
highest good lies in
the highest power;and so they either desire to reign themselves,
or try
to cleave to those who do reign. Others think that renown is the
greatest
good, and they therefore hasten to make a famous name by the arts
of
peace or of war. But more than all measure the fruit of good by
pleasure and enjoyment, and these think that the happiest man is
abandoned to pleasure.
'Further, there are those who confuse the aims and the
causes
of these good things: as those who desire riches for the sake of
power
or of pleasure, or those who seek power for the sake of money or
celebrity. In these, then, and
Page 59
other things like to them, lies the aim of men's actions and
prayers,
such as renown and popularity, which seem to afford some fame, or
wife and children, which are sought for the pleasure they give.
On the
other hand, the good of friends, which is the most honourable and
holy
of all, lies not in Fortune's but in Virtue's realm. All others
are adopted
for the sake of power or enjoyment.
'Again, it is plain that the good things of the body must
be
accounted to those false causes which we have mentioned; for
bodily
strength and stature seem to make men more able and strong;
beauty
and swiftness seem to give renown; health seems to give pleasure.
By
all these happiness alone is plainly desired. For each man holds
that to
be the highest good, which he seeks before all others. But we
have
defined the highest good to be happiness. Wherefore what each man
desires above all others, he holds to be a state of happiness.
'Wherefore you have each of these placed before you as
the
form of human happiness: wealth, honours, power, glory, and
pleasure.
Epicurus29 considered these forms alone,
and accordingly
determined
upon pleasure as the highest good, because all the others seemed
but
Page 60
to join with it in bringing enjoyment to the mind.
'But to return to the aims of men: their minds seem to
seek
to regain the highest good, and their memories seem to dull their
powers.
It is as though a drunken man were seeking his home, but could
not
remember the way thither. Can those people be altogether wrong
whose
aim it is to lack nothing? No, there is nothing which can make
happiness so perfect as an abundant possession of good things,
needing
naught that belongs to others, but in all ways sufficing for
itself. Surely
those others too are not mistaken who think that what is best is
also
most worthy of reverence and respect. It cannot be any cheap or
base
thing, to attain which almost all men aim and strive. And is
power not
to be accounted a good thing? Surely it is: can that be a weak
thing or
forceless, which is allowed in all cases to excel? Is renown of
no value
? We cannot surrender this; that whatever is most excellent, has
also
great renown. It is hardly worth saying that happiness has no
torturing
cares or gloom, and is not subject to grief and trouble; for even
in
small things, the aim is to find that which it is a delight to
have and to
enjoy. These, then, are the desires of men: they long for riches,
places
of honour, kingdoms, glory, and pleasure;and they long for them
because they think that thereby they will find satisfaction,
veneration,
power, renown, and happiness. It is the good then which men seek
by
their different desires;
Page 61
and it is easy to shew how great a force nature has put therein,
since in
spite of such varying and discordant opinions, they are all
agreed in the
goal they seek, that of the highest good.
'I would to pliant strings set forth a song of how
almighty
Nature turns her guiding reins, telling with what laws her
providence
keeps safe this boundless universe, binding and tying each and
all with
cords that never shall be loosed. The lions of Carthage, though
they
bear the gorgeous bonds and trappings of captivity, and eat the
food
that is given them by hand, and though they fear their harsh
master
with his lash they know so well; yet if once blood has touched
their
bristling jaws, their old, their latent wills return; with deep
roaring they
remember their old selves; they loose their bands and free their
necks,
and their tamer is the first torn by their cruel teeth, and his
blood is
poured out by their rage and wrath.
'If the bird who sings so lustily upon the high tree-top,
be
caught and caged, men may minister to him with dainty care, may
give
him cups of liquid honey and feed him with all gentleness on
plenteous
food; yet if he fly to the roof of his cage and see the shady
trees he
loves, he spurns with his foot the food they have put before him;
the
woods are all his sorrow calls for, for the woods he sings with
his
sweet tones.
'The bough which has been downward thrust by force of
strength to bend its top to
Page 62
earth, so soon as the pressing hand is gone, looks up again
straight to
the sky above.
'Phoebus sinks into the western waves, but by his
unknown track he turns his car once more to his rising in the
east.
'All things must find their own peculiar course again,
and
each rejoices in his own return. Not one can keep the order
handed
down to it, unless in some way it unites its rising to its end,
and so
makes firm, immutable, its own encircling course.
'And you too, creatures of the earth, do
dream of your first state, though with a dim
idea. With whatsoever thinking it may be,
you look to that goal of happiness, though never
so obscure your thoughts: thither, to true
happiness, your natural course does guide you,
and from the same your various errors lead you.
For I would have you consider whether men
can reach the end they have resolved upon,
namely happiness, by these ways by which they
think to attain thereto. If money and places of
honour and such-like do bring anything of that
sort to a man who seems to lack no good thing,
then let us acknowledge with them that men do
become happy by the possession of these things.
But if they cannot perform their promises, and
there is still lack of further good things, surely
it is plain that a false appearance of happiness is
there discovered. You, therefore, who had
lately abundant riches, shall first answer me.
With all that great wealth, was your mind never
Page 63
perturbed by torturing care arising from some sense of
injustice?'
'Yes,' I said; 'I cannot remember that my mind was ever
free from some such care.'
Was it not because something was lacking, which you
missed,
or because something was present to you which you did not like to
have?'
'Yes,' I answered.
'You desired, then, the presence of the one, and the
absence of the other?'
'I acknowledge it.'
'Then,' said she, 'such a man lacks what he desires.'
'He does.'
'But while a man lacks anything, can he possibly satisfy
himself?'
'No,' said I.
'Then, while you were bountifully supplied with wealth,
you felt that you did not satisfy yourself?'
'I did indeed.'
'Then,' said she, 'wealth cannot prevent a man from
lacking
or make him satisfied. And this is what it apparently professed
to do. And
this point too I feel is most important: money has in itself, by
its own
nature, nothing which can prevent its being carried off from
those, who
possess it, against their will.'
'It has not,' I said.
'No, you cannot deny that any stronger man may any day
snatch it from them. For how come about the quarrels of the
law-courts
? Is it not because people try to regain money that
Page 64
has been by force or by fraud taken from them?'
'Yes,' I answered.
'Then,' said she, 'a man will need to seek from the
outside help to guard his own money.'
'That cannot be denied,' I said.
'And a man will not need that unless he possesses money
which he can lose.'
'Undoubtedly he will not.'
'Then the argument turns round the other way,' she said.
'The riches which were thought to make a man all-sufficient for
himself,
do really put him in need of other people's help. Then how can
need be
separated from wealth? Do the rich never feel hunger nor thirst?
Do
the limbs of moneyed men never feel the cold of winter? You will
say,
" Yes, but the rich have the wherewithal to satisfy hunger and
thirst,
and drive away cold." But though riches may thus console wants,
they
cannot entirely take them away. For, though these ever crying
wants,
these continual requests, are satisfied, yet there must exist
that which is
to be satisfied. I need not say that nature is satisfied with
little, greed is
never satisfied. Wherefore, I ask you, if wealth cannot remove
want,
and even creates its own wants, what reason is there that you
should
think it affords satisfaction to a man?
'Though the rich man with greed heap up from ever-flowing
streams
the wealth that cannot satisfy, though he deck himself with
pearls from
the Red Sea's shore, and plough
Page 65
his fertile field with oxen by the score, yet gnawing care will
never in
his lifetime leave him, and at his death his wealth will not go
with him,
but leave him faithlessly.'
'But,' I urged, 'places of honour make the man, to whom
they fall, honoured and venerated.'
'Ah!' she answered, 'have those offices their force in
truth
that they may instil virtues
into the minds of those that hold them, and drive out vices
therefrom?
And yet we are too well accustomed to see them making wickedness
conspicuous rather than avoiding it. Wherefore we are displeased
to see
such places often falling to the most wicked of men, so that
Catullus
called Nonius "a diseased growth,"30
though he sat in the
highest chair
of office. Do you see how great a disgrace high honours can add
to evil
men? Their unworthiness is less conspicuous if they are not made
famous by honours. Could you yourself have been induced by any
dangers to think of being a colleague with
Decoratus,31 when
you saw that he had the mind of an unscrupulous buffoon, and a
base informer? We cannot
consider men worthy of veneration on account of their high
places, when we hold them to be unworthy of those
Page 66
high places. But if you see a man endowed with wisdom, you cannot
but consider him worthy of veneration, or at least of the wisdom
with
which he is endowed. For such a man has the worth peculiar to
virtue,
which it transmits directly to those in whom it is found. But
since
honours from the vulgar crowd cannot create merit, it is plain
that they
have not the peculiar beauty of this worth. And here is a
particular
point to be noticed: if men are the more worthless as they are
despised
by more people, high position makes them all the worse because it
cannot make venerable those whom it shews to so many people to be
contemptible. And this brings its penalty with it: wicked people
bring a
like quality into their positions, and stain them with their
infection.
'Now I would have you consider the matter thus, that you
may recognise that true veneration cannot be won through these
shadowy
honours. If a man who had filled the office of consul many times
in
Rome, came by chance into a country of barbarians, would his high
position make him venerated by the barbarians? Yet if this were a
natural quality in such dignities, they would never lose their
effective
function in any land, just as fire is never aught but hot in all
countries.
But since they do not receive this quality of veneration from any
force
peculiar to themselves, but only from a connexion in the
untrustworthy
opinions of men, they become as nothing as soon as they are among
those who do not consider these dignities as such.
Page 67
'But that is only in the case of foreign peoples. Among
the
very peoples where they had their beginnings, do these dignities
last for
ever? Consider how great was the power in Rome of old of the
office
of Præfect: now it is an empty name and a heavy burden upon
the
income of any man of Senator's rank. 'The præfect then, who
was
commissioner of the corn-market, was held to be a great man. Now
there is no office more despised. For, as I said before, that
which has
no intrinsic beauty, sometimes receives a certain glory,
sometimes loses
it, according to the opinion of those who are concerned with it.
If then
high offices cannot make men venerated, if furthermore they grow
vile
by the infection of bad men, if changes of time can end their
glory, and,
lastly, if they are held cheaply in the estimation of whole
peoples, I ask
you, so far from affording true beauty to men, what beauty have
they in
themselves which men can desire?
'Though Nero decked himself proudly with purple of Tyre
and
snow-white gems, none the less that man of rage and luxury lived
ever
hated of all. Yet would that evil man at times give his
dishonoured
offices to men who were revered. Who then could count men
blessed,
who to such a villain owed their high estate?
'Can kingdoms and intimacies with kings make people
powerful? " Certainly," some The may answer, " in so far as their
happiness is lasting." But
antiquity and our times too are
Page 68
full of examples of the contrary; examples of men whose happiness
as
kings has been exchanged for disaster. What wonderful power,
which is
found to be powerless even for its own preservation! But if this
kingly
power is really a source of happiness, surely then, if it fail in
any way,
it lessens the happiness it brings, and equally causes
unhappiness.
However widely human empires may extend, there must be still more
nations left, over whom each king does not reign. And so, in
whatever
direction this power ceases to make happy, thereby comes in
powerlessness, which makes men unhappy; thus therefore there must
be a greater part of unhappiness in every king's estate. That
tyrant 1
had learnt well the dangers of his lot, who likened the fear
which goes
with kingship to the terror inspired by a sword ever hanging
overhead.
What then is such a power, which cannot drive away the bite of
cares,
nor escape the stings of fear?
'Yet these all would willingly live without fear, but
they
cannot, and yet they boast of their power. Think you a man is
powerful
when you see that he longs for that which he cannot bring to
pass? Do
you reckon a man powerful who walks abroad with dignity and
attended by servants? A man who strikes fear into his subjects,
yet
fears them more himself? Damocles, what it was to be a tyrant,
by setting him in his own seat at a sumptuous banquet, but hung a
sword above him by a hair.
Page 69
A man who must be at the mercy of those that serve him, in order
that
he may seem to have power?
'Need I speak of intimacies with kings when kingship
itself is
shewn to be full of weakness? Not only when kings' powers fall
are
their friends laid low, but often even when their powers are
intact. Nero
compelled his friend and tutor, Seneca,32
to choose how he
would die.
Papinianus,33 for a long while a powerful
courtier, was handed
over to
the soldiers' swords by the Emperor Antoninus. Yet each of these
was
willing to surrender all his power. Seneca even tried to give up
all his
wealth to Nero, and to seek retirement. But the very weight of
their
wealth and power dragged them down to ruin, and neither could do
what he wished.
'What then is that power, whose possessors fear it? in
desiring to possess which, you are not safe, and from which you
cannot
escape, even though you try to lay it down? What help are
friends,
made not by virtue but by fortune? The friend gained by good
fortune
becomes an enemy in ill-fortune. And what plague can more
effectually
injure than an intimate enemy?
'The man who would true power gain, must needs subdue his
own wild thoughts: never
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must he let his passions triumph and yoke his neck by their foul
bonds.
For though the earth, as far as India's shore, tremble before the
laws
you give, though Thule bow to your service on earth's farthest
bounds,
yet if thou canst not drive away black cares, if thou canst not
put to
flight complaints, then is no true power thine.
'How deceitful is fame often, and how base a thing it is!
Justly
did the tragic poet cry out,34 "O Fame,
Fame, how many
lives of men
Of naught hast thou puffed up! " For many men have got a great
name
from the false opinions of the crowd. And what could be baser
than
such a thing? For those who are falsely praised, must blush to
hear
their praises. And if they are justly won by merits, what can
they add to
the pleasure of a wise man's conscience? For he measures his
happiness not by popular talk, but by the truth of his
conscience. If it
attracts a man to make his name widely known, he must equally
think it
a shame if it be not made known. But I have already said that
there
must be yet more lands into which the renown of a single man can
never come; wherefore it follows that the man, whom you think
famous, will seem to have no such fame in the next quarter of the
earth.
'Popular favour seems to me to be unworthy even of
mention under this head, for it comes not by any judgment, and is
never
constant.
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'Again, who can but see how empty a name, and how futile,
is
noble birth? For if its glory is due to renown, it belongs not to
the
man. For the glory of noble birth seems to be praise for the
merits of a
man's forefathers. But if praise creates the renown, it is the
renowned
who are praised. Wherefore, if you have no renown of your own,
that
of others cannot glorify you. But if there is any good in noble
birth, I
conceive it to be this, and this alone, that the highborn seem to
be
bound in honour not to show any degeneracy from their fathers'
virtue.
'From like beginning rise all men on earth, for there is
one
Father of all things; one is the guide of everything. 'Tis He who
gave
the sun his rays, and horns unto the moon. 'Tis He who set
mankind on
earth, and in the heavens the stars. He put within our bodies
spirits
which were born in heaven. And thus a highborn race has He set
forth
in man. Why do ye men rail on your forefathers? If ye look to
your
beginning and your author, which is God, is any man degenerate or
base but he who by his own vices cherishes base things and leaves
that
beginning which was his?
'And now what am I to say of the pleasures of the body?
The
desires of the flesh are full of cares, their fulfilment is full
of remorse.
What terrible diseases, what unbearable griefs,
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truly the fruits of sin, do they bring upon the bodies of those
who enjoy
them! I know not what pleasure their impulse affords, but any who
cares to recall his indulgences of his passions, will know that
the results
of such pleasures are indeed gloomy. If any can shew that those
results
are blest with happiness, then may the beasts of the field be
justly
called blessed, for all their aims are urged toward the
satisfying of their
bodies' wants. The pleasures of wife and children may be most
honourable; but nature makes it all too plain that some have
found
torment in their children. How bitter is any such kind of
suffering, I
need not tell you now, for you have never known it, nor have any
such
anxiety now. Yet in this matter I would hold with my philosopher
Euripides,35 that he who has no children
is happy in his
misfortune.
'All pleasures have this way: those who enjoy them they
drive
on with stings. Pleasure, like the winged bee, scatters its honey
sweet,
then flies away, and with a clinging sting it strikes the hearts
it touches.
'There is then no doubt that these roads to VIII
happiness
are
no roads, and they cannot lead any man to any end whither they
profess
to take him. I would shew you shortly with
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what great evils they are bound up. Would you heap up money? You
will need to tear it from its owner. Would you seem brilliant by
the glory of great
honours? You must kneel before their dispenser, and in your
desire to
surpass other men in honour, you must debase yourself by setting
aside
all pride. Do you long for power? You will be subject to the
wiles of
all over whom you have power, you will be at the mercy of many
dangers. You seek fame? You will be drawn to and fro among rough
paths, and lose all freedom from care. Would you spend a life of
pleasure? Who would not despise and cast off such servitude to so
vile
and brittle a thing as your body? How petty are all the aims of
those
who put before themselves the pleasures of the body, how
uncertain is
the possession of such? In bodily size will you ever surpass the
elephant? In strength will you ever lead the bull, or in speed
the tiger?
Look upon the expanse of heaven, the strength with which it
stands, the
rapidity with which it moves, and cease for a while to wonder at
base
things. This heaven is not more wonderful for those things than
for the
design which guides it. How sweeping is the brightness of outward
form, how swift its movement, yet more fleeting than the passing
of the
flowers of spring. But if, as Aristotle says, many could use the
eyes of
lynxes to see through that which meets the eye, then if they saw
into
the organs within, would not that body,
Page 74
though it had the most fair outside of
Alcibiades, 42
And, on the other hand, the will
sometimes restrains what nature always desires,
namely the operation of begetting, by which
alone the continuance of mortal things becomes
enduring. Thus far, then, this love of
self-preservation arises not from the reasoning
animal's intention, but from natural instinct.
Providence has given to its creatures this the
greatest cause of permanent existence, the
instinctive desire to remain existent so far as
possible. Wherefore you have no reason to
doubt that all things, which exist, seek a
permanent existence by nature, and similarly
avoid extinction.'
'Yes,' I said, 'I confess that I see now
beyond all doubt what appeared to me just now
uncertain.'
'But,' she continued, 'that which seeks to
continue its existence, aims at unity; for take
Page 93
this away, and none will have any chance of
continued existence.'
'That is true.'
'Then all things desire unity,' she said, and
I agreed.
'But we have shewn unity to be identical
with the good? '
'Yes,' said I.
'Then all things desire the good; and that
you may define as being the absolute good
which is desired by all.'
'Nothing could be more truthfully reasoned.
For either everything is brought back to
nothing, and all will flow on at random with
no guiding head; or if there is any universal
aim, it will be the sum of all good.'
'Great is my rejoicing, my son,' said she,
'for you have set firmly in your mind the mark
of the central truth. And hereby is made
plain to you that which you a short time ago
said that you knew not.'
'What was that? '
'What was the final aim of all things,' she
said, 'for that is plainly what is desired by all:
since we have agreed that that is the good, we
must confess that the good is the end of all
things.
'If any man makes search for truth with all
his penetration, and would be led astray by no
deceiving paths, let him turn upon himself the
light of an inward gaze, let him bend by force
the long-drawn wanderings of his thoughts into
Page 94
one circle; let him tell surely to his soul,
that he has, thrust away within the treasures of
his mind, all that he labours to acquire without.
Then shall that truth, which now was hid in
error's darkening cloud, shine forth more clear
than Phoebus's self. For the body, though it
brings material mass which breeds forgetfulness,
has never driven forth all light from the mind.
The seed of truth does surely cling within, and
can be roused as a spark by the fanning of
philosophy. For if it is not so, how do ye
men make answers true of your own instinct
when teachers question you? Is it not that the
quick spark of truth lies buried in the heart's
low depths? And if the Muse of Plato sends
through those depths the voice of truth, each
man has not forgotten and is but reminding
himself of what he learns.'43
When she made an end, I said, 'I agree
very strongly with Plato; for this is the second
time that you have reminded me of these
thoughts. The first time I had lost them
through the material influence of the body; the
second, when overwhelmed by this weight of
trouble.'
'If,' said she, 'you look back upon what we
that have agreed upon earlier, you will also soon
recall what you just now said you knew not.'
'What is that?' I asked.
Page 95
'The guidance by which the universe is directed.'
'Yes, I remember confessing my ignorance,
and though I think I foresee the answer you
will offer, I am eager to hear you explain it more fully.'
'This world,' she said, 'you thought a
little while ago must without doubt be guided by God.'
'And I think so now,' I said, 'and will
never think there is any doubt thereof; and I
will shortly explain by what reasoning I arrive
at that point. This universe would never have
been suitably put together into one form from
such various and opposite parts, unless there
were some One who joined such different parts
together; and when joined, the very variety of
their natures, so discordant among themselves,
would break their harmony and tear them
asunder unless the One held together what it
wove into one whole. Such a fixed order of
nature could not continue its course, could not
develop motions taking such various directions
in place, time, operation, space, and attributes,
unless there were One who, being immutable,
had the disposal of these various changes. And
this cause of their remaining fixed and their
moving, I call God, according to the name
familiar to all.'
Then said she, 'Since these are your feelings,
I think there is but little trouble left me before
you may revisit your home with happiness in
your grasp. But let us look into the matter we
Page 96
have set before ourselves. Have we not shewn
that complete satisfaction exists in true happiness,
and we have agreed that God is happiness
itself, have we not? '
'We have.'
'Wherefore He needs no external aid in
governing the universe, or, if He had any such
need, He would not have this complete
sufficiency. '
'That of necessity follows,' I said.
'Then He arranges all things by Himself.'
Without doubt He does.'
'And God has been shewn to be the
absolute good.'
'Yes, I remember.'
'Then He arranges all things by good, if
He arranges them by Himself, whom we have
agreed to be the absolute good. And so this
is the tiller and rudder by which the ship of the
universe is kept sure and unbreakable.'
'I feel that most strongly,' I said; 'and I
foresaw that you would say so before, though
I had a slight uncertainty.'
'I believe you,' she said, 'for now you
bring your eyes more watchfully to scan the
truth. But what I am going to say is no less
plain to the sight.'
'What is that; '
'Since we may reasonably be sure that God
steers all things by the helm of goodness, and,
as I have shewn you, all things have a natural
instinct to hasten towards the good, can there
be any doubt that they are guided according to
Page 97
their own will: and that of their own accord
they turn to the will of the supreme disposer,
as though agreeing with, and obedient to, the
helmsman? '
'That is so,' I said, 'and the government
would not seem happy if it was a yoke upon
discontented necks, and not the salvation of the
submissive.'
'Then nothing need oppose God's way for
its own nature's preservation.'
'No.'
'But if it try to oppose Him, will it ever
have any success at all against One whom we
have justly allowed to be supremely powerful in
matters of happiness? '
'Certainly not. '
'Then there is nothing which could have
the will or the power to resist the highest good? '
I think not.'
'Then it is the highest good which is
guiding with strength and disposing with gentleness?'
Then said I, 'How great pleasure these
things give me! not only those which have
been proved by the strongest arguments, but
still more the words in which you prove them,
which make me ashamed that my folly has
bragged so loudly.'
'You have heard in mythology how the
giants attacked heaven. It was this kindly
strength which overthrew them too, as was
their desert. But would you care to put these
Page 98
arguments at variance? For perhaps from such
a friction, some fair spark of truth may leap
forth.'
'As you hold best,' I said.
'Nobody would care to doubt that God is all-powerful? '
'At any rate, no sane man would doubt it.'
'Being, then, all-powerful, nothing is beyond His power?
'
'Nothing.'
'Can, then, God do evil? '
'No.'
'Then evil is nothing, since it is beyond His
power, and nothing is beyond His power? '
'Are you playing with me,' I asked, 'weaving
arguments as a labyrinth out of which I shall
find no way? You may enter a labyrinth by
the way by which you may come forth: come
now forth by the way you have gone in: or are
you folding your reason in some wondrous circle
of divine simplicity? A little while ago you
started from happiness, and said that happiness
was the highest good; and you shewed how
that rested in the highest Deity. And you
reasoned that God too was the highest good,
and the fullest happiness; and you allowed, as
though granting a slight gift, that none could
be happy except such as were similarly divine.
Again, you said that the essence of God and
of happiness was identical with the very form of
good; and that that alone was good which was
sought by all nature. And you argued, too,
that God guided this universe by the helm of
Page 99
goodness; and that all creatures with free will
obeyed this guidance, and that there was no
such thing as natural evil; and all these things
you developed by no help from without, but by
homely and internal proofs, each gaining its
credence from that which went before it.'
Then she answered, 'I was not mocking you.
We have worked out the greatest of all matters
by the grace of God, to whom we prayed.
For the form of the divine essence is such that
it is not diffused without, nor receives aught
into itself from without. But as Parmenides
says of it, " It is a mass well rounded upon all
sides."44
But if you examine it with reasoning, sought for not externally
but by lying within the sphere
of the very thing we are handling,
you will not wonder at what you have learnt on Plato's authority,
45
that our language must be
akin to the subjects of which we speak.
'Happy the man who could reach the crystal
fount of good: happy he who could shake off
Page 100
the chains of matter and of earth. The singer
of Thrace in olden time lamented his dead
wife: by his tearful strains he made the trees
to follow him, and bound the flowing streams to
stay: for him the hind would fearlessly go side
by side with fiercest lions, and the hare would
look upon the hound, nor be afraid, for he was
gentle under the song's sway. But when the
hotter flame burnt up his inmost soul, even the
strains, which had subdued all other things,
could not soothe their own lord's mind. Complaining
of the hard hearts of the gods above,
he dared approach the realms below. There
he tuned his songs to soothing tones, and sang
the lays he had drawn from his
mother's 46
fount
of excellence. His unrestrained grief did give
him power, his love redoubled his grief's power:
his mourning moved the depths of hell. With
gentlest prayers he prayed to the lords of the
shades for grace. The three-headed
porter47
was taken captive with amazement at his fresh
songs. The avenging goddesses,48
who haunt
with fear the guilty, poured out sad tears.
Ixion's 49
wheel no longer swiftly turned.
Tantalus,50
so long abandoned unto thirst, could
Page 101
then despise the flowing stream. The vulture,
satisfied by his strains, tore not awhile at
Tityos's51
heart. At last the lord of the shades52
in pity
cried: "We are conquered; take your bride
with you, bought by your song; but one condition
binds our gift: till she has left these
dark abodes, turn not your eyes upon her."
Who shall set a law to lovers? Love is a
greater law unto itself. Alack! at the very
bounds of darkness Orpheus looked upon his
Eurydice; looked, and lost her, and was lost
himself.
'To you too this tale refers; you, who seek
to lead your thoughts to the light above. For
whosoever is overcome of desire, and turns his
gaze upon the darkness 'neath the earth, he,
while he looks on hell, loses the prize he
carried off.'
Page 102
BOOK IV
THUS gently sang the Lady Philosophy with
dignified mien and grave countenance; and
when she ceased, I, who had not thoroughly
forgotten the grief within me, interrupted her
as she was about to speak further. 'Herald of
true light,' I said, 'right clear have been the
outpourings of your speech till now, seeming
inspired as one contemplates them, and invincible
through your reasonings. And though
through grief for the injustices I suffer, I had
forgotten them, yet you have not spoken of
They what I knew not at all before. But this one
thing is the chief cause of my grief, namely
that, when there exists a good governor of the
world, evils should exist at all, or, existing,
should go unpunished. I would have you think
how strange is this fact alone. But there is an
even stranger attached thereto: ill-doing reigns
and flourishes, while virtue not only lacks its
reward, but is even trampled underfoot by wicked
doers, and pays the penalties instead of crime.
Who can wonder and complain enough that
such things should happen under the rule of
One who, while all-knowing and all-powerful,
wills good alone? '
Then she answered: 'Yes, it would be most
terrible, monstrous, and infinitely amazing if
Page 103
it were as you think. It would be as though in
a well-ordered house of a good master, the vilest
vessels were cared for while the precious were
left defiled. But it is not so. If our former conclusions
are unshaken, God Himself, of whose
government we speak, will teach you that the
good are always powerful, the evil are always
the lowest and weakest; vice never goes unpunished;
virtue never goes without its own
reward; happiness comes to the good, misfortune
to the wicked: and when your complaints are
set at rest, many such things would most firmly
strengthen you in this opinion. You have seen
now from my teaching the form of true happiness;
you know now its place: let us go
quickly through all that must be lightly passed
over, and let me shew you the road which shall
lead you to your home. I will give wings to
your mind, by which it shall raise itself aloft:
so shall disquiet be driven away, and you may
return safe to your home by my guidance, by
the path I shall shew you, even by myself
carrying you thither.
'Yea, airy wings are mine to scale the heights
of heaven; when these the mind has donned,
swiftly she loathes and spurns this earth. She
soars above the sphere of this vast atmosphere,
sees the clouds behind her far; she passes
high above the topmost fires which seethe above
the feverish turmoil of the air, 53
until she rises
Page 104
to the stars' own home, and joins her path
unto the sun's; or accompanies on her path the
cold and ancient Saturn, maybe as the shining
warrior Mars; or she may take her course
through the circle of every star that decks the
night. And when she has had her fill of
journeying, then may she leave the sky and
tread the outer plane of the swift moving air,
as mistress of the awful light. Here holds the
King of kings His sway, and guides the reins
of the universe, and Himself unmoved He
drives His winged chariot, the bright disposer
of the world. And if this path brings thee
again hither, the path that now thy memory
seeks to recall, I tell thee, thou shalt say,
" This is my home, hence was I derived, here
shall I stay my course." But if thou choose to
look back upon the earthly night behind thee,
thou shalt see as exiles from light the tyrants
whose grimness made wretched peoples so to
fear.'
'Wondrous,' I cried; 'what vast things do
you promise! and I doubt not that you can
fulfil them. I only beg that you will not hold
me back with delays, now that you have excited
me thus far.'
'First, then, you must learn that power is
never lacking to the good, while the wicked are
devoid of all strength. The proofs of these
two statements hang upon each other. For
good and bad are opposites, and therefore, if it
is allowed that good is powerful, the weakness
Page 105
of evil is manifest: if the weakness and uncertainty
of evil is made plain, the strength and
sureness of good is proved. To gain more full
credit for my opinion, I will go on to make my
argument sure by first the one, then the other of
the two paths, side by side.
'It is allowed that there are two things upon
which depend the entire operation of human
actions: they are will and power. For if the
will be wanting, a man does not even attempt
that which he has no desire to perform; if the
power be wanting, the will is exercised in vain.
Wherefore, if you see a man wish for that which
he will in no wise gain, you cannot doubt that
he lacks the power to attain that which he
wishes.'
'That is plain beyond doubt.'
'And if you see a man gain that which he
wishes, can you doubt that he has the power? '
'No.'
'But wherein a man has power, he is strong;
wherein he has not power, he must be counted
weak? '
'Yes.'
'Do you remember that we agreed from our
earlier reasonings, that the instinct of all human
will, though acted upon by different aims, does
lead with eagerness towards happiness? '
'Yes,' said I, 'I remember that that too was
proved.'
'Do you remember that happiness is the
absolute good, and that the good is desired of
all, when in that manner happiness is sought? '
Page 106
'I need not recall that,' I said, 'since it is
present fixedly in my memory.'
'Then all men, good and bad alike, seek to
arrive at the good by no different instincts? '
'Yes, that follows necessarily.'
'But it is certain that the good become so by
the attainment of good? '
'Yes.'
'Then the good attain that which they wish? '
'Yes,' said I, 'it seems so.'
'But if evil men attain the good they seek,
they cannot be evil? '
'No.'
'Since, then, both classes seek the good, which
the good attain, but the evil attain not, it is
plain that the good are powerful, while the evil
are weak? '
'If any doubt that, he cannot judge by the
nature of the world, nor by the sequence of
arguments.'
Again she said, 'If there are two persons
before whom the same object is put by natural
instinct, and one person carries his object
through, working by his natural functions, but
the other cannot put his natural instinct into
practice, but using some function unsuitable to
nature he can imitate the successful person, but
not fulfil his original purpose, in this case, which of
the two do you decide to be the more capable? '
'I think I guess what you mean, but I would
hear more explicitly.'
'You will not, I think, deny that the motion
of walking is a natural one to mankind? '
Page 107
'No, I will not.'
'And is not that the natural function of the
feet? '
'Yes.'
'If, then, one man walks, being able to advance
upon his feet, while another, who lacks the
natural function of feet, uses his hands and so
tries to walk, which of these two may justly be
held the more capable? '
'Weave me other riddles!' I exclaimed,
'for can any one doubt that a man who enjoys
his natural functions, is more capable than one
who is incapable in that respect? '
'But in the case of the highest good,' she
said, 'it is equally the purpose set before good
and bad men; good men seek it by the natural
functions of virtue, while bad men seek to attain
the same through their cupidity, which is not a
natural function for the attainment of good.
Think you not so? '
'I do indeed,' said I; 'this is plain, as also
is the deduction which follows. For it must
be, from what I have already allowed, that the
good are powerful, the wicked weak.'
'Your anticipation is right; and as doctors
are wont to hope, it shews a lively nature now
fit to withstand disease. But I see that you are
very ready in understanding, and I will multiply
my arguments one upon another. See how
great is the weakness of these wicked men who
cannot even attain that to which their natural
instinct leads them, nay, almost drives them.
And further, how if they are deprived of this
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great, this almost invincible, aid of a natural
instinct to follow? Think what a powerlessness
possesses these men. They are no light
objects which they seek; they seek no objects
in sport, objects which it is impossible that they
should achieve. They fail in the very highest
of all things, the crown of all, and in this they
find none of the success for which they labour
day and night in wretchedness. But herein the
strength of good men is conspicuous. If a man
could advance on foot till he arrived at an
utmost point beyond which there was no path
for further advance, you would think him most
capable of walking: equally so, if a man grasps
the very end and aim of his search, you must
think him most capable. Wherefore also the
contrary is true; that evil men are similarly
deprived of all strength. For why do they
leave virtue and follow after vice? Is it from
ignorance of good? Surely not, for what is
weaker or less compelling than the blindness of
ignorance? Do they know what they ought to
follow, and are they thrown from the straight
road by passions? Then they must be weak
too in self-control if they cannot struggle with
their evil passions. But they lose thus not only
power, but existence all together. For those
who abandon the common end of all who exist,
must equally cease to exist. And this may
seem strange, that we should say that evil men,
though the majority of mankind, do not exist at
all; but it is so. For while I do not deny that
evil men are evil, I do deny that they " are,"
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in the sense of absolute existence. You may
say, for instance, that a corpse is a dead man,
but you cannot call it a man. In a like manner,
though I grant that wicked men are bad, I
cannot allow that they are men at all, as regards
absolute being. A thing exists which keeps its
proper place and preserves its nature; but when
anything falls away from its nature, its existence
too ceases, for that lies in its nature. You
will say, " Evil men are capable of evil ": and
that I would not deny. But this very power of
theirs comes not from strength, but from weakness.
They are capable of evil; but this evil
would have no efficacy if it could have stayed
under the operation of good men. And this
very power of ill shews the more plainly that
their power is naught. For if, as we have
agreed, evil is nothing, then, since they are only
capable of evil, they are capable of nothing '
'That is quite plain.'
'I would have you understand what is this
strength of power. We have a little while ago
laid down that nothing is more powerful than
the highest good? '
'Yes,' I said.
'But the highest good can do no evil? '
'No.'
'Is there any one who thinks that men are
all-powerful? '
'No one,' I said, 'unless he be mad.'
'And yet those same men can do evil.'
Would to heaven they could not!' I cried.
'Then a powerful man is capable only of all
Page 110
good; but even those who are capable of evil,
are not capable of all: so it is plain that those
who are capable of evil, are capable of less.
Further, we have shewn that all power is to be
counted among objects of desire, and all objects
of desire have their relation to the good, as to
the coping-stone of their nature. But the power
of committing crime has no possible relation to
the good. Therefore it is not an object of
desire. Yet, as we said, all power is to be
desired. Therefore the power of doing evil is
no power at all. For all these reasons the
power of good men and the weakness of evil
men is apparent. So Plato's opinion54
is plain
that " the wise alone are able to do what they
desire, but unscrupulous men can only labour at
what they like, they cannot fulfil their real
desires." They do what they like so long as
they think that they will gain through their
pleasures the good which they desire; but they
do not gain it, since nothing evil ever reaches
happiness.
'Kings you may see sitting aloft upon their
thrones, gleaming with purple, hedged about
with grim guarding weapons, threatening with
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fierce glances, and their hearts heaving with
passion. If any man take from these proud
ones their outward covering of empty honour,
he will see within, will see that these great
ones bear secret chains. For the heart of one
is thus filled by lust with the poisons of greed,
or seething rage lifts up its waves and lashes his
mind therewith: or gloomy grief holds them
weary captives, or by slippery hopes they are
tortured. So when you see one head thus
labouring beneath so many tyrants, you know
he cannot do as he would, for by hard task-
masters is the master himself oppressed.
'Do you see then in what a slough crimes
are invo]ved, and with what glory honesty
shines forth? It is plain from this that reward
is never lacking to good deeds, nor punishment
to crime. We may justly say that the reward
of every act which is performed is the object
for which it is performed. For instance, on
the racecourse the crown for which the runner
strives is his reward. But we have shewn that
happiness is the identical good for the sake of
which all actions are performed. Therefore
the absolute good is the reward put before all
human actions. But good men cannot be
deprived of this. And further, a man who
lacks good cannot justly be described as a
good man; wherefore we may say that good
habits never miss their rewards. Let the
wicked rage never so wildly, the wise man's
crown shall never fail nor wither. And the
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wickedness of bad men can never take away
from good men the glory which belongs to
them. Whereas if a good man rejoiced in a
glory which he received from outside, then
could another, or even he, may be, who granted
it, carry it away. But since honesty grants to
every good man its own rewards, he will only
lack his reward when he ceases to be good.
And lastly, since every reward is sought for
the reason that it is held to be good, who shall
say that the man, who possesses goodness, does
not receive his reward? And what reward is
this? Surely the fairest and greatest of all.
Remember that corollary 55
which I emphasised
when speaking to you a little while ago; and
reason thus therefrom. While happiness is the
absolute good, it is plain that all good men
become good by virtue of the very fact that
they are good. But we agreed that happy men
are as gods. Therefore this is the reward of
the good, which no time can wear out, no
power can lessen, no wickedness can darken;
they become divine. In this case, then, no wise
man can doubt of the inevitable punishment of
the wicked as well. For good and evil are so
set, differing from each other just as reward and
punishment are in opposition to each other:
hence the rewards, which we see fall to the
good, must correspond precisely to the punishments
of the evil on the other side. As,
therefore, honesty is itself the reward of the
honest, so wickedness is itself the punishment
Page 113
of the wicked. Now whosoever suffers punishment,
doubts not that he is suffering an evil:
if, then, they are ready so to judge of themselves,
can they think that they do not receive
punishment, considering that they are not only
affected but thoroughly permeated by wickedness,
the worst of all evils?
'Then, from the other point of view of the
good, see what a punishment ever goes with the
wicked. You have learnt a little while past
that all that exists is one, and that the good
itself is one; it follows therefrom that all that
exists must appear to be good. In this way,
therefore, all that falls away from the good,
ceases also to exist, wherefore evil men cease
to be what they were. The form of their
human bodies still proves that they have been
men; wherefore they must have lost their
human nature when they turned to evil-doing.
But as goodness alone can lead men forward
beyond their humanity, so evil of necessity will
thrust down below the honourable estate of
humanity those whom it casts down from their
first position. The result is that you cannot
hold him to be a man who has been, so to say,
transformed by his vices. If a violent man
and a robber burns with greed of other men's
possessions, you say he is like a wolf. Another
fierce man is always working his restless tongue
at lawsuits, and you will compare him to a
hound. Does another delight to spring upon
men from ambushes with hidden guile? He is
as a fox. Does one man roar and not restrain
Page 114
his rage? He would be reckoned as having
the heart of a lion. Does another flee and
tremble in terror where there is no cause of
fear? He would be held to be as deer. If
another is dull and lazy, does he not live the
life of an ass? One whose aims are inconstant
and ever changed at his whims, is in no wise
different from the birds. If another is in a
slough of foul and filthy lusts, he is kept down
by the lusts of an unclean swine. Thus then a
man who loses his goodness, ceases to be a man,
and since he cannot change his condition for
that of a god, he turns into a beast.
'The east wind wafted the sails which carried
on the wandering ships of Ithaca's king to the
island where dwelt the fair goddess Circe, the
sun's own daughter. There for her new guests
she mingled cups bewitched by charms. Her
hand, well skilled in use of herbs, changed these
guests to different forms. One bears the face
of a boar; another grows like to an African
lion with fangs and claws; this one becomes as
a wolf, and when he thinks to weep, he howls;
that one is an Indian tiger, though he walks all
harmless round about the dwelling-place. The
leader alone, Ulysses, though beset by so many
dangers, was saved from the goddess's bane by
the pity of the winged god, Mercury. But the
sailors had drunk of her cups, and now had
turned from food of corn to husks and acorns,
food of swine. Naught is left the same,
speech and form are gone; only the mind remains
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unchanged, to bewail their unnatural
sufferings.
'How weak was that hand, how powerless
those magic herbs which could change the
limbs but not the heart! Within lies the
strength of men, hidden in deep security.
Stronger are those dread poisons which can
drag a man out of himself, which work their
way within: they hurt not the body, but on
the mind their rage inflicts a grievous
wound.'56
Then I answered: 'I confess that I think
it is justly said that vicious men keep only the
outward bodily form of their humanity, and, in
the attributes of their souls, are changed to
beasts. But I would never have allowed them
willingly the power to rage in the ruin of
good men through their fierce and wicked
intentions.'
'They have not that power,' said she, 'as I
will shew you at a convenient time. But if
this very power, which you believe is allowed
to them, were taken from them, the punishment
of vicious men would be to a great extent
lightened. For, though some may scarcely
believe it, evil men must be more unhappy
when they carry out their ill desires than when
they cannot fulfil them. For if it is pitiable
to have wished bad things, it is more pitiable
to have had the power to perform them, without
which power the performance of this pitiable
will would never have effect. Thus, when you
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see men with the will and the power to commit
a crime, and you see them perform it, they
must be the victims of a threefold misfortune,
since each of those three things brings its own
misery.
'Yes,' said I,' I agree; but I do wish from
my heart that they may speedily be rid of one
of these misfortunes, being deprived of this
power of doing evil.'
'They will be rid of it,' she said, 'more
speedily even than you wish perhaps, and
sooner than they think they will be rid thereof.
There is in the short course of life naught
which is so long coming that an immortal mind
can think it has long to wait for it. Many a
time are their high hopes and great plans for
evil-doing cut short by a sudden and unlooked-
for end. This indeed it is that sets a limit to
their misery. For if wickedness makes a man
miserable, the longer he is wicked, the more
miserable must he be; and I should hold them
most miserable of all, if not even death at last
put an end to their evil-doing. If we have
reached true conclusions concerning the unhappiness
of depravity, the misery, which is said to
be eternal, can have no limit.'
'That is a strange conclusion and hard to
accept. But I see that it is suited too well by
what we have agreed upon earlier.'
'You are right,' she said; 'but when one
finds it hard to agree with a conclusion, one
ought in fairness to point out some fault in the
argument which has preceded, or shew that
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the sequence of statements is not so joined
together as to effectively lead to the conclusion;
otherwise, if the premises are granted, it is not
just to cavil at the inference. This too, which
I am about to say, may not seem less strange,
but it follows equally from what has been taken
as fact.'
'What is that?' I asked.
'That wicked men are happier when they
pay the penalty for their wickedness than when
they receive no penalty at the hands of
justice.57
I am not going to urge what may occur to any
one, namely, that depraved habits are corrected
by penalties, and drawn towards the right by
fear of punishment, and that an example is
hereby given to others to avoid all that deserves
blame. But I think that the wicked who are
not punished are in another way the more
unhappy, without regard to the corrective
quality of punishment, nor its value as an
example.'
'And what way is there other than these?'
'We have allowed, have we not,' she said,
'that the good are happy, but the bad are
miserable .
'Yes.'
'Then if any good be added to the misery of
any evil man, is he not happier than the man
whose miserable state is purely and simply
miserable without any good at all mingled
therewith?'
'I suppose so.'
Page 118
'What if some further evil beyond those
by which a man, who lacked all good things,
were made miserable, were added to his
miseries? Should not he be reckoned far more
unhappy than the man whose misfortune was
lightened by a share in some good? '
'Of course it is so.'
'Therefore,' she said, 'the wicked when
punished have something good added to their
lot, to wit, their punishment, which is good by
reason of its quality of justice; and they also,
when unpunished, have something of further
evil, their very impunity, which you have
allowed to be an evil, by reason of its injustice.'
'I cannot deny that,' said I.
'Then the wicked are far more unhappy
when they are unjustly unpunished, than when
they are justly punished. It is plain that it is
just that the wicked should be punished, and
unfair that they should escape punishment.'
'No one will gainsay you.'
'But no one will deny this either, that all
which is just is good; and on the other part,
all that is unjust is evil.'
Then I said: 'The arguments which we
have accepted bring us to that conclusion.
But tell me, do you leave no punishment of the
soul to follow after the death of the body?'
'Yes,' she answered, 'heavy punishments,
of which some, I think, are effected by bitter
penalties, others by a cleansing
mercy. 58
But
Page 119
it is not my intention to discuss these now.
My object has been to bring you to know
that the power of evil men, which seems to
you so unworthy, is in truth nothing; and that
you may see that those wicked men, of whose
impunity you complained, do never miss the
reward of their ill-doing; and that you may
learn that their passion, which you prayed
might soon be cut short, is not long-enduring,
and that the longer it lasts, the more unhappiness
it brings, and that it would be most unhappy
if it endured for ever. Further, I have
tried to shew you that the wicked are more to
be pitied if they escape with unjust impunity,
than if they are punished by just retribution.
And it follows upon this fact that they will be
undergoing heavier penalties when they are
thought to be unpunished.'
'When I hear your arguments, I feel sure
that they are true as possible. But if I turn to
human opinions, I ask what man would not
think them not only incredible, but even
unthinkable? '
'Yes,' she said, 'for men cannot raise to the
transparent light of truth their eyes which have
been accustomed to darkness. They are like
those birds whose sight is clear at night, but
blinded by daylight. So long as they look not
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upon the true course of nature, but upon their
own feelings, they think that the freedom of
passion and the impunity of crime are happy
things. Think upon the sacred ordinances of
eternal law. If your mind is fashioned after
better things, there is no need of a judge to
award a prize; you have added yourself to the
number of the more excellent. If your mind
sinks to worse things, seek no avenger from
without: you have thrust yourself downward
to lower things. It is as though you were
looking at the squalid earth and the heavens in
turn; then take away all that is about you;
and by the power of sight, you will seem to be
in the midst now of mud, now of stars. But
mankind looks not to such things. What then
shall we do? Shall we join ourselves to those
whom we have shewn to be as beasts? If a
man lost utterly his sight, and even forgot that
he had ever seen, so that he thought he lacked
naught of human perfection, should we think
that such a blind one can see as we do? Most
people would not even allow another point,
which rests no less firmly upon strong reasons,
namely, that those who do an injury are more
unhappy than those who suffer one.' 59
'I would hear those strong reasons,' I said.
'You do not deny that every wicked man
deserves punishment? '
'No.'
'It is plain for many reasons that the wicked
are unhappy? '
Page 121
'Yes.'
'Then you doubt not that those who are
worthy of punishment are miserable? '
'No, I agree.'
'If then you were sitting as a judge, upon
which would you consider punishment should
fall--the man who did the injury, or the man
who suffered it? '
'I have no hesitation in saying that I would
make amends to the sufferer at the expense of
the doer of the injustice.'
'Then the doer of the injustice would seem
to you more miserable than the sufferer? '
'That follows.'
'Then from this,' said she, 'and other
causes which rest upon the same foundation,
it is plain that, since baseness makes men more
miserable by its own nature, the misery is
brought not to the sufferer of an injustice, but
to the doer thereof. But the speakers in law-
courts take the opposite course: they try to
excite the pity of the judges for those who
have suffered any heavy or bitter wrong; but
more justly their pity would be due to those
who have committed the wrong. These guilty
men ought to be brought, by accusers kindly
rather than angry, to justice, as patients to a
doctor, that their disease of crime may be
checked by punishment. Under such an
arrangement the occupation of advocates for
defence would either come to a complete stand-
still, or if it seemed more to the advantage of
mankind, it might turn to the work of prosecution.
Page 122
And if the wicked too themselves
might by some device look on virtue left behind
them, and if they could see that they would
lay aside the squalor of vice by the pain of
punishment, and that they would gain the compensation
of achieving virtue again, they would
no longer hold it punishment, but would refuse
the aid of advocates for their defence, and
would intrust themselves unreservedly to their
accusers and their judges. In this way there
would be no place left for hatred among wise
men. For who but the most foolish would
hate good men? And there is no cause to
hate bad men. Vice is as a disease of the
mind, just as feebleness shews ill-health in the
body. As, then, we should never think that
those, who are sick in the body, deserve hatred,
so are those, whose minds are oppressed by a
fiercer disease than feebleness, namely wickedness,
much more worthy of pity than of
persecution.
'To what good end do men their passions
raise, even to drag from fate their deaths by
their own hands? If ye seek death, she is
surely nigh of her own will; and her winged
horses she will not delay. Serpents and lions,
bears, tigers and boars, all seek your lives with
their fangs, yet do ye seek them with swords?
Is it because your manners are so wide in
variance that men raise up unjust battles and
savage wars, and seek to perish by each other's
darts? Such is no just reason for this cruelty.
Page 123
Wouldst thou apportion merit to merit fitly?
Then love good men as is their due, and for
the evil shew your pity.'
Then said I, 'I see how happiness and
misery lie inseparably in the deserts of good
and bad men. But I am sure that there is
some good and some bad in the general fortune
of men. For no wise man even would wish to
be exiled, impoverished, and disgraced rather
than full of wealth, power, veneration, and
strength, and flourishing securely in his own
city. The operation of wisdom is shewn in
this way more nobly and clearly, when the
happiness of rulers is in a manner transmitted
to the people who come into contact with their
rule; and especially when prisons, bonds, and
other penalties of the law become the lot of the
evil citizens for whom they were designed. I
am struck with great wonder why these dues
are interchanged; why punishments for crimes
fall upon the good, while the bad citizens seize
the rewards of virtue; and I long to learn from
you what reason can be put forward for such
unjust confusion. I should wonder less if I
could believe that everything was the confusion
of accident and chance. But now the thought
of God's guidance increases my amazement;
He often grants happiness to good men and
bitterness to the bad, and then, on the other
hand, sends hardships to the good and grants
the desires of the wicked. Can we lay our
hands on any cause? If not, what can make
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this state different in any way from accidental
chance? '
'It is no wonder,' she answered, 'if one who
knows not the order and reasons of nature,
should think it is all at random and confused.
But doubt not, though you know not the cause
of such a great matter of the world's government,
doubt not, I say, that all is rightly done,
because a good Governor rules the universe.
'If any man knows not that the star
Arcturus60
has his course nearest the topmost pole
how shall he not be amazed that Bo”tes so
slowly takes his wain and is so late to dip his
brightness in the ocean, and yet so swiftly turns
to rise again? The law of heaven on high
will but bewilder him. When the full moon
grows dim to its horns, darkened by the shadow
of dull night, when Phoebe thus lays bare all
the varying bands of the stars, which she had
hidden by the power of her shining face: then
are the nations stirred by the errors of the
vulgar, and beat without ceasing brazen
cymbals.61
No man is surprised when the blasts of
the wind beat a shore with roaring waves, nor
when a solid mass of frozen snow is melted by
Page 125
the warmth of Phoebus's rays; for herein the
causes are ready at hand to be understood.
But in those other matters the causes are
hidden, and so do trouble all men's hearts, for
time does not grant them to advance with
experience in such things as seldom recur: the
common herd is ever amazed at all that is
extraordinary. But let the cloudy errors of
ignorance depart, and straightway these shall
seem no longer marvellous.'
'That is true,' I said; 'but it is your kind
office to unravel the causes of hidden matters,
and explain reasons now veiled in darkness;
wherefore I beg of you, put forth your decree
and expound all to me, since this wonder most
deeply stirs my mind.'
Then said she, smiling, 'Your question calls
me to the greatest of all these matters, and a
full answer thereto is well-nigh impossible.
For this is its kind: if one doubt be cut away,
innumerable others arise, as the Hydra's heads;
and there can be no limit unless a man restrains
them by the most quick fire of the mind. For
herein lie the questions of the directness of
Providence, the course of Fate, chances which
cannot be foreseen, knowledge, divine predestination,
and freedom of judgment. You
can judge for yourself the weight of these
questions. But since it is a part of your treatment
to know some of these, I will attempt to
make some advantage therefrom, though we are
penned in by our narrow space of time. But
Page 126
if you enjoy the delights of song, you must
wait a while for that pleasure, while I weave
together for you the chain of reasons.'
'As you will,' said I.
Then, as though beginning afresh, she spake
thus:
'The engendering of all things, the whole
advance of all changing natures, and every
motion and progress in the world, draw their
causes, their order, and their forms from the
allotment of the unchanging mind of God,
which lays manifold restrictions on all action
from the calm fortress of its own directness
Such restrictions are called Providence when
they can be seen to lie in the very simplicity of
divine understanding; but they were called
Fate in old times when they were viewed with
reference to the objects which they moved or
arranged. It will easily be understood that
these two are very different if the mind
examines the force of each. For Providence
is the very divine reason which arranges all
things, and rests with the supreme disposer of
all; while Fate is that ordering which is a
part of all changeable things, and by means of
which Providence binds all things together in
their own order. Providence embraces all
things equally, however different they may be,
even however infinite: when they are assigned
to their own places, forms, and times, Fate sets
them in an orderly motion; so that this
development of the temporal order, unified in
the intelligence of the mind of God, is Providence.
Page 127
The working of this unified development
in time is called Fate. These are
different, but the one hangs upon the other.
For this order, which is ruled by Fate,
emanates from the directness of Providence.
Just as when a craftsman perceives in his mind
the form of the object he would make, he sets
his working power in motion, and brings through
the order of time that which he had seen
directly and ready present to his mind. So by
Providence does God dispose all that is to be
done, each thing by itself and unchangeably;
while these same things which Providence has
arranged are worked out by Fate in many ways
and in time. Whether, therefore, Fate works
by the aid of the divine spirits which serve
Providence, or whether it works by the aid of
the soul, or of all nature, or the motions of the
stars in heaven, or the powers of angels, or the
manifold skill of other spirits, whether the
course of Fate is bound together by any or all
of these, one thing is certain, namely that Providence
is the one unchangeable direct power
which gives form to all things which are to
come to pass, while Fate is the changing bond,
the temporal order of those things which are
arranged to come to pass by the direct disposition
of God. Wherefore everything which is
subject to Fate is also subject to Providence, to
which Fate is itself subject. But there are
things which, though beneath Providence, are
above the course of Fate. Those things are
they which are immovably set nearest the
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primary divinity, and are there beyond the
course of the movement of Fate. As in
the case of spheres moving round the same
axis, that which is nearest the centre approaches
most nearly the simple motion of the centre,
and is itself, as it were, an axis around which
turn those which are set outside it. That
sphere which is outside all turns through a
greater circuit, and fulfils a longer course in
proportion as it is farther from the central axis;
and if it be joined or connect itself with that
centre, it is drawn into the direct motion
thereof, and no longer strays or strives to turn
away. In like manner, that which goes farther
from the primary intelligence, is bound the
more by the ties of Fate, and the nearer it
approaches the axis of all, the more free it is
from Fate. But that which clings without
movement to the firm intellect above, surpasses
altogether the bond of Fate. As, therefore,
reasoning is to understanding; as that which
becomes is to that which is; as time is to
eternity; as the circumference is to the centre:
so is the changing course of Fate to the immovable
directness of Providence. That course of
Fate moves the heavens and the stars, moderates
the first principles in their turns, and alters their
forms by balanced interchangings. The same
course renews all things that are born and
wither away by like advances of offspring and
seed. It constrains, too, the actions and fortunes
of men by an unbreakable chain of causes:
and these causes must be unchangeable, as they
Page 129
proceed from the beginnings of an unchanging
Providence. Thus is the world governed for
the best if a directness, which rests in the
intelligence of God, puts forth an order of
causes which may not swerve. This order
restrains by its own unchangeableness changeable
things, which might otherwise run hither
and thither at random. Wherefore in disposing
the universe this limitation directs all for
good, though to you who are not strong enough
to comprehend the whole order, all seems confusion
and disorder. Naught is there that
comes to pass for the sake of evil, or due to
wicked men, of whom it has been abundantly
shewn that they seek the good, but misleading
error turns them from the right course; for
never does the true order, which comes forth
from the centre of the highest good, turn any
man aside from the right beginning.
'But you will ask, " What more unjust confusion
could exist than that good men should
sometimes enjoy prosperity, sometimes suffer
adversity, and that the bad too should sometimes
receive what they desire, sometimes what
they hate? " Are then men possessed of such
infallible minds that they, whom they consider
honest or dishonest, must necessarily be what
they are held to be? No, in these matters
human judgment is at variance with itself, and
those who are held by some to be worthy of
reward, are by others held worthy of punishment.
But let us grant that a man could
discern between good and bad characters. Can
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he therefore know the inmost feelings of the
soul, as a doctor can learn a body's temperature?
For it is no less a wonder to the ignorant why
sweet things suit one sound body, while bitter
things suit another; or why some sick people
are aided by gentle draughts, others by sharp
and bitter ones. But a doctor does not wonder
at such things, for he knows the ways and
constitutions of health and sickness. And
what is the health of the soul but virtue? and
what the sickness, but vice? And who is the
preserver of the good and banisher of the evil,
who but God, the guardian and healer of
minds? God looks forth from the high watch-
tower of His Providence, He sees what suits
each man, and applies to him that which suits
him. Hence then comes that conspicuous cause
of wonder in the order of Fate, when a wise
man does that which amazes the ignorant.
For, to glance at the depth of God's works
with so few words as human reason is capable
of comprehending, I say that what you think to
be most fair and most conducive to justice's
preservation, that appears different to an all-seeing
Providence. Has not our fellow-philosopher
Lucan told us how " the conquering cause did
please the gods, but the conquered,
Cato?"62
What then surprises you when done on this
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earth, is the true-guided order of things; it is
your opinion which is perverted and confused.
But if there is any one whose life is so good
that divine and human estimates of him agree,
yet he must be uncertain in the strength of his
mind; if any adversity befall him, it may
always be that he will cease to preserve his
innocence, by which he found that he could
not preserve his good fortune. Thus then a
wise dispensation spares a man who might be
made worse by adversity, lest he should suffer
when it is not good for him to be oppressed.
Another may be perfected in all virtues, wholly
conscientious, and very near to God: Providence
holds that it is not right such an one
should receive any adversity, so that it allows
him to be troubled not even by bodily diseases.
As a better man 63
than I has said, " The powers
of virtues build up the body of a good man."
It often happens that the duty of a supreme
authority is assigned to good men for the
purpose of pruning the insolent growth of
wickedness. To some, Providence grants a
mingled store of good and bad, according to the
nature of their minds. Some she treats bitterly,
lest they grow too exuberant with long
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continued good fortune; others she allows to
be harassed by hardships that the virtues of
their minds should be strengthened by the
habit and exercise of patience. Some have
too great a fear of sufferings which they can
bear; others have too great contempt for those
which they cannot bear: these she leads on by
troubles to make trial of themselves. Some
have brought a name to be honoured for all
time at the price of a glorious death. Some
by shewing themselves undefeated by punishment,
have left a proof to others that virtue
may be invincible by evil. What doubt can
there be of how rightly such things are disposed,
and that they are for the good of those whom
we see them befall? The other point too
arises from like causes, that sometimes sorrows,
sometimes the fulfilment of their desires, falls to
the wicked. As concerns the sorrows, no one
is surprised, because all agree that they deserve
ill. Their punishments serve both to deter
others from crime by fear, and also to amend
the lives of those who undergo them; their
happiness, on the other hand, serves as a proof
to good men of how they should regard good
fortune of this nature, which they see often
attends upon the dishonest. And another
thing seems to me to be well arranged: the
nature of a man may be so headstrong and
rough that lack of wealth may stir him to
crime more readily than restrain him; for the
disease of such an one Providence prescribes a
remedy of stores of patrimony: he may see
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that his conscience is befouled by sin, he may
take account with himself of his fortune, and
will perhaps fear lest the loss of this property,
of which he enjoys the use, may bring
unhappiness. Wherefore he will change his
ways, and leave off from ill-doing so long as
he fears the loss of his fortune. Again, good
fortune, unworthily improved, has flung some
into ruin. To some the right of punishing is
committed that they may use it for the exercise
and trial of the good, and the punishment of
evil men. And just as there is no league
between good and bad men, so also the bad
cannot either agree among themselves: nay,
with their vices tearing their own consciences
asunder, they cannot agree with themselves, and
do often perform acts which, when done, they
perceive that they should not have done.
Wherefore high Providence has thus often
shewn her strange wonder, namely, that bad
men should make other bad men good. For
some find themselves suffering injustice at the
hands of evil men, and, burning with hatred
of those who have injured them, they have
returned to cultivate the fruits of virtue,
because their aim is to be unlike those whom
they hate. To divine power, and to that
alone, are evil things good, when it uses them
suitably so as to draw good results therefrom.
For a definite order embraces all things, so
that even when some subject leaves the true
place assigned to it in the order, it returns to
an order, though another, it may be, lest aught
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in the realm of Providence be left to random
chance. But "hard is it for me to set forth
all these matters as a god,"64
nor is it right for
a man to try to comprehend with his mind all
the means of divine working, or to explain
them in words. Let it be enough that we
have seen that God, the Creator of all nature,
directs and disposes all things for good. And
while He urges all, that He has made manifest,
to keep His own likeness, He drives out by the
course of Fate all evil from the bounds of His
state. Wherefore if you look to the disposition
of Providence, you will reckon naught as bad
of all the evils which are held to abound upon
earth.
'But I see that now you are weighed down
by the burden of the question, and wearied by
the length of our reasoning, and waiting for the
gentleness of song. Take then your draught,
be refreshed thereby and advance further the
stronger.
'If thou wouldst diligently behold with unsullied
mind the laws of the God of thunder
upon high, look to the highest point of heaven
above. There, by a fair and equal compact, do
the stars keep their ancient peace. The sun is
hurried on by its whirl of fire, but impedes not
the moon's cool orb. The Bear turns its
rushing course around the highest pole of the
universe, and dips not in the western depths,
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and though it sees the other constellations sink,
it never seeks to quench its flames in the ocean
stream. In just divisions of time does the
evening star foretell the coming of the late
shadows, and, as Lucifer, brings back again the
warming light of day. Thus does the interchanging
bond of love bring round their neverfailing
courses; and strife is for ever an exile
from the starry realms. This unity rules by
fair limits the elements, so that wet yields to
dry, its opposite, and it faithfully joins cold to
heat. Floating fire rises up on high, and matter
by its weight sinks down. From these same
causes in warm spring the flowering season
breathes its scents; then the hot summer dries
the grain; then with its burden of fruits comes
autumn again, and winter's falling rain gives
moisture. This mingling of seasons nourishes
and brings forth all on earth that has the breath
of life; and again snatches them away and
hides them, whelming in death all that has arisen.
Meanwhile the Creator sits on high, rules all
and guides, king and Lord, fount and source
of all, Law itself and wise judge of justice.
He restrains all that stirs nature to motion,
holds it back, and makes firm all that would
stray. If He were not to recall them to their
true paths, and set them again upon the circles
of their courses, they would be torn from their
source and so would perish. This is the
common bond of love; all seek thus to be
restrained by the limit of the good. In no
other manner can they endure if this bond of
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love be not turned round again, and if the
causes, which He has set, return not again.
'Do you see now,' she continued, 'what
follows upon all that we have said? '
'What is it?' I asked.
'That all fortune is plainly good,' she
answered.
'How can that be?' said I.
'Consider this,' she said: 'all fortune, whether
pleasant or difficult, is due to this cause; it is
for the sake of rewarding the good or exercising
their virtue, and of punishing and correcting
bad men: therefore it is plain that all this
fortune which is allowed to be just or expedient,
must be good.'
'Yes,' I said, 'that is a true argument, and
when I think of the Providence or Fate about
which you have taught me, the conclusion
rests upon strong foundations. But if it please
you, let us count it among those conclusions
which you a little while ago set down as inconceivable.'
'Why?' she asked.
'Because it is a commonplace saying among
men -- indeed an especially frequent one -- that
some people have bad fortune.'
'Would you then have us approach more
nearly the common conversation of men, lest
we should seem to withdraw too far from human
ways?'
'If you will,' I said.
Page 137
'Do you not think that that, which is advantageous,
is good?'
'Yes.'
'And that fortune, which exercises or corrects,
is advantageous? '
'I agree,' said I.
'Then it is good, is it not? '
'It must be so.'
'This is the fortune of those who are either
firmly set in virtue and struggling against their
difficulties, or of those who would leave their
vices and take the path of virtue? '
'That is true,' I said.
'But what of that pleasant fortune which is
granted as a reward to good men? Do most
people perceive that it is bad? No; but, as is
true, they esteem it the best. And what of
the last kind of fortune, which is hard and
which restrains bad men by just punishment?
Is that commonly held to be good? '
'No,' said I, 'it is held to be the most
miserable of all that can be imagined.'
'Beware lest in following the common conception,
we come to some truly inconceivable
conclusion.'
'What do you mean? '
'From what we have allowed,' she said, 'it
results that the fortune of those who are in
possession of virtue, or are gaining it, or advancing
therein, is entirely good, whatever it be,
while for those who remain in wickedness, their
fortune is the worst.'
'That is true, but who would dare confess it? '
Page 138
'For this reason a wise man should never
complain, whenever he is brought into strife
with fortune; just as a brave man cannot
properly be disgusted whenever the noise of
battle is heard, since for both of them their very
difficulty is their opportunity, for the brave
man of increasing his glory, for the wise man
of confirming and strengthening his wisdom.
From this is virtue itself so named,65
because it
is so supported by its strength that it is not
overcome by adversity. And you who were
set in the advance of virtue have not come to
this pass of being dissipated by delights, or
enervated by pleasure; but you fight too
bitterly against all fortune. Keep the middle
path of strength and virtue, lest you be overwhelmed
by misfortune or corrupted by pleasant
fortune. All that falls short or goes too far
ahead, has contempt for happiness, and gains
not the reward for labour done. It rests in
your own hands what shall be the nature of the
fortune which you choose to form for yourself.
For all fortune which seems difficult, either
exercises virtue, or corrects or punishes vice.
'The avenging son of Atreus strove for full
ten years before he expiated in the fall of
Phrygian Troy the wrong done to his brother's
marriage. The same Agamemnon must needs
throw off his father's nature, and himself, an
unwilling priest, thrust his knife into his unhappy
Page 139
daughter's throat, and buy the winds at
the cost of blood, when he sought to fill the
sails of the fleet of Greece. The King of
Ithaca wept sore for his lost comrades whom the
savage Polyphemus swallowed into his huge
maw as he lay in his vast cave; but, when
mad for his blinded eye, he paid back with
rejoicings for the sad tears he had drawn.
Hercules became famous through hard labours.
He tamed the haughty Centaurs, and from the
fierce lion of Nemea took his spoil. With his
sure arrows he smote the birds of Stymphalus;
and from the watchful dragon took the apples
of the Hesperides, filling his hand with their
precious gold; and Cerberus he dragged along
with threefold chain. The story tells how he
conquered the fierce Diomede and set before
his savage mares their master as their food.
The Hydra's poison perished in his fire. He
took the horn and so disgraced the brow of the
river Achelous, who hid below his bank his
head ashamed. On the sands of Libya he laid
Antæus low; Cacus he slew to sate Evander's
wrath. The bristling boar of Erymanthus
flecked with his own foam the shoulders which
were to bear the height of heaven; for in his
last labour he bore with unbending neck the
heavens, and so won again his place in heaven,
the reward of his last work.
'Go forth then bravely whither leads the lofty
path of high example. Why do ye sluggards
turn your backs? When the earth is overcome,
the stars are yours.
Page 140
BOOK V
HERE she made an end and was for turning the
course of her speaking to the handling and
explaining of other subjects. Then said I:
'Your encouragement is right and most worthy
in truth of your name and weight. But I am
learning by experience what you just now said
of Providence; that the question is bound up
in others. I would ask you whether you think
that Chance exists at all, and what you think
it is?'
Then she answered: 'I am eager to fulfil
my promised debt, and to shew you the path by
which you may seek your home. But these
things, though all-expedient for knowledge, are
none the less rather apart from our path, and we
must be careful lest you become wearied by our
turnings aside, and so be not strong enough to
complete the straight journey.'
'Have no fear at all thereof,' said I. 'It
will be restful to know these things in which
I have so great a pleasure; and when every
view of your reasoning has stood firm with
unshaken credit, so let there be no doubt of
what shall follow.'
'I will do your pleasure,' she made answer,
and thus she began to speak:
Page 141
'If chance is defined as an outcome of
random influence, produced by no sequence
of causes, I am sure that there is no such
thing as chance, and I consider that it is but
an empty word, beyond shewing the meaning
of the matter which we have in hand. For
what place can be left for anything happening
at random, so long as God controls everything
in order? It is a true saying that nothing
can come out of nothing. None of the old
philosophers has denied that, though they did
not apply it to the effective principle, but to
the matter operated upon--that is to say, to
nature; and this was the foundation upon
which they built all their reasoning. If anything
arises from no causes, it will appear to
have risen out of nothing. But if this is
impossible, then chance also cannot be anything
of that sort, which is stated in the definition
which we mentioned.'
'Then is there nothing which can be justly
called chance, nor anything "by chance"? '
I asked. 'Or is there anything which common
people know not, but which those words do
suit? '
'My philosopher, Aristotle, defined it in his
Physics66
shortly and well-nigh truly.'
'How?' I asked.
'Whenever anything is done with one intention,
but something else, other than was
intended, results from certain causes, that is
called chance: as, for instance, if a man digs
Page 142
the ground for the sake of cultivating it, and finds
a heap of buried gold. Such a thing is believed
to have happened by chance, but it does not
come from nothing, for it has its own causes,
whose unforeseen and unexpected coincidence
seem to have brought about a chance. For if
the cultivator did not dig the ground, if the
owner had not buried his money, the gold
would not have been found. These are the
causes of the chance piece of good fortune,
which comes about from the causes which
meet it, and move along with it, not from
the intention of the actor. For neither the
burier nor the tiller intended that the gold
should be found; but, as I said, it was a
coincidence, and it happened that the one dug
up what the other buried. We may therefore
define chance as an unexpected result from the
coincidence of certain causes in matters where
there was another purpose. The order of the
universe, advancing with its inevitable sequences,
brings about this coincidence of causes. This
order itself emanates from its source, which is
Providence, and disposes all things in their
proper time and place.
'In the land where the Parthian, as he
turns in flight, shoots his arrows into the
pursuer's breast, from the rocks of the crag of
Ach‘menia, the Tigris and Euphrates flow from
out one source, but quickly with divided streams
are separate. If they should come together
and again be joined in a single course, all, that
Page 143
the two streams bear along, would flow in one
together. Boats would meet boats, and trees
meet trees torn up by the currents, and the
mingled waters would together entwine their
streams by chance; but their sloping beds
restrain these chances vague, and the downward
order of the falling torrent guides their
courses. Thus does chance, which seems to
rush onward without rein, bear the bit, and
take its way by rule.'
'I have listened to you,' I said,' and agree
that it is as you say. But in this close sequence
of causes, is there any freedom for our judgment
or does this chain of fate bind the very feelings
of our minds too?'
'There is free will,' she answered. 'Nor
could there be any reasoning nature without
freedom of judgment. For any being that
can use its reason by nature, has a power of
judgment by which it can without further aid
decide each point, and so distinguish between
objects to be desired and objects to be shunned.
Each therefore seeks what it deems desirable,
and flies from what it considers should be
shunned. Wherefore all who have reason have
also freedom of desiring and refusing in themselves.
But I do not lay down that this is
equal in all beings. Heavenly and divine
beings have with them a judgment of great
insight, an imperturbable will, and a power
which can effect their desires. But human
Page 144
spirits must be more free when they keep themselves
safe in the contemplation of the mind of
God; but less free when they sink into bodies,
and less still when they are bound by their
earthly members. The last stage is mere
slavery, when the spirit is given over to vices
and has fallen away from the possession of
its reason. For when the mind turns its eyes
from the light of truth on high to lower darkness,
soon they are dimmed by the clouds of
ignorance, and become turbid through ruinous
passions; by yielding to these passions and
consenting to them, men increase the slavery
which they have brought upon themselves, and
their true liberty is lost in captivity. But God,
looking upon all out of the infinite, perceives
the views of Providence, and disposes each as
its destiny has already fated for it according to
its merits: " He looketh over all and heareth
all "67
'Homer with his honeyed lips sang of the
bright sun's clear light; yet the sun cannot
burst with his feeble rays the bowels of the
earth or the depths of the sea. Not so with
the Creator of this great sphere. No masses
of earth can block His vision as He looks over
all. Night's cloudy darkness cannot resist Him.
With one glance of His intelligence He sees
all that has been, that is, and that is to come.
Page 145
He alone can see all things, so truly He may
be called the Sun.' 68
Then said I, 'Again am I plunged in yet
more doubt and difficulty.'
'What are they,' she asked, 'though I
have already my idea of what your trouble
consists?
'There seems to me,' I said, 'to be such
incompatibility between the existence of God's
universal foreknowledge and that of any freedom
of judgment. For if God foresees all things
and cannot in anything be mistaken, that, which
His Providence sees will happen, must result.
Wherefore if it knows beforehand not only
men's deeds but even their designs and wishes,
there will be no freedom of judgment For
there can neither be any deed done, nor wish
formed, except such as the infallible Providence
of God has foreseen. For if matters could ever
so be turned that they resulted otherwise than
was foreseen of Providence, this foreknowledge
would cease to be sure. But, rather than knowledge,
it is opinion which is uncertain; and
that, I deem, is not applicable to God. And,
further, I cannot approve of an argument by
which some men think that they can cut this
knot; for they say that a result does not come
Page 146
to pass for the reason that Providence has foreseen
it, but the opposite rather, namely, that
because it is about to come to pass, therefore
it cannot be hidden from God's Providence.
In that way it seems to me that the argument
must resolve itself into an argument on the
other side. For in that case it is not necessary
that that should happen which is foreseen, but
that that which is about to happen should be
foreseen; as though, indeed, our doubt was
whether God's foreknowledge is the certain
cause of future events, or the certainty of future
events is the cause of Providence. But let our
aim be to prove that, whatever be the shape
which this series of causes takes, the fulfilment
of God's foreknowledge is necessary, even if
this knowledge may not seem to induce the
necessity for the occurrence of future events.
For instance, if a man sits down, it must be
that the opinion, which conjectures that he is
sitting, is true; but conversely, if the opinion
concerning the man is true because he is sitting,
he must be sitting down. There is therefore
necessity in both cases: the man must be
sitting, and the opinion must be true. But he
does not sit because the opinion is true, but
rather the opinion is true because his sitting
down has preceded it. Thus, though the
cause of the truth of the opinion proceeds from
the other fact, yet there is a common necessity
on both parts. In like manner we must reason
of Providence and future events. For even
though they are foreseen because they are about
Page 147
to happen, yet they do not happen because
they are foreseen. None the less it is necessary
that either what is about to happen should
be foreseen of God, or that what has been
foreseen should happen; and this alone is
enough to destroy all free will.
'Yet how absurd it is that we should say that
the result of temporal affairs is the cause of
eternal foreknowledge! And to think that
God foresees future events because they are
about to happen, is nothing else than to hold
events of past time to be the cause of that
highest Providence. Besides, just as, when I
know a present fact, that fact must be so; so
also when I know of something that will
happen, that must come to pass. Thus it
follows that the fulfilment of a foreknown
event must be inevitable.
'Lastly, if any one believes that any matter
is otherwise than the fact is, he not only has
not knowledge, but his opinion is false also, and
that is very far from the truth of knowledge
Wherefore, if any future event is such that its
fulfilment is not sure or necessary, how can it
possibly be known beforehand that it will
occur? For just as absolute knowledge has no
taint of falsity, so also that which is conceived
by knowledge cannot be otherwise than as it is
conceived. That is the reason why knowledge
cannot lie, because each matter must be just as
knowledge knows that it is. What then
How can God know beforehand these uncertain
future events? For if He thinks inevitable the
Page 148
fulfilment of such things as may possibly not
result, He is wrong; and that we may not
believe, nor even utter, rightly. But if He
perceives that they will result as they are in
such a manner that He only knows that they
may or may not occur, equally, how is this
foreknowledge, this which knows nothing for
sure, nothing absolutely? How is such a fore-
knowledge different from the absurd prophecy
which Horace puts in the mouth of Tiresias:
" Whatever I shall say, will either come to
pass, or it will not "? 69
How, too, would God's
Providence be better than man's opinion, if, as
men do, He only sees to be uncertain such
things as have an uncertain result? But if
there can be no uncertainty with God, the most
sure source of all things, then the fulfilment of
all that He has surely foreknown, is certain.
Thus we are led to see that there is no freedom
for the intentions or actions of men; for
the mind of God, foreseeing all things without
error or deception, binds all together and controls
their results. And when we have once
allowed this, it is plain how complete is the
fall of all human actions in consequence. In
vain are rewards or punishments set before
good or bad, for there is no free or voluntary
action of the mind to deserve them and what
we just now determined was most fair, will
prove to be most unfair of all, namely to punish
the dishonest or reward the honest, since their
own will does not put them in the way of
Page 149
honesty or dishonesty, but the unfailing necessity
of development constrains them. Wherefore
neither virtues nor vices are anything, but
there is rather an indiscriminate confusion of
all deserts. And nothing could be more
vicious than this; since the whole order of all
comes from Providence, and nothing is left to
human intention, it follows that our crimes, as
well as our good deeds, must all be held due to
the author of all good. Hence it is unreasonable
to hope for or pray against aught. For
what could any man hope for or pray against,
if an undeviating chain links together all that
we can desire? Thus will the only understanding
between God and man, the right of
prayer, be taken away. We suppose that at the
price of our deservedly humbling ourselves
before Him we may win a right to the inestimable
reward of His divine grace: this is the
only manner in which men can seem to deal
with God, so to speak, and by virtue of prayer
to join ourselves to that inaccessible light,
before it is granted to us; but if we allow the
inevitability of the future, and believe that we
have no power, what means shall we have to
join ourselves to the Lord of all, or how can
we cling to Him? Wherefore, as you sang
but a little while ago,70
the human race must be
cut off from its source and ever fall away.
'What cause of discord is it breaks the
Page 150
bonds of agreement here? What heavenly
power has set such strife between two truths?
Thus, though apart each brings no doubt, yet
can they not be linked together. Comes there
no discord between these truths? Stand they
for ever sure by one another? Yes, 'tis the
mind, o'erwhelmed by the body's blindness,
which cannot see by the light of that dimmed
brightness the finest threads that bind the truth.
But wherefore burns the spirit with so strong
desire to learn the hidden signs of truth?
Knows it the very object of its careful search?
Then why seeks it to learn anew what it
already knows? If it knows it not, why
searches it in blindness? For who would
desire aught unwitting? Or who could seek
after that which is unknown? How should he
find it, or recognise its form when found, if
he knows it not? And when the mind of man
perceived the mind of God, did it then know
the whole and parts alike? Now is the mind
buried in the cloudy darkness of the body, yet
has not altogether forgotten its own self, and
keeps the whole though it has lost the parts.
Whosoever, therefore, seeks the truth, is not
wholly in ignorance, nor yet has knowledge
wholly; for he knows not all, yet is not
ignorant of all. He takes thought for the
whole which he keeps in memory, handling
again what he saw on high, so that he may add
to that which he has kept, that which he has
forgotten.'
Page 151
Then said she, 'This is the old plaint concerning
Providence which was so strongly urged Philosophy
by Cicero when treating of Divination,71
and you yourself have often and at length questioned
the same subject. But so far, none of you have
explained it with enough diligence or certainty.
The cause of this obscurity is that the working
of human reason cannot approach the directness
of divine foreknowledge. If this could be
understood at all, there would be no doubt left.
And this especially will I try to make plain, if
I can first explain your difficulties.
'Tell me why you think abortive the reasoning
of those who solve the question thus; they
argue that foreknowledge cannot be held to be
a cause for the necessity of future results, and
therefore free will is not in any way shackled
by foreknowledge.72
Whence do you draw your
proof of the necessity of future results if not
from the fact that such things as are known
beforehand cannot but come to pass? If, then
(as you yourself admitted just now), foreknowledge
brings no necessity to bear upon
future events, how is it that the voluntary results
of such events are bound to find a fixed end?
Now for the sake of the argument, that you may
turn your attention to what follows, let us state
that there is no foreknowledge at all. Then
are the events which are decided by free will,
bound by any necessity, so far as this goes?
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Of course not. Secondly, let us state that
foreknowledge exists, but brings no necessity to
bear upon events; then, I think, the same free
will will be left, intact and absolute. " But,"
you will say, " though foreknowledge is no
necessity for a result in the future, yet it is a
sign that it will necessarily come to pass."
Thus, therefore, even if there had been no
foreknowledge, it would be plain that future
results were under necessity; for every sign can
only shew what it is that it points out; it does
not bring it to pass. Wherefore we must first
prove that nothing happens but of necessity, in
order that it may be plain that foreknowledge
is a sign of this necessity. Otherwise, if there
is no necessity, then foreknowledge will not be
a sign of that which does not exist. Now it is
allowed that proof rests upon firm reasoning,
not upon signs or external arguments; it must
be deduced from suitable and binding causes.
How can it possibly be that things, which are
foreseen as about to happen, should not occur?
That would be as though we were to believe
that events would not occur which Providence
foreknows as about to occur, and as though we
did not rather think this, that though they
occur, yet they have had no necessity in their
own natures which brought them about. We
can see many actions developing before our
eyes; just as chariot drivers see the development
of their actions as they control and guide
their chariots, and many other things likewise.
Does any necessity compel any of those things
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to occur as they do? Of course not. All art,
craft, and intention would be in vain, if everything
took place by compulsion. Therefore, if
things have no necessity for coming to pass
when they do, they cannot have any necessity
to be about to come to pass before they do.
Wherefore there are things whose results are
entirely free from necessity. For I think not
that there is any man who will say this, that
things, which are done in the present, were not
about to be done in the past, before they are
done. Thus these foreknown events have their
free results. Just as foreknowledge of present
things brings no necessity to bear upon them as
they come to pass, so also foreknowledge of
future things brings no necessity to bear upon
things which are to come.
'But you will say that there is no doubt
of this too, whether there can be any foreknowledge
of things which have not results
bounden by necessity. For they do seem to
lack harmony: and you think that if they are
foreseen, the necessity follows; if there is no
necessity, then they cannot be foreseen; nothing
can be perceived certainly by knowledge, unless
it be certain. But if things have uncertainty of
result, but are foreseen as though certain, this is
plainly the obscurity of opinion, and not the
truth of knowledge. For you believe that to
think aught other than it is, is the opposite of
true knowledge. The cause of this error is
that every man believes that all the subjects,
that he knows, are known by their own force or
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nature alone, which are known; but it is quite
the opposite. For every subject, that is known,
is comprehended not according to its own force,
but rather according to the nature of those who
know it. Let me make this plain to you by a
brief example: the roundness of a body may be
known in one way by sight, in another way by
touch. Sight can take in the whole body at
once from a distance by judging its radii,
while touch clings, as it were, to the outside of
the sphere, and from close at hand perceives
through the material parts the roundness of the
body as it passes over the actual circumference.
A man himself is differently comprehended by
the senses, by imagination, by reason, and by
intelligence. For the senses distinguish the
form as set in the matter operated upon by the
form; imagination distinguishes the appearance
alone without the matter. Reason goes even
further than imagination; by a general and
universal contemplation it investigates the
actual kind which is represented in individual
specimens. Higher still is the view of the
intelligence, which reaches above the sphere
of the universal, and with the unsullied eye of
the mind gazes upon that very form of the kind
in its absolute simplicity. Herein the chief
point for our consideration is this: the higher
power of understanding includes the lower, but
the lower never rises to the higher. For the
senses are capable of understanding naught but the
matter; imagination cannot look upon universal
or natural kinds; reason cannot comprehend
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the absolute form; whereas the intelligence
seems to look down from above and comprehend
the form, and distinguishes all that lie below,
but in such a way that it grasps the very form
which could not be known to any other than
itself. For it perceives and knows the general
kind, as does reason; the appearance, as does
the imagination; and the matter, as do the
senses, but with one grasp of the mind it looks
upon all with a clear conception of the whole.
And reason too, as it views general kinds, does
not make use of the imagination nor the senses,
but yet does perceive the objects both of the
imagination and of the senses. It is reason
which thus defines a general kind according to
its conception: Man, for instance, is an animal,
biped and reasoning. This is a general notion
of a natural kind, but no man denies that the
subject can be approached by the imagination
and by the senses, just because reason investigates
it by a reasonable conception and not by the
imagination or senses. Likewise, though imagination
takes its beginning of seeing and forming
appearances from the senses, yet without their
aid it surveys each subject by an imaginative
faculty of distinguishing, not by the distinguishing
faculty of the senses.
'Do you see then, how in knowledge of all
things, the subject uses its own standard of
capability, and not those of the objects known?
And this is but reasonable, for every judgment
formed is an act of the person who judges, and
therefore each man must of necessity perform
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his own action from his own capability and not
the capability of any other.
'In days of old the Porch at Athens 73
gave
us men, seeing dimly as in old age, who could
believe that the feelings of the senses and the
imagination were but impressions on the mind
from bodies without them, just as the old
custom was to impress with swift-running pens
letters upon the surface of a waxen tablet which
bore no marks before. But if the mind with
its own force can bring forth naught by its own
exertions; if it does but lie passive and subject
to the marks of other bodies; if it reflects, as
does, forsooth, a mirror, the vain reflections of
other things; whence thrives there in the soul
an all-seeing power of knowledge? What is
the force that sees the single parts, or which
distinguishes the facts it knows? What is the
force that gathers up the parts it has distinguished,
that takes its course in order due,
now rises to mingle with the things on high,
and now sinks down among the things below,
and then to itself brings back itself, and, so
examining, refutes the false with truth? This
is a cause of greater power, of more effective
force by far than that which only receives the
impressions of material bodies. Yet does the
passive reception come first, rousing and stirring
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all the strength of the mind in the living body
When the eyes are smitten with a light, or the
ears are struck with a voice's sound, then is
the spirit's energy aroused, and, thus moved,
calls upon like forms, such as it holds within
itself, fits them to signs without and mingles the
forms of its imagination with those which it has
stored within.
'With regard to feeling the effects of bodies,
natures which are brought into contact from
without may affect the organs of the senses,
and the body's passive affection may precede
the active energy of the spirit, and call forth
to itself the activity of the mind; if then, when
the effects of bodies are felt, the mind is not
marked in any way by its passive reception
thereof, but declares that reception subject to
the body of its own force, how much less do
those subjects, which are free from all affections
of bodies, follow external objects in their
perceptions, and how much more do they make
clear the way for the action of their mind?
By this argument many different manners of
understanding have fallen to widely different
natures of things. For the senses are incapable
of any knowledge but their own, and they alone
fall to those living beings which are incapable
of motion, as are sea shell-fish, and other low
forms of life which live by clinging to rocks;
while imagination is granted to animals with the
power of motion, who seem to be affected by
some desire to seek or avoid certain things.
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But reason belongs to the human race alone,
just as the true intelligence is God's alone.
Wherefore that manner of knowledge is better
than others, for it can comprehend of its own
nature not only the subject peculiar to itself,
but also the subjects of the other kinds of
knowledge. Suppose that the senses and
imagination thus oppose reasoning, saying, " The
universal natural kinds, which reason believes
that it can perceive, are nothing; for what is
comprehensible to the senses and the imagina-
tion cannot be universal: therefore either the
judgment of reason is true, and that which can
be perceived by the senses is nothing or, since
reason knows well that there are many subjects
comprehensible to the senses and imagina-
tion, the conception of reason is vain, for it
holds to be universal what is an individual
matter comprehensible to the senses." To this
reason might answer, that " it sees from a
general point of view what is comprehensible
to the senses and the imagination, but they
cannot aspire to a knowledge of universals,
since their manner of knowledge cannot go
further than material or bodily appearances;
and in the matter of knowledge it is better to
trust to the stronger and more nearly perfect
judgment." If such a trial of argument
occurred, should not we, who have within us
the force of reasoning as well as the powers of
the senses and imagination, approve of the cause
of reason rather than that of the others? It
is in like manner that human reason thinks that
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the divine intelligence cannot perceive the
things of the future except as it conceives them
itself. For you argue thus: " If there are
events which do not appear to have sure or
necessary results, their results cannot be known
for certain beforehand: therefore there can be
no foreknowledge of these events; for if we
believe that there is any foreknowledge thereof,
there can exist nothing but such as is brought
forth of necessity." If therefore we, who have
our share in possession of reason, could go
further and possess the judgment of the mind
of God, we should then think it most just that
human reason should yield itself to the mind of
God, just as we have determined that the
senses and imagination ought to yield to
reason.
'Let us therefore raise ourselves, if so be that
we can, to that height of the loftiest intelligence.
For there reason will see what it cannot of
itself perceive, and that is to know how even
such things as have uncertain results are perceived
definitely and for certain by foreknowledge;
and such foreknowledge will not be
mere opinion, but rather the single and direct
form of the highest knowledge unlimited by any
finite bounds.
'In what different shapes do living beings
move upon the earth! Some make flat their
bodies, sweeping through the dust and using
their strength to make therein a furrow without
break; some flit here and there upon light wings
Page 160
which beat the breeze, and they float through
vast tracks of air in their easy flight. 'Tis
others' wont to plant their footsteps on the
ground, and pass with their paces over green
fields or under trees. Though all these thou
seest move in different shapes, yet all have
their faces downward along the ground, and
this doth draw downward and dull their senses.
Alone of all, the human race lifts up its head
on high, and stands in easy balance with the
body upright, and so looks down to spurn the
earth. If thou art not too earthly by an evil
folly, this pose is as a lesson. Thy glance is
upward, and thou dost carry high thy head,
and thus thy search is heavenward: then lead
thy soul too upward, lest while the body is
higher raised, the mind sink lower to the
earth.
'Since then all that is known is apprehended,
as we just now shewed, not according to its
nature but according to the nature of the
knower, let us examine, so far as we lawfully
may, the character of the divine nature, so that
we may be able to learn what its knowledge is.
'The common opinion, according to all men
living, is that God is eternal. Let us therefore
consider what is eternity. For eternity will, I
think, make clear to us at the same time the
divine nature and knowledge.
'Eternity is the simultaneous and complete
possession of infinite life. This will appear
more clearly if we compare it with temporal
Page 161
things. All that lives under the conditions of
time moves through the present from the past
to the future; there is nothing set in time
which can at one moment grasp the whole
space of its lifetime. It cannot yet comprehend
to-morrow; yesterday it has already
lost. And in this life of to-day your life is no
more than a changing, passing moment. And
as Aristotle74
said of the universe, so it is of all
that is subject to time; though it never began
to be, nor will ever cease, and its life is co-
extensive with the infinity of time, yet it is not
such as can be held to be eternal. For though
it apprehends and grasps a space of infinite lifetime,
it does not embrace the whole simultaneously;
it has not yet experienced the future.
What we should rightly call eternal is that
which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously
the fulness of unending life, which
lacks naught of the future, and has lost naught
of the fleeting past; and such an existence
must be ever present in itself to control and aid
itself, and also must keep present with itself the
infinity of changing time. Therefore, people
who hear that Plato thought that this universe
had no beginning of time and will have no end,
are not right in thinking that in this way the
created world is co-eternal with its
creator75
Page 162
For to pass through unending life, the attribute
which Plato ascribes to the universe is one
thing; but it is another thing to grasp simultaneously
the whole of unending life in the
present; this is plainly a peculiar property of
the mind of God.
'And further, God should not be regarded
as older than His creations by any period of
time, but rather by the peculiar property of His
own single nature. For the infinite changing
of temporal things tries to imitate the ever
simultaneously present immutability of His life:
it cannot succeed in imitating or equalling this,
but sinks from immutability into change, and
falls from the single directness of the present
into an infinite space of future and past. And
since this temporal state cannot possess its life
completely and simultaneously, but it does in
the same manner exist for ever without ceasing,
it therefore seems to try in some degree to rival
that which it cannot fulfil or represent, for it
binds itself to some sort of present time out of
this small and fleeting moment; but inasmuch
as this temporal present bears a certain appearance
of that abiding present, it somehow makes
Page 163
those, to whom it comes, seem to be in truth
what they imitate. But since this imitation
could not be abiding, the unending march of
time has swept it away, and thus we find that it
has bound together, as it passes, a chain of life,
which it could not by abiding embrace in its
fulness. And thus if we would apply proper
epithets to those subjects, we can say, following
Plato, that God is eternal, but the universe is
continual.
'Since then all judgment apprehends the
subjects of its thought according to its own
nature, and God has a condition of ever-present
eternity, His knowledge, which passes over
every change of time, embracing infinite lengths
of past and future, views in its own direct
comprehension everything as though it were
taking place in the present. If you would
weigh the foreknowledge by which God distinguishes
all things, you will more rightly hold
it to be a knowledge of a never-failing constancy
in the present, than a foreknowledge of the
future. Whence Providence is more rightly to
be understood as a looking forth than a looking
forward, because it is set far from low matters
and looks forth upon all things as from a lofty
mountain-top above all. Why then do you demand
that all things occur by necessity, if divine
light rests upon them, while men do not render
necessary such things as they can see? Because
you can see things of the present, does your
sight therefore put upon them any necessity?
Page 164
Surely not. If one may not unworthily compare
this present time with the divine, just as
you can see things in this your temporal present,
so God sees all things in His eternal present.
Wherefore this divine foreknowledge does not
change the nature or individual qualities of things:
it sees things present in its understanding just as
they will result some time in the future. It
makes no confusion in its distinctions, and with
one view of its mind it discerns all that shall
come to pass whether of necessity or not. For
instance, when you see at the same time a man
walking on the earth and the sun rising in the
heavens, you see each sight simultaneously, yet
you distinguish between them, and decide that
one is moving voluntarily, the other of necessity.
In like manner the perception of God looks
down upon all things without disturbing at all
their nature, though they are present to Him
but future under the conditions of time. Wherefore
this foreknowledge is not opinion but
knowledge resting upon truth, since He knows
that a future event is, though He knows too
that it will not occur of necessity. If you
answer here that what God sees about to
happen, cannot but happen, and that what
cannot but happen is bound by necessity, you
fasten me down to the word necessity, I will
grant that we have a matter of most firm truth,
but it is one to which scarce any man can
approach unless he be a contemplator of the
divine. For I shall answer that such a thing
Page 165
will occur of necessity, when it is viewed from
the point of divine knowledge; but when it is
examined in its own nature, it seems perfectly
free and unrestrained. For there are two kinds
of necessities; one is simple: for instance, a
necessary fact, "all men are mortal "; the other
is conditional; for instance, if you know that a
man is walking, he must be walking: for what
each man knows cannot be otherwise than it is
known to be; but the conditional one is by no
means followed by this simple and direct
necessity; for there is no necessity to compel
a voluntary walker to proceed, though it is
necessary that, if he walks, he should be proceeding.
In the same way, if Providence sees
an event in its present, that thing must be,
though it has no necessity of its own nature.
And God looks in His present upon those
future things which come to pass through free
will. Therefore if these things be looked at
from the point of view of God's insight, they
come to pass of necessity under the condition of
divine knowledge; if, on the other hand, they
are viewed by themselves, they do not lose
the perfect freedom of their nature. Without
doubt, then, all things that God foreknows do
come to pass, but some of them proceed from
free will; and though they result by coming
into existence, yet they do not lose their own
nature, because before they came to pass they
could also not have come to pass.
'"What then," you may ask, " is the difference
Page 166
in their not being bound by necessity,
since they result under all circumstances as by
necessity, on account of the condition of divine
knowledge? " This is the difference, as I just
now put forward: take the sun rising and a man
walking; while these operations are occurring,
they cannot but occur: but the one was bound
to occur before it did; the other was not so
bound. What God has in His present, does
exist without doubt; but of such things some
follow by necessity, others by their authors'
wills. Wherefore I was justified in saying
that if these things be regarded from the view
of divine knowledge, they are necessary, but
if they are viewed by themselves, they are
perfectly free from all ties of necessity: just
as when you refer all, that is clear to the
senses, to the reason, it becomes general truth,
but it remains particular if regarded by itself.
" But," you will say, " if it is in my power to
change a purpose of mine, I will disregard
Providence, since I may change what Providence
foresees." To which I answer, " You can
change your purpose, but since the truth of
Providence knows in its present that you can
do so, and whether you do so, and in what
direction you may change it, therefore you
cannot escape that divine foreknowledge: just
as you cannot avoid the glance of a present eye,
though you may by your free will turn yourself
to all kinds of different actions." "What? "
you will say, " can I by my own action change
Page 167
divine knowledge, so that if I choose now one
thing, now another, Providence too will seem
to change its knowledge?" No; divine insight
precedes all future things, turning them
back and recalling them to the present time
of its own peculiar knowledge. It does not
change, as you may think, between this and
that alternation of foreknowledge. It is constant
in preceding and embracing by one
glance all your changes. And God does not
receive this ever-present grasp of all things and
vision of the present at the occurrence of future
events, but from His own peculiar directness.
Whence also is that difficulty solved which you
laid down a little while ago, that it was not
worthy to say that our future events were the
cause of God's knowledge. For this power of
knowledge, ever in the present and embracing
all things in its perception, does itself constrain
all things, and owes naught to following events
from which it has received naught. Thus,
therefore, mortal men have their freedom of
judgment intact. And since their wills are
freed from all binding necessity, laws do not
set rewards or punishments unjustly. God is
ever the constant foreknowing overseer, and
the ever-present eternity of His sight moves in
harmony with the future nature of our actions,
as it dispenses rewards to the good, and punishments
to the bad. Hopes are not vainly put in
God, nor prayers in vain offered: if these are
right, they cannot but be answered. Turn
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therefore from vice: ensue virtue: raise your
soul to upright hopes: send up on high your
prayers from this earth. If you would be
honest, great is the necessity enjoined upon
your goodness, since all you do is done before
the eyes of an all-seeing Judge.'
Boethius:
Consolation of Philosophy